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ABSTRACT 
Public-private partnership (P3) procurement has grown into an 
internationally acclaimed means of achieving value for money while procuring 
public infrastructure projects. Unlike conventional infrastructure procurement 
models, P3s transfer a considerable amount of project risk away from the public 
sector to the private sector. During a long, methodical procurement phase, public 
and private partners reach a final risk allocation agreement over forecasted risks 
regarding a project’s potential design, build, finance, operation, and maintenance.  
This thesis begins with exploring the P3 procurement phase, highlighting 
relevant project actors and stages leading up to the signing of a final contract. The 
concepts of risk and project risk management are studied under the assumption that 
P3 project partners operate under a principal-agent relationship, where public 
authorities are tasked with aligning private partner motivations with their own 
motivations through contractual incentives.  
A core literature database provides 54 identified P3 project risks along with 
their suggested sectorial allocations. Exactly half – 27 – of these risks are deemed 
contentious because they are not unanimously allocated to a given sector within 
the database. These 27 contentious P3 project risks were subjected to an expert 
questionnaire asking Canadian practitioners to allocate them to a preferred sector 
based on a five-point semantic differential scale. The respondent pool was equally 
comprised of public and private sector practitioners from an array of specialized 
occupations relevant to P3 project risk management.  
Expert input was subjected to various quantitative methods that measured: 
(i) levels of agreement within sectors over risk allocation preferences, (ii) levels of 
agreement between sectors over risk allocation preferences, and (iii) overall risk 
allocation preferences based on the five-point semantic differential scale. It is 
found that: (i) both sectors enjoy strong levels of agreement over risk allocation 
preferences, (ii) 6 of 27 risks show statistically significant levels of disagreement 
between sectors over their allocation preferences, and (iii) there are risks that 
should generally be borne by either the public or private sector pending individual 
P3 project circumstances. 
The research findings should enable scholars and practitioners alike to 
establish more concrete conceptions of where P3 project risks should generally be 
allocated pending circumstantial conditions unique to different P3 projects. Where 
risks cannot be broadly allocated due to circumstantial conditions, a review of the 
study’s final risk allocation model provides contextual considerations that 
influence their allocation. Concluding sections acknowledge this study’s 
methodological and theoretical limitations. Recommendations for future studies to 
consider, both methodological and theoretical, are provided.  
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CHAPTER 1 
A NATIONAL CONTEXT FOR P3s 
1.1 Introduction 
Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) are rapidly emerging as a predominant form of 
public infrastructure procurement in Canada in lieu of conventional methods due to their 
capacity for accessing alternative financing sources and transferring multiple project risks 
away from the public sector. The emergence of P3s in Canada originates from the public 
sector’s “new public management” (NPM) approach to governance in response to 
globalization pressures and increasing levels of both infrastructural necessities and public 
debt.1 Under NPM, P3s are used to procure public infrastructure more efficiently by 
drawing private actor investment and involvement into the public sphere.   
On an international level, governments are globally embracing P3s as a means to 
procure new infrastructure – and services – to address an “infrastructure deficit.”2 The 
European Union (EU), World Bank, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have all developed regulations, guidelines, and promotional 
campaigns for the global use of P3s,3 while the European Commission (EC) publicly 
																																								 																				
1 Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in 
Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007).; Biljana Rakić 
and Tamara Rađenović, “Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of New Public 
Management,” Facta Universitatis-Series: Economics and Organization 8, no. 2 (2011): 207–20, 
http://scindeks.ceon.rs/article.aspx?artid=0354-46991102207R. 
2 Anthony E Boardman, Matti Siemiatycki, and Aidan R Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in 
Canada and Elsewhere” 9, no. 12 (2016), 1.; Eoin Reeves, “Public—Private Partnerships in 
Ireland: Policy and Practice,” Public Money & Management 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 163, 
doi:10.1111/1467-9302.00364.; Geethanjali Nataraj, Infrastructure Challenges in South Asia: The 
Role of Public-Private Partnerships, ADB Institute Discussion Papers, vol. 80, 2007, 5. 
http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2007/09/27/2364.infrastructure.challenges.south.asia/. 
3 European Commission, “Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships,” DG Regional 
Policy Http://ec. Europa. Eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/ppp_en. Pdf (Brussels: 
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termed the “Investment Plan for Europe” – a monolithic investment program premised on 
procuring public infrastructure through large-scale financing from the private sector4 – its 
number one initiative in the EC’s new “roadmap for getting Europe back to work, based 
on clear priorities… to boost [its] economy.”5 In North America alone, cumulative P3 
investments reached over 200 billion dollars in either planned or realized monies by 
2010.6 In the United States, the Obama administration heavily considered policies to 
attract private financing and investment of large infrastructure projects.7 
North of the American border, Canadian governments have embraced P3s even 
more than their neighbouring state; scholars note that “there has been much more P3 
activity in Canada than in the USA.”8 The 2011 Canadian federal budget introduced 
measures to ensure the national use of P3 projects increased, making it mandatory for 
government departments and agencies to assess and evaluate the feasibility of procuring 
large pieces of public infrastructure – or megaprojects – through P3 contracts: 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
European Union, 2003); Banco Asiático de Desarrollo, Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento, and 
others, “Public Private Partnerships Reference Guide Version 2.0” (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2014); OECD, “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Public Governance of 
Public-Private Partnerships,” Oecd (Paris: OECD, 2012), 
https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/PPP-Recommendation.pdf. 
4 European Commission, “European Commission Investment Plan,” 2015, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0012&from=EN. 
5 European Commission, “A New Start: European Commission Work Plan to Deliver Jobs, 
Growth and Investment” (Strasbourg, 2015), par. 4. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
6308_en.htm. 
6 In American dollars. See Public Works Financing, “Public Works Financing Major Project 
Database” (Peterborough, NH, 2016), http://pwfinance.net/projects-database/. 
7 White House Press Secretary Office, “Increasing Investment in U.S. Roads, Ports and Drinking 
Water Systems through Innovative Financing,” 2015, http://www.nawc.org/uploads/documents-
and-publications/documents/2015 BUILD AMERICAN INVESTMENT THROUGH 
INNOVATIVE FINANCING FACT SHEET.pdf. 
8 Anthony E. Boardman and Aidan R. Vining, “P3s in North America: Renting the Money (in 
Canada), Selling the Roads (in the USA),” in International Handbook on Public-Private 
Partnerships, ed. Graeme A. Hodge, Carsten Greve, and Anthony E. Boardman (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 355. 
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Going forward, federal departments and agencies will be required to 
evaluate the potential for using a P3 for large federal capital projects. All 
infrastructure projects creating an asset with a lifespan of at least 20 years 
and having a capital cost of $100 million or more will be subjected to a P3 
Screen to determine whether a P3 may be a suitable procurement option. 
Should the assessment conclude that there is P3 potential, the procuring 
department will be required to develop a P3 proposal among possible 
procurement options.9  
Canada now boasts what is widely considered to be one of the most successful 
state models of P3s in the world.10 At the end of 2016, a total of 247 P3 projects have 
been either approved for commission, under construction, or completed in Canada11 
across multiple public sectors12 resulting in an estimated capital value of over 116 billion 
dollars. 13  As a global leader in P3 infrastructure procurement, Canadian federal, 
																																								 																				
9 Department of Finance Canada, “Budget 2011, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Plan: A 
Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth,” 2011, http://www.budget.gc.ca/march-mars-
2011/plan/chap4a-eng.html., 102. 
10 Mark Hellowell, “Public-Private Partnerships: What the World Can Learn from Canada” (The 
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2014.), http://www.constructcanada.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/canada_p3_white_paper_swg.pdf. 
11 I.e. from initial stages done post-project approval and pre-project construction – such as request 
for qualifications, request for proposals, or commercial close – to stages done post-project 
construction, such as the operations and maintenance phases of a P3 facility or complete 
expiration of the P3 contract entirely. See The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 
“Canadian PPP Project Database” (Toronto: CCPPP, 2016), 
http://projects.pppcouncil.ca/ccppp/src/public/search-project. 
12 I.e. Transportation, health, energy, justice, education, accommodations, recreation, water 
treatment, and information technology. Supra note 9. 
13 In Canadian dollars. See Stephen Thorne, “The World Learns About P3s from Canada” 
(Toronto: The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2016), 
http://www.pppcouncil.ca/web/News_Media/2016/The_World_Learns_About_P3s_from_Canada
.aspx. 
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provincial, and municipal governments are highly committed to incorporating private 
investment in their infrastructure projects, especially in the transportation sector.14  
1.2 Defining Optimal Risk Allocation 
P3 megaprojects are having a profound influence on Canada’s infrastructural 
landscape, albeit the large majority of P3 projects in Canada are contracted primarily 
through provincial governments and in primarily urban areas.15 As P3s continue to grow 
in national popularity, the need for a clear and cohesive dialogue between Canadian 
practitioners, from both public and private sectors, increases. One of the main factors 
considered in structuring P3s is risk allocation and transfer.  
More specifically, the success of P3s is dependent on agreement between project 
actors over which parties will bear potential benefits or losses incurred from risks that 
may arise over a project’s timeline. Factors like costs associated with mitigating a risk, 
the likelihood of a risk’s occurrence, and a risk’s potential severity to a project all play 
pivotal roles in deciding which parties should bear which risks, and how much they 
should be compensated for bearing them.  
All notable project risks have the potential to directly affect a project and/or its 
actors adversely in two general ways: (i) a project’s provision of responsibilities16 or (ii) a 
project’s financial capacity.17 Since P3 advocates characterize the procurement process as 
an innovative way to meet service-based and finance-based objectives, mitigating risks 
																																								 																				
14 Charles Lammam, Hugh MacIntyre, and Joseph Berechman, “Using Public-Private 
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” no. May (2013): 1–78, 
papers3://publication/uuid/35113246-01FE-4BB2-8E7E-41064EFAA36D. 
15 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 1.  
16 For example, when a facility’s construction is behind schedule. 
17 For example, when a facility’s construction incurs unanticipated cost overruns. 
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that affect project responsibilities and financing is crucial. Where P3s deliver public 
services efficiently and economically, they create value for money (VFM), which is 
broadly defined as “the optimum combination of lifecycle costs and quality to meet user 
requirements.”18 
VFM will be elaborated on in the next chapter. For now, it is important to know 
that P3s are premised on obtaining VFM, and – of the factors that influence a P3’s VFM 
– the allocation of project risk is one of the most critical. Risk transfer is “at the heart” of 
P3 procurement.19 Indeed, the “core of a P[3] arrangement… is the transfer of appropriate 
risks from the public to the private partner.”20 The comprehensiveness with which risk is 
treated in P3 projects separates this highly innovative infrastructure procurement model 
from conventional procurement models. P3 contracts tend to be much more complex than 
conventional public-private contracts, as risk transfer and risk management are integral 
contractual components to the design, build, finance, operation, and management 
(DBFOM) of P3-procured public infrastructure. 
While Chapter 2 explicates the major players and steps involved in P3 
procurement processes, a general conception of risk allocation can be portrayed here. 
Risk transfer occurs on many levels in P3s. First, there is a primary transfer of risk from 
the public sector to the private sector – i.e. the P3 contract – followed by a secondary 
																																								 																				
18 A Roumboutsos et al., “Risks and Risk Allocation in Transport PPP Projects: A Literature 
Review,” in COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships: Trends & Theory, ed. Athena 
Roumboutsos and Nunzia Carbonara (COST European Cooperation in Science and Technology, 
2011), 17-18, http://www.ppptransport.eu/docs/2011_12_Discussion_Papers.pdf. 
19 E R Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 2nd ed., 
Elsevier Finance (London: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2011), 
https://books.google.ca/books?id=fyHWtz7OepsC. 
20 Roumboutsos et al., “Risks and Risk Allocation in Transport PPP Projects: A Literature 
Review,” 18. 
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transfer of risk delineated between private sector parties – i.e. subcontracts – leaving 
many potential opportunities for suboptimal risk transfer to take place. Of course, P3 
actors do not possess clairvoyant capabilities; there will be parties that experience a more 
desirable project outcome than others pending which risks arise and which players they 
adversely affect.  
However, through the educated input of public and private practitioners – whose 
opinions are supported by both theoretical knowledge of, and practical experience with, 
P3 risk management – the primary transfer of risk in P3 contracts can reach equitable 
levels to achieve what is referred to as optimal risk allocation.  Optimal risk allocation is 
achieved when a P3 contract, which is signed at the end of the P3 procurement phase, 
transfers risks to the parties best able to manage them and at the most efficient cost.21  
Figure 1.1 provides a broad summary of the theoretical advantages of using P3 
procurement models in lieu of conventional procurement models. The following chapters 
expound on these concepts. For now, it is important to know that P3 benefits can only be 
realized through sound contracts premised on optimal risk allocation between both public 
																																								 																				
21 Jennifer Firmenich and Marcus Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the 
Provision of Social Infrastructure,” in New Forms of Procurement: PPP and Relational 
Contracting in the 21st Century, ed. Marcus Jefferies and Steve Rowlinson (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 71–94; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private 
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada”; Bon Gang Hwang, Xianbo 
Zhao, and Mindy Jiang Shu Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, 
Critical Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” International 
Journal of Project Management 31, no. 3 (2013): 424–33, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.08.003; 
US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” no. December (2012): 44, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/p3_risk_assessment_primer_122612.pdf; Mario Iacobacci, 
“Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Investments,” no. January (2010): 83; Yongjian Ke et al., “Preferred Risk 
Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” International Journal of Project 
Management 28, no. 5 (2010): 482–92, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.08.007. 
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and private actors. The remainder of this thesis delineates the P3 process, illuminates 
factors that affect risk allocation, and offers solutions based on original research premised 
on extensive literature reviews. 
Figure 1. 1: Key features Distinguishing P3s from Conventional Procurement22 
P3 
Procurement Model 
Conventional  
Procurement Model 
Comparative Advantage  
of P3 Model 
Output-based contracts Input-based contracts  Promotes private sector 
innovation in building public 
infrastructure 
Mostly or fully  
private financing  
Mostly or fully  
public financing  
Transfers investment risks 
from taxpayers to private 
sector 
Conditional payments  
based on delivery 
Regular payments 
in intervals  
Gives Incentives to the private 
sector to work both on time 
and on budget 
Integration of two  
or more project phases  
(i.e. design, build, 
operation, and/or 
maintenance) 
Project phases  
contracted separately 
(i.e. design, build, 
operation,  
and maintenance)  
Transfers project risks from 
taxpayers to private sector; this 
ensures accountability 
Project management  
by private sector  
Project management  
by public sector  
Utilizes private sector’s 
expertise in specialized fields 
 
The goal of this thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of risk allocation in 
P3s, followed by developing further insight into what is required to arrive at sound risk 
allocation models between public and private actors at the P3 procurement stage. The 
assessment, allocation, and management of P3 project risks involve a plethora of players 
from public and private sectors alike. Thus, insights into the competing perspectives of 
																																								 																				
22 This is a summative adaptation of Mario Iacobacci’s original table; see Iacobacci, “Dispelling 
the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure 
Investments,” 3. The third section of the table concerning the comparative advantage of P3 
models over conventional models is an original addition.  
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P3 actors – both public and private – based in Canada have been sought out and analyzed 
for empirical review.  
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The remaining structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the core 
lexicon of the P3 procurement process and its administration. A detailed overview of the 
general P3 procurement process, from its inception as a considered possibility to its 
completion at financial close, will provide readers with a comprehensive understanding 
of the many actors and stages involved in the signing of an official P3 contract. Once 
fundamental P3 concepts are explained, modern research trends and academic studies of 
focus are underlined in literature reviews of forthcoming chapters. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical overview of how P3s can be examined and 
assessed. Theory frameworks and methodologies used to analyze P3 risk allocation and 
risk management are considered. Agency theory is then adopted to conceive of the 
relationship between public and private parties as a principal-agent relationship premised 
on self-motivation and a progressive separation between power and control. The 
theoretical concept of risk is examined and demarcated from uncertainty before assessing 
P3 project risk management (PRM) in the following chapter.  
Chapter 4 outlines the PRM process in detail based on an extensive literature 
review. Concepts like pre-contractual PRM and post-contractual PRM, first-step risk 
transfer and second-step risk transfer, and risk identification, assessment, classification, 
and mitigation are explained to provide an overview of the PRM process for both public 
and private actors.  
9	
	
Chapter 5 presents a literature review of articles from which this thesis’ original 
research is premised. This core literature database is comprised of a dozen articles that 
directly reference risk allocation preferences between public and private sectors. A cross-
comparative analysis of the core literature database is conducted to arrive at sound risk 
preferences and contentious risk preferences. Sound risk preferences are defined as those 
given the same allocation preferences amongst the dozen pieces of literature that 
comprise the study’s core database. Contentious risk preferences are defined as those that 
have been allocated to different preferential sectors at least once amongst the articles in 
the core literature database. 
Chapter 6 presents an original psychometric study premised on the allocation 
preferences of contentious risks outlined in the previous chapter. Sound risks are not 
included in the study because it is assumed that their conclusive allocation preferences 
within the core literature database signifies a lessened need to conduct original research 
over their allocation preferences. An expert questionnaire is used to obtain risk allocation 
preferences of contentious P3 project risks from both public and private sector 
practitioners. Respondent views are measured using a semantic differential scale. The 
data is aggregated and analyzed through various quantitative methods to find patterns of 
risk allocation preferences for P3s both within and between the public and private sector. 
After a data analysis of the questionnaire’s preliminary findings, explanations are 
proposed to describe identifiable patterns of reasoning within and between respondent 
groups. This chapter proposes an equitable risk allocation decision model premised on 
the study’s respondent preferences.  
10	
	
Chapter 7 concludes with an acknowledgement of the study’s limitations – both 
methodological and theoretical – and suggestions for future research, highlighting further 
recommendations for risk management and risk transfer in P3 literature.  
Keyword searches include commonly used phrases and abbreviations associated 
with P3s, such as: public-private partnership (P3 or PPP), private financing initiative 
(PFI), alternative financing and procurement (AFP), design-build-finance-operate-
maintain (DBFOM), build-operate-transfer (BOT), build-operate-own (BOO), build-
operate-own-transfer (BOOT), project risk management (PRM), risk mitigation, risk 
transfer, and risk allocation, among others.23 References retrieved from keyword searches 
were subject to content analysis to confirm their thematic relation to optimal risk 
allocation in P3s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
23 PFI and AFP procurement methods “are essentially an outgrowth of the public-private 
partnership.” These terms have been used interchangeably in literature to denote P3-esque 
projects. The use of different acronyms is often a matter of politicized rhetoric – contingent on 
geopolitical trends of different regions or politically-charged motives of public organizations. 
Plainly, “any arrangement which involves a government player and a [risk-bearing] private sector 
player may be described as a kind of public-private partnership.” See Kevin McGuinness and 
Steve Bauld, “P3, PFI, and AFP: De-Cluttering the Terms Used Regarding Capital Asset 
Procurement,” Summit: Canada’s Magazine on Public Sector Purchasing 13, no. 4 (2010): 2, 
http://www.summitconnects.com/Articles_Columns/PDF_Documents/20100601/jun10_vol13_i4
_07.pdf. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE P3 PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 aims to both clarify P3 nomenclature and elucidate the P3 procurement 
process. Before conducting a literature review of contemporary P3 research on project 
risk management and risk allocation, it is necessary to develop an understanding and 
appreciation of the wide array of influential actors and project phases involved in P3 
procurement. Because P3 contracts contain sensitive, privileged information, data on 
project bidding, project negotiation, and project implementation is scarce. A large amount 
of contractual data on the intricacies of P3 projects is inaccessible because private biding 
firms “are often reluctant to share information about their strategies.” 24  Thus, an 
empirical assessment of primary data pertaining to specific policies between public and 
private parties is unfeasible.  
However, theoretical models that explain the P3 procurement process, P3 project 
decision-making, and P3 risk management – especially from the public sector’s 
perspective – are plentiful.25 Such resources are used to conduct a literature review 
explaining the chronological P3 procurement process and the major actors involved. 
Concepts such as project risk, P3 player relationships, obtaining value for money, and the 
feasibility of conducting P3s in lieu of conventional models are explained largely from 
the perspective of the public sector.  
																																								 																				
24 Dennis De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the 
Tender Process,” Ku Leuven Faculty of Economics and Business, no. 490 (2015): 13, 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/500596/1/PhD+dissertation+Dennis+De+Clerck.p
df. 
25 Ibid, 12. 
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Due to their situational nature, a consensus on the exact definition of P3s does not 
exist. P3 literature invites a multidisciplinary study of multiple industries, scopes, and 
sectors of focus. 26  Across the globe, different countries have their own varying 
experiences with P3 projects – so much so that scholars have argued in favour of 
assessing P3 projects on a country-specific basis in lieu of extrapolating results to 
develop global models. 27  There are, however, general characteristics of P3s that 
consistently arise in the literature examined: (i) P3s are a partnership agreement between 
public and private sectors for delivering infrastructure and/or services; (ii) the tasks and 
responsibilities involved in delivering infrastructure – which may include service 
components as well – are shared between partners; and (iii) the risks and rewards 
involved with infrastructure delivery are also shared.28 
Also, it is generally accepted that the private sector is responsible for two or more 
of the following infrastructure tasks in any P3: (i) design, (ii) build, (iii) finance, (iv) 
																																								 																				
26 Disciplines used to assess P3s include political science, legal science, and economics. 
Industries of study include transportation, health care, and education. Scopes of study include 
international, national, jurisdiction-based, and case-based. Sectors of focus include project risk 
management, operations management, and project cost-benefit analyses. These lists are not 
exhaustive; P3 literature is not limited to the aforementioned examples. 
27 Albert P. C. Chan et al., “Drivers for Adopting Public Private Partnerships—Empirical 
Comparison between China and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management 135, no. 11 (2009): 1115–24, 
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000088; Ronald W. McQuaid and Walter Scherrer, 
“Changing Reasons for Public–private Partnerships (PPPs),” Public Money & Management 30, 
no. 1 (2010): 27–34, doi:10.1080/09540960903492331; Ofer Zwikael and Mark Ahn, “The 
Effectiveness of Risk Management: An Analysis of Project Risk Planning Across Industries and 
Countries,” Risk Analysis 31, no. 1 (2011): 25–37, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01470.x; K S 
Rebeiz, “Public-Private Partnership Risk Factors in Emerging Countries: BOOT Illustrative Case 
Study,” Journal of Management in Engineering 28 (2012): 421–28, 
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000079. 
28 Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships 
for Infrastructure Investments”; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private 
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada.” 
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operation, and/or (v) maintenance (DBFOM).29 It is assumed that all carefully structured 
P3 contracts are created in the attempt to promote the benefits of: an optimal share of risk 
and reward between partners, an optimal method of financing between partners, and 
performance-based conditional payments by which the public sector sets goals and the 
private sector micromanages the means to achieve them.  
Performance-based conditional payments are contingent on a P3 contract’s 
stipulations (e.g. timelines of completion and materials that should be used) whereby 
private actors incur either rewards or penalties based on their performance exceeding, 
meeting, or falling short of the public sector’s stipulations.30 This relationship generally 
transpires between the public sector’s specialized crown corporations and a consortium of 
specialized private firms that form a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV). 
While the private actor in a P3 theoretically consists of a single company, it is 
generally a consortium of multiple joint venture companies (JVs) that form an SPV. A 
consortium is an association of several companies forming a coalition to adequately 
address the diverse levels of specialized industry experience required to produce public 
infrastructure. Because P3s delineate a diverse array of tasks to the private sector aside 
from simply building infrastructure – contra conventional procurement methods – private 
sector consortiums (i.e. SPVs) must address an array of fields: finance (e.g. insurance 
companies and banks), law (e.g. public-private mediation, land use permits, and 
																																								 																				
29 Samuel Carpintero, “Public-Private Partnership Projects in Canada : A Case Study Approach” 
9, no. 5 (2015): 1; Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-
Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Investments,” iv; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, 
“Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” iii. 
30  Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve 
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” iv-v. 
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environmental policy), engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance, among 
others.31  
Another key aspect of SPV consortiums is that – despite being their own distinct 
legal entities – SPVs limit risks and liabilities transferred to them from public authorities. 
Financial burdens and project responsibilities are spread throughout different JVs under 
SPVs.32 Potential risks transferred from the government to SPVs may include: project 
delays and cost overruns, erratic functionality of the finished facility, or the potential risk 
that the user demand and revenue stream projections denoted with a future piece of 
infrastructure are not realized.  
In exchange for taking on various risks, SPVs can be reimbursed through: (i) 
availability payments, where the government directly compensates the SPV through pre-
agreed periodic dates “based on the facility being available for use when needed and 
meeting certain requirements with penalties levied otherwise” (e.g. where government 
funds are allocated under the stipulation of safety regulations being met);33 (ii) milestone 
payments, where the government pays the SPV through the completion of pre-agreed 
project standards;34 (iii) full tolls, where the SPV retains all profit from the P3 facility for 
																																								 																				
31 Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve 
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 4. 
32 While at first blush it may appear to be a benefit that firms can absorb a shared risk under a 
SPV consortium, this shared risk can also harm the project, as it leaves firms susceptible to a 
complex allocation of tasks and responsibilities, which can be especially harmful if issues arise in 
projects and there is no clear actor or outlet to blame. This will be elaborated on in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.1 during a case study on the Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway. 
33 Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve 
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 17. 
34 For milestone payments, like availability payments before it, payments “may be subject to a 
holdback provision or liquidated damages (penalties) should the private partner not fully meet the 
obligations as outlined in the project agreement’s predetermined performance specifications.” See 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual” 
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an agreed period of time; or (iv) shadow tolls, where payments are issued “from the 
public sector authority based on the use of the facility. Wishing to receive payment, the 
private operator has an incentive to provide suitable customer service, thus enticing 
drivers to use a road.”35 Any combination of these methods may be used to compensate 
SPVs.  
Together, SPVs and specialized crown corporations interact under a mutually 
agreed upon contract to procure public infrastructure in Canada. The SPV consortium is 
usually incentivized with some future revenue stream over the life of a long-term P3 
contract, which typically lasts 20 to 35 years.36 Generally, the communal goal of P3s is to 
incentivize the private sector – known for possessing a presumably higher level of 
expertise and innovation than the government – to invest in large-scale infrastructure 
projects while absorbing a large share of accountability and risk associated with these 
projects.37  
In principle, the aforementioned revenue streams are supposed to cover the 
private consortium’s portion of investment in the project’s DBFOM while including a 
margin for profit to be realized over the course of the project’s lifecycle. Upon the end of 
the project’s lifecycle, contracts are either renegotiated or ownership of the facility 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
(Government of Canada, 2016), 9.60.45, e., https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-and-
guidelines/supply-manual/section/9/60#section-9.60. 
35 Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve 
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 17. 
36 Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort, “The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private 
Partnerships,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 17, no. 1 (2015): 4.; Boardman, Siemiatycki, 
and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 2. 
37 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” viii; Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private 
Partnerships for Infrastructure Investments,” 32. 
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reverts back to the government.38 In the event that asset ownership reverts back to the 
government, the P3 process has been referred to as a “rent to own” transaction; “that is, 
the public sector pays the private sector an annual rental fee for a specified period and 
then owns the asset at the end of that period.”39  
2.2 P3 Project Types 
The aforementioned situational nature and complexity of P3s also means that their 
structure, or delivery model, will vary between projects. The delivery model is contingent 
on the public sector’s infrastructural needs, the project’s available funding options, the 
urgency associated with the project’s timeline, the expert agents available for the project, 
potential risks associated with the project, and other strategic considerations.40  
The private sector’s involvement in DBFOM phases of a P3 project signifies its 
delivery model. While a literature review revealed that scholars consider a P3 to involve 
the private sector in at least two phases of DBFOM,41 progressive interpretations of P3s 
are widely adopting a consensus that major private sector involvement in the financing of 
projects are a prerequisite to be considered an authentic P3. By this standard, a P3 project 
provides “project financing and also engages in at least two of the other [DBOM] 
activities… ensur[ing] that the private sector has some [financial] ‘skin in the game.’”42  
																																								 																				
38 David Parker and Keith Hartley, “Transaction Costs, Relational Contracting and Public Private 
Partnerships: A Case Study of UK Defence,” Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 9, 
no. 3 (2003): 97–108, doi:10.1016/S0969-7012(02)00035-7. 
39 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 2. 
40 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.5, a. 
41 Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships 
for Infrastructure Investments,” 3; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private 
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 7. 
42 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 4. 
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The interpretation above runs parallel with the Federal Government of Canada’s 
interpretation, which recognizes four distinct P3 infrastructure delivery models – all of 
which include a financing phase for SPVs: (i) DBF, (ii) DBFO, (iii) DBFM, and (iv) 
DBFOM.43 Regardless of the delivery model used, P3 projects in Canada will always 
differ from conventional procurement options in that they are financed at least partially 
by the private sector under a single, performance-based contract rather than financed by 
the public sector under distinct, separate contracts to various firms for DBOM.44  
It is important to note that the delivery models listed above all entail the design 
and construction of new public infrastructure, but – because P3s can be utilized to offer 
the public both critical infrastructure and/or services45 – not all P3 projects entail the 
procurement of a major piece of infrastructure. Just as P3s can vary in project delivery 
models, they can also vary in project scopes. P3s can be used as an outlet for providing 
structural modifications, structural additions, operational services, and maintenance 
services to previously existing infrastructure. The phases required of a P3 project, as well 
as the extent to which the public sector transfers risk to the private sector, are contingent 
on project scope. The three general scopes of P3 projects are: brownfield, greenfield, and 
hybrid projects.  
Previously existing infrastructure can be leased under P3 brownfield projects, 
where the public actor “generates a capital inflow or debt payoff by transferring the 
rights, responsibilities, and revenues attached to an existing asset to a private [actor]… 
																																								 																				
43 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.5, b. 
44 Ibid., 9.60.5, e. 
45 Neither of which are necessarily mutually inclusive.  
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for a defined period.”46 Generally, brownfield projects present considerably less risk to 
private actors, because design and build phases (i.e. construction) are either minimal or 
non-existent, and service-related factors like toll revenue or traffic volume can be 
projected more accurately due to the already-existing facility’s present or past patterns of 
use by the public.  
 In greenfield projects, public actors transfer either a portion or all of the project’s 
DBFOM responsibilities – and the risks associated with them – to private actors. Because 
greenfield projects require infrastructure procurement and the operation and maintenance 
of new pieces of infrastructure, they “generally present higher risks to both [public and 
private] parties than do brownfield projects because of the greater uncertainty 
surrounding traffic forecasts, permitting, and construction.” 47  The complexity of 
greenfield projects becomes increasingly apparent when issues of financing and future 
revenue allocation are addressed, as project management teams consider the options of 
using availability payment concessions or toll concessions to reimburse the private actor, 
for example. 
Hybrid projects require the expansion or extension of existing pieces of 
infrastructure through capital improvement, whereby private actors provide financing 
options to improve,48 operate, and/or maintain the facility. While risks associated with 
future revenue for hybrid projects are relatively lower than greenfield projects, both 
																																								 																				
46 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” no. December (2012): 9, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/p3_risk_assessment_primer_122612.pdf. 
47 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 9. 
48 I.e. through design and build. 
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public and private actors may still have to contend with issues of uncertainty concerning 
estimations of the public’s willingness to accept new or increased toll fees that are often 
used to finance the project.49 Further unforeseen issues denoted with any construction 
project may also arise, such as latent defects within the facility’s new extensions. PPP 
Canada Inc. notes that hybrid projects “offer less potential for risk transfer because it may 
not be possible to distinguish the defects in new construction from pre-existing or latent 
defects in the [pre-existing] infrastructure.”50  
The extent to which private firms engage in various DBFOM activities varies 
between P3 projects, including those with the same delivery model. For example, for 
hospitals, prisons, and schools procured through DBFOM P3s, private firms may provide 
‘soft’ operation services, (e.g. cleaning, laundry, catering, etc.) while the public sector 
retains control of the primary operation services pertaining to the main functions of 
respective facilities (e.g. nursing, detainment, teaching, etc.). In rare instances, DBFOM 
P3s can transfer core operation services to the private sector as well. For example, there 
are P3s in the Spanish city of Valencia that require SPVs to provide medical services as 
part of their operation duties for hospitals procured under a DBFOM delivery model.51 
The delivery model used for P3 projects shares a generally positive relationship with the 
degree of risk transferred to the private sector, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
																																								 																				
49 Ibid, 6.; Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and 
Elsewhere,” 2.  
50 PPP Canada, “Identifying P3 Potential: A Guide for Federal Departments & Agencies” 
(Ottawa, ON: PPP Canada, 2012), 15, http://www.p3canada.ca/~/media/english/resources-
library/files/p3 a guide for federal departments  agencies.pdf. 
51 Basilio Acerete, Anne Stafford, and Pamela Stapleton, “Spanish Healthcare Public Private 
Partnerships: The ‘Alzira Model,’” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 22, no. 6 (2011): 533–49, 
doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2011.06.004. 
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Figure 2. 1: Scope of P3 Risk Transfer by Delivery Model52 
            
2.3 Major P3 Players: Interests, Incentives, and Financial Relationships 
 To summarize, public authorities use P3s to procure, operate, and maintain 
infrastructure efficiently – achieving VFM – through long-term, lifecycle-driven 
contracts. The public sector utilizes the private sector’s capacity to bear project risks and 
provide alternative financing options. SPVs are financially reimbursed through the public 
sector via one or more of the aforementioned methods (e.g. directly through payments 
and/or indirectly through tolls) and, in some P3 projects, public authorities will provide 
public subsidies via government bonds (with budgetary authority).53 Generally, the more 
																																								 																				
52 This is a simplified adaptation of a P3 involvement spectrum. See Figure 2 in Infrastructure 
Canada, “Infrastructure Spotlight: Improving Canada’s Infrastructure Through Public-Private 
Partnerships” (Ottawa, ON, 2012), http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/pub/infra/p3/p3-eng.html. 
53 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 10. 
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risks a private partner bears, the more compensation it receives from governments.54 
SPVs are also privately financed through lenders and equity investors. In turn, private 
SPV financiers encourage SPVs to bear minimal project risks so that they are more likely 
to receive subsequent repayment for their capital contributions.55 
Lenders provide bonds and loans to SPVs to cover the large majority of a P3 
project’s required initial investment. In return for providing original private capital, 
lenders require SPV repayment through amortization agreements and associated interest 
fees. Their interest rates for capital bonds and loans are contingent on SPVs’ risk-bearing 
capacities, which are assessed before contractual agreements (i.e. through due diligence). 
Generally speaking, SPVs with higher risk-bearing capacities pay lenders back with 
lower risk premiums and interest.56  Lenders prioritize: (i) the dependability of SPVs to 
deliver on future dues owed, (ii) the capacity of SPVs to bear risks, and (iii) the 
soundness of project contracts to ensure relevant parties are contractually liable for 
financial risks associated with a project’s DBFOM.57 
Equity Investors also contribute to the initial investment of P3 projects. They 
provide private equity to the project, which is an essential component to ensure risk-
bearing agents are held accountable for future project risks. Their share of equity is 
																																								 																				
54 Stephen Gruneberg, Will Hughes, and Debbie Ancell, “Risk under Performance-Based 
Contracting in the UK Construction Sector,” Construction Management and Economics 25, no. 7 
(2007): 694, 
http://journals2.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/pdf/01446193/v25i0007/691_rupcitucs.x
ml. 
55 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 72. 
56 Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships 
for Infrastructure Investments,” 37. 
57 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 72. 
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contingent on macroeconomic factors, and – like the interest rates of lenders – their 
required dividends and subsequent interest fees become more expensive as SPVs bear 
more risks.58 Both project lenders and equity investors require due diligence to ensure 
that SPVs are dependable in issuing repayments and accurately gauging their respective 
risk-bearing capacities.59   
The relationship between public authorities, SPVs, lenders, and equity investors 
for DBFOM P3s is depicted in Figure 2.2. SPVs – and their accompanying JVs – are at 
the focal point of all DBFOM monetary relations, as they bear most of the project’s risk 
and, often, capital financing. The relationship between individual JVs – within SPV 
consortiums – and other P3 players is described more in depth in Chapter 4. For now, it 
suffices to conceptualize P3 projects as a set of interdependent relations between public 
and private agents premised on sound project financing and optimal risk allocation. 
In particular, the remainder of this paper focuses on the features of DBFOM P3 
projects, as these project models encapsulate all relevant broad phases related to risk 
allocation between public and private actors during P3 procurement. Figure 2.2 is a 
summative adaptation of various sources in P3 literature, particularly taken from primers 
and general P3 guides.   
 
 
																																								 																				
58 In finance literature, dividends are regular payments made at pre-agreed intervals (e.g. quarterly 
payments) throughout a project’s lifecycle.  
59 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 17. 
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Figure 2. 2: Structural Relationships of Major P3 Players in DBFOM Projects60 
 
  
																																								 																				
60 This figure broadly summarizes the relationships between project actors in DBFOM P3s. Due 
to its generality, Figure 2.2 includes the possibility of availability payments and fixed payments 
(i.e. an availability-based P3 model or a P3 concession model) to show all possible broad cash 
flow relations. For the original figures from which Figure 2.2 is adapted, see: 
NTSA, “National Treasury PPP Manual - Module 4 : Ppp Feasibility Study National Treasury 
Ppp Practice Note” (Pretoria, 2004), 29, http://www.ppp.gov.za/Legal Aspects/PPP 
Manual/Module 01.pdf. OECD, “Public-Private Partnerships in the Middle East and North 
Africa: A Handbook for Policy Makers” (Paris, 2014), 21, 
https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/PPP Handbook_EN_with_covers.pdf; US 
Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 11; and VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: 
A Guide” (Melbourne, 2001), 11, http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Publications/Infrastructure-Delivery-
publications/Partnerships-Victoria/Partnerships-Victoria-Risk-allocation-and-contractual-issues. 
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2.4 Advisory Units 
In order for a P3 to be successful, the public sector requires specialized legal and 
technical skills in writing and negotiating P3 contracts with private firms. Thus, 
governments create specialized public agencies – or crown corporations – to handle P3s 
(e.g. PPP Canada Inc., Partnerships BC, and Infrastructure Ontario). In some instances, 
projects can be so specialized that they require their own crown corporation altogether to 
handle the construction and continued operation of infrastructure projects (e.g. the 
Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority for the Gordie Howe Bridge). Often, specialized 
public agents consult with private sector experts in an array of fields while overseeing a 
given project.  
Private advisory units to the public sector may include: financial, legal, technical, 
procurement, fairness, and integrity advisors.61 Together, public and private agents form a 
dedicated project team – called a P3 project team – to coordinate different activities, 
including: planning, procurement, design, and construction phases. They also develop 
performance specifications for the project and provide oversight to public-private 
communications throughout project phases.62 Third party advisors can come from both 
the public and private sector.  
For an example of a third party advisor from the public sector, the P3 National 
Center of Expertise (P3 NCOE) assists the federal government in obtaining support for 
																																								 																				
61 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.40, a. 
62 Ibid., 9.60.40, b. 
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Real Property Branch projects,63 facilitating informed decision making through drafting 
and submitting reports to federal bodies like the Treasury Board Secretariat and Public 
Works and Government Services Canada. The P3 NCOE can have a role in both the 
assessment and development of P3 projects.64  
Another large vanguard for P3s in Canada, albeit not an official public entity, is 
the Canadian Council of Public-Private Partnerships (CCPPP). Established in 1993, the 
CCPPP is a member-based organization comprised of – and sponsored by – both public 
and private representatives. Together, these public and private sponsors form the 
CCPPP’s Board of Directors along with its various committees.65  While the Council is 
considered a nonpartisan third party organization, its research studies, published findings, 
forums, and annual conference on P3s suggest biased reporting for P3s in lieu of 
alternative infrastructural procurement methods. As a pro-P3 lobby group, it “is difficult 
to see them as impartial or unbiased, although they… have a role in helping the public 
sector negotiate with potential private partners once the decision to go the P[3] route has 
been made.”66 The CCPPP also provides a project database that summarizes the status of 
																																								 																				
63 The Real Property Branch of government deals with procurement services involving real 
property contracting. Real property services include the architecture, engineering, construction, 
operation, and maintenance of public facilities. See Ibid., 9.10, b. 
64 Toren Barnes, “Toren Barnes: Real Property Branch of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada,” Simon Fraser University, 2012, http://www.sfu.ca/olc/blog/co-op/toren-barnes-real-
property-branch-public-works-and-government-services-canada. 
65 I.e. its Executive Committee, Communications and Government Relations Committee, Awards 
Committee (which selects award recipients for its annual conference), Research Committee, and 
Nominating Committee (which reviews and proposes Board of Director members annually). 
66 John Loxley, “Public-Private Partnerships after the Global Financial Crisis: Ideology Trumping 
Economic Reality,” Studies in Political Economy, no. 89 (2012): 22, 
doi:10.1080/19187033.2012.11674999. 
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all P3 projects – planned, active, or completed – in Canada. This database is accessible to 
the public.67 
For an example of a third party advisor from the private sector, Deloitte LLP – a 
finance, law, auditing, consulting, and risk management firm – has developed a global 
network of P3 teams that provide assistance to both public and private sector clients in 
the selection, negotiation, procurement, and financing of P3 projects. Both federal and 
provincial governments have hired Deloitte LLP for advisory roles. The former generally 
use the private advisor to help develop P3 frameworks and policies while the latter 
generally use the private advisor to help assess, structure, and procure individual P3 
projects. Deloitte LLP also aids private actors, both financiers and SPVs alike, with P3 
projects. For financiers, Deloitte LLP provides both financial advisor services (e.g. debt 
structuring) and financial transaction services. For SPVs, Deloitte LLP assists in 
developing project bids, structuring deals, and negotiating contracts.68  
When private sector experts comprise part of a P3 project team, they must sign 
confidentiality agreements to ensure that due diligence is applied to the commercially 
confidential meetings P3 project teams hold. For example, during pre-contractual 
planning stages of a project, private third party advisors to the public sector may possess 
information that has yet to be released to SPV bidders. If any private advisors to the 
public sector have possible ties with a bidding private firm, they must not collude with 
this firm because P3 fairness and integrity rules dictate that SPV bidders must receive 
																																								 																				
67 The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, “Canadian PPP Project Database.” 
68 Nick Prior, “Public-Private Partnerships: Leveraging Global Best Practice,” Deloitte LLP, 
2016, https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/infrastructure-and-capital-projects/solutions/public-
private-partnerships.html#. 
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project information simultaneously in the Request for Proposal (RFP) stage before the 
public sector awards a contract to its ‘preferred proponent’ – the winning SPV.69 
The RFP stage, coupled with the Request for Qualifications (RFQ) stage, deals 
with SPV bids for a project that the government evaluates. This integral step to the P3 
process is explained towards the conclusion of this chapter. Before SPVs can bid for a P3 
project, however, the government must first evaluate if a P3 model is the optimal 
procurement method (i.e. in lieu of conventional procurement). Ergo, planned public 
infrastructure projects that are large enough to warrant the consideration of a P3 go 
through a screening process consisting of P3 Screening, risk analysis, and Value for 
Money (VFM) analysis.70 
2.5 P3 Screening 
 While P3s are issued on a federal, provincial, and municipal level in Canada, the 
federal government plays a large role in advancing potential P3 projects during early 
screening stages. Major branches and departments in the federal government, like the 
Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and Public Works and Government Services Canada 
(PWGSC), play advisory roles in documenting and evaluating early stage P3 screenings 
and assessments to ensure that a potential P3 procurement method is advisable in lieu of 
conventional procurement methods.  
The TBS is in charge of awarding various P3 approvals, “including project 
approval, expenditure authority, contract approval, and the authority to enter into a real 
																																								 																				
69 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.30, f. and 9.60.40, d. 
70 Ibid., 9.60.10, a.  
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property transaction.”71 PWGSC holds ultimate accountability for recommending the 
most suitable delivery model for P3 projects under the DBFOM spectrum.72 There are 
various departments within PWGSC that contribute to both risk and financial analysis of 
prospective P3 projects. An exhaustive list of these departments is, however, outside of 
the scope of this research.73  
 In 2008, the federal government established PPP Canada Inc. as an overarching 
federal crown corporation to act as an advisory unit for various departments and agencies 
involved in P3s and prospective P3 projects. PPP Canada Inc. – along with the TBS and 
PWGSC – consider various contributing factors to potential P3 procurement. These 
factors include, but are not limited to: (i) private sector interest and capacity; (ii) asset 
characteristics and size; (iii) time horizon; (iv) public acceptance or interest; (v) 
opportunity to transfer risk; (vi) performance specifications; (vii) potential for innovation; 
(viii) organizational capacity; and (ix) financial or funding considerations.74  
When considering the viability of a potential P3 project, relevant departments and 
agencies must use and abide by PPP Canada Inc.’s P3 Screening Matrix and supporting 
guide. The P3 Screening Matrix is a tool used in conjunction with a department’s 
assessment of capital projects for P3 potential. Users are faced with fourteen distinct 
questions that individually assess specific criteria pertaining to a potential P3 project. 
Each of the fourteen questions are answered with a score between one to five. These 
																																								 																				
71 Ibid., 9.60.35, a. 
72 External advice from expert consultants is often considered before the Federal Government of 
Canada chooses to use a P3 and an accompanying delivery model. Ibid., 9.60.10, c. 
73 PWGSC’s Real Property Branch and Acquisitions Program are large contributors to PWGSC 
assessment. For more information on P3 development and advisory services, visit PWGSC’s 
official government website.  
74 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.15, b.  
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corresponding response indicators are meant to be objective in nature, with specific 
information demarcating the number values between one and five.75  
For example, one of the fourteen criteria questions concerns the anticipated 
service life of the asset in question. Because “longer-lived assets tend to be better suited 
to a P3,” five points are given if an asset’s “life is greater than 25 years,” and one point is 
given if an asset’s “life is less than 10 years.”  In another example, for a criteria question 
concerning the potential for contract integration, five points are given if – under the 
DBFOM model – “all elements… could be integrated into one contract” while, 
conversely, one point is given if “only two elements could be integrated into one 
contract.” This rationale is given because “P3s generate value… [through] the integration 
of various elements of the potential P3. The greater the potential for integration, the more 
likely a P3 will be viable.”76  Together, the values given for each of the fourteen 
questions accumulate to give a total score out of seventy to predict the feasibility of a P3 
project. The higher the score, the more likely it is suitable for some form of P3 
procurement model. 
The Federal Government of Canada provides the screening matrix described 
above. While it serves as a simple and clear template for risk assessment, there are more 
intricate and exhaustive matrices used when assessing the viability of P3s and the 
monetary risks associated with allocating risks throughout a P3 project. Often, these in-
																																								 																				
75 PPP Canada, “Federal Screening Matrix” (Ottawa, ON: PPP Canada, 2016), 
http://www.p3canada.ca/en/about-p3s/p3-resource-library/federal-screening-matrix/. 
76 Infrastructure Canada, “P3 Suitability Assessment Questionnaire” (Government of Canada, 
2016), http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/plan/nic-vin/bc-ar09-eng.html., Criteria 1 and 14. 
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depth matrices are held as private property to be used between SPV consortiums and 
public authorities during P3 contract negotiations.  
The World Bank provides an example of a more complex screening matrix that 
can be used to deeply assess the following areas of risk in using P3s to procure 
transportation infrastructure, all of which will be elaborated on in upcoming chapters: 
design risks, site risks, construction risks, force majeure risks, revenue risks, operation 
and maintenance risks, performance risks, external risks, other market risks, political 
risks, default risks, and strategic risks.77  
2.6 Value for Money  
If a P3 has been selected as a conceivable outlet for a project’s procurement after 
it goes through P3 screening, a value for money (VFM) analysis becomes the determining 
factor for deciding to use a P3 and, more specifically, deciding which P3 delivery model 
is the optimal method for procuring and managing the given project.78 VFM compares the 
costs and benefits of investment options pertaining to P3 projects through a risk-adjusted, 
iterative process that occurs throughout the project planning process. The VFM “is based 
on significant input from the project team and client who are most familiar with 
Government of Canada and project-specific requirements.” 79 To mitigate evaluative 
subjectivity, data retrieved from internal (i.e. public) and external (i.e. private) experts is 
continually reassessed and aggregated throughout project phases. 
																																								 																				
77 See Robert Phillips, “Matrix of Risks Distribution - Roads,” Infrastructure Resource Center for 
Contracts, Laws, and Regulations (World Bank, 2008), http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/sites/ppp.worldbank.org/files/documents/roadriskmatrix_1.pdf. 
78 I.e. from the aforementioned DBFOM spectrum. 
79 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.20, d. 
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VFM aids government officials with their recommendations to either proceed 
with a project or not by providing critical information concerning “project-specific 
qualitative, quantitative, and risk factors.”80 Literature on VFM analysis for proposed P3 
projects outlines: (i) the creation of a “Public Sector Comparator” (PSC), a tool charged 
with estimating the whole-life cost of a proposed project through conventional means of 
infrastructure procurement; 81  (ii) using hypothetical “shadow bids” from a public 
authority (e.g. Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority) to estimate the whole-life cost of a 
proposed project through a P3;82 and (iii) comparing the values of the two aforesaid 
methods in an “apples-to-apples” manner.83  
A typical PSC includes: base costs, financing costs, ancillary costs, retained and 
transferable risk, and competitive neutrality. Base costs refer to all relevant costs 
involved in both building and owning a piece of public infrastructure – including the 
delivery of services associated with it – for a pre-determined amount of time (e.g. a 
DBFOM project’s lifecycle).  
Ancillary costs refer to other costs, such as project monitoring costs and project 
procurement costs (e.g. easement costs for using privately owned land to build public 
																																								 																				
80 Ibid., 9.60.20, e-f. 
81 US Department of Transportation, “Value for Money Analysis for Public–Private Partnerships 
(P3s),” Program Areas of the Office of Innovative Program Delivery, 2013, 1, 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/factsheet_03_vfm.pdf. 
82 Pre-contractual bids from private project bidders are also used as tools for cost estimation in 
lieu of – or in coordination with – shadow bids. They are typically used in lieu of a shadow bid at 
the end of the RFP stage, when a single bidder is chosen as the government’s preferred 
proponent. Ibid., 1; European Investment Bank, “How to Prepare, Procure and Deliver PPP 
Projects” ( Luxembourg, 2015), http://www.eib.org/epec/g2g/ii-detailed-
preparation/22/222/index.htm. 
83 US Department of Transportation, “P3-Value: Shadow Bid Tool User Manual,” Program Areas 
of the Office of Innovative Program Delivery, 2013, 6, 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/p3_value_shadowbid_manual_v1.pdf.; US Department of 
Transportation, “Value for Money Analysis for Public–Private Partnerships (P3s),” 1. 
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infrastructure, like right-of-way fees).84 Financing costs refer to both project issuance fees 
(e.g. attorney and accountant fees) and interests costs shared amongst taxpayers (i.e. 
public debt). The premiums of both retainable risks (i.e. public risk) and transferrable 
risks (i.e. private risk) refer to an assigned monetary value placed on bearing various 
project risks, derived from complex quantitative measures. These will be covered in more 
detail in Chapter 4. Lastly, competitive neutrality refers to mathematical adjustments 
made when assessing procurement options that account for competitive advantages and 
disadvantages accrued by virtue of a public authority’s public ownership of infrastructure 
and services (e.g. a public agent’s advantage of tax exemptions over private agents).85  
In response to a PSC, a shadow bid is developed to estimate potential future bids 
from the private sector. These hypothetical estimations, contrasted with the PSC-
estimated conventional procurement costs, consider: the net amount of expected 
payments to be given to the private agents involved (this includes base costs, financing 
costs, and premiums for transferred risks), the estimated value of the public sector’s 
retained risks, and the value of the public sector’s ancillary costs.86  
With a PSC and shadow bid in place, the public authority of a P3 project conducts 
a financial assessment of a proposed project that compares the different costs for 
procuring the infrastructure and assesses the financial subsidies required when using 
either a conventional or P3 procurement model. Figure 2.3 broadly depicts the 
																																								 																				
84 “An easement is a right… created by grant or its equivalent, to do certain acts on another’s 
land” for a specified purpose (e.g. to build part of a highway). See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
“Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases,” The Yale Law Journal 27, no. 1 (1917): 70, 
doi:10.2307/786730. 
85 US Department of Transportation, “Value for Money Analysis for Public–Private Partnerships 
(P3s).” 
86 Ibid. 
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preliminary risk analysis phase of a potential P3 project – i.e. VFM phase – before it is 
granted public consent to follow through with the project. This figure adopts a public 
sector stakeholder perspective. 
Figure 2. 3: Preliminary Value for Money Methodology for P3s 
 
 During the final phase of calculating preliminary VFM, referred to above as 
‘financial assessment,’ the PSC’s predicted project costs of conventional procurement 
and the shadow bid’s predicted project costs of P3 procurement are compared on a risk-
adjusted basis. If a shadow bid’s projected estimation costs less than a PSC, the project is 
likely to be contracted out through a P3. When a P3 presents net savings over 
conventional procurement options, it provides VFM.  
VFM is expressed as the difference by which either the PSC (i.e. conventional 
model) or shadow bid (i.e. P3 model) exceeds the other in cost. Because even incremental 
changes in underlying assumptions used in a complex VFM analysis can drastically 
change results, “it is important to undertake a sensitivity analysis to understand the 
[project’s] critical assumptions” during preliminary VFM assessment measures.87  
																																								 																				
87 Ibid., 2. 
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Thorough government-issued user manuals and reports on PSCs, shadow bids, 
and general VFM processes are publicly accessible for those who wish to understand the 
subtle complexities involved in these stages of P3 screening.88 For an independent 
evaluation of VFM procedures, there are scholarly articles – albeit limited in number – 
that highlight strengths and weaknesses of current VFM methodology along with further 
suggestions for public agencies to adopt when conducting VFM assessments for 
prospective P3 projects.89  
Government VFM projections are also regularly scrutinized by the Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada (OAG) through ex post project reports and audits. The OAG 
is an independent government watchdog that audits federal government departments, 
agencies, and crown corporations, reporting publicly to the House of Commons on 
matters on the allocation and management of public resources. The OAG increases 
transparency between public authorities and Canadian taxpayers by highlighting the 
consistency of government statements and projections for P3 projects.90 
The accuracy of government-issued PSCs, shadow bids, and VFM statements are 
inspected through public reports, which often include recommendations for government 
																																								 																				
88 See US Department of Transportation, “P3-Value: Shadow Bid Tool User Manual.”; See also 
City of Saskatoon, “Business Case to PPP Canada: North Commuter Parkway Project and the 
Traffic Bridge Replacement Project” (Saskatoon, 2013), 
https://www.saskatoon.ca/sites/default/files/documents/transportation-
utilities/transportation/planning/NorthCommuterParkwayPPPCanadaBusinessCase.pdf. 
89 See David Heald, “Value for Money Tests and Accounting Treatment in PFI Schemes,” 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 16, no. 3 (2003): 342–71, 
doi:10.1108/09513570310482291. See also Joaquim M. Sarmento, “Do Public-Private 
Partnerships Create Value for Money for the Public Sector? The Portuguese Experience,” OECD 
Journal on Budgeting 10, no. 1 (2010): 93–119, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/docview/1030082620?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:
primo&accountid=11979. 
90 Geert Bouckaert and John Halligan, Managing Performance: International Comparisons, 
Public Management (New York: Routledge, 2008), 260-261, doi:10.1108/09604529210029272.	
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on how to proceed with either current or future projects based on the OAG’s findings.91 
One particular criticism of VFM assessments globally, including in Canada, is that 
governments are often guilty of overestimating “their own capacity to manage such large, 
complex, and long-term projects aside from what the final value [of their predictions] 
might say.” 92   Figure 2.4 depicts a conceptual illustration of a preliminary VFM 
calculation comparing a PSC with a shadow bid for a prospective P3 project. 
Figure 2. 4: Conceptual Value for Money Illustration 
 
																																								 																				
91 In some instances, the OAG has questioned public authorities over the very use of the term P3, 
highlighting it as a potential rhetorical tool and not reflective of supposed P3-proclaimed projects. 
In a 2011 report on the Northwest Territories Deh Cho Bridge Project, advertised as a P3 by the 
provincial government, the OAG declared that “the project was not a public-private partnership… 
and did not shift any significant risk to the private sector; risk sharing was anticipated when a P3 
procurement strategy was selected.” See Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Northwest 
Territories Deh Cho Bridge Project — Department of Transportation” (Ottawa, ON, 2011), 
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/nwt_201103_e_34999.html. 
92 Dorothy Morallos and Adjo Amekudzi, “The State of the Practice of Value for Money Analysis 
in Comparing Public Private Partnerships to Traditional Procurements,” Public Works 
Management and Policy 13, no. 2 (2008): 114–25, 
http://journals2.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/pdf/1087724x/v13i0002/114_tsotpoppptt
p.xml. 
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 Although the shadow bid estimates an increased amount of $5 million for base 
costs, $2 million for financing costs, and $4 for ancillary costs over the PSC, a projected 
$23 million reduction in costs from privately transferred risks and $11 million in 
adjustments for competitive neutrality result in a projected $23 million in savings overall. 
The shadow bid’s projected net cost of $104 million divided by the PSC’s projected net 
cost of $127 million equals 0.82,93 meaning the same project procured through a P3 is 
estimated to be 18 percent cheaper than if it were procured through conventional 
methods.  
Thus, Figure 2.4 represents an estimated 18 percent VFM for a P3. This 
hypothetical example of VFM illuminates the general trade-offs that encourage the use of 
P3s both in Canada and around the world – the public sector trades large risks to the 
private sector in exchange for relatively higher project base costs, financing costs, and 
ancillary costs. In other words, while P3s may generally be more expensive than 
conventional procurement options, they have the potential to mitigate and transfer 
conventional project risks away from the public sector, securing more VFM, and thus 
making large infrastructure projects cheaper and safer for governments in the long term.  
2.7 Competitive Selection  
Once a P3 is selected as the optimal procurement model for an infrastructure 
project via VFM analysis, the public sector generally conducts a Request for 
Qualifications (RFQ) followed by a Request for Proposal (RFP). Together, the RFQ and 
RFP stages aid public authorities in choosing what they believe to be the best SPV 
																																								 																				
93 Rounded to two decimal places. 
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consortium for a P3 project through a competitive bidding process where public agencies 
invite private actors to submit proposals for their services.  
SPV proposals are assessed by public authorities, the public sector’s third party 
advisors, and fairness monitors. Fairness monitors, like P1 Consulting Inc., are appointed 
by the government to ensure its selection of a preferred proponent is as objective and 
unbiased as possible. Fairness monitors are provided full access to documentation 
concerning the competitive selection process.94 RFQ and RFP invitations extend to 
private firms on an international, national, and local representation level.  
In the RFQ stage, prospective SPVs submit a detailed portfolio of their 
consortiums’ abilities to handle all relevant parameters of a P3 project. Prospective SPVs 
express their interest in, and qualifications for, a project by outlining their ability to 
handle specified phases – either all or some – of a project’s DBFOM. SPVs are supposed 
to show how they can provide the government with VFM and reduce the project’s burden 
on taxpayers. RFQs provide a broad synopsis of project backgrounds, overviews, 
expectations, instructions, evaluation criteria, deadlines, and any other pertinent 
information for SPVs considering a submission. The main purpose of RFQs is to 
establish a shortlist of qualified consortiums – often the three most qualified from the 
pool of submissions – to invite to the following RFP stage, which is more specific, 
exhaustive, complex, and demanding.95  
																																								 																				
94 Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, “Request For Qualifications: Gordie Howe International 
Bridge” (Windsor, 2015), 26, https://www.wdbridge.com/u/files/Spotlight/en/WDBA RFQ.pdf. 
95 Brian Watkinson, “Understanding Public Private Partnerships in Canada,” Association of 
Consulting Engineering Companies Canada, 2015, 15, 
http://www.acec.ca/files/resources/acec_P3_report_v3.pdf. 
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The reason for RFQs being less comprehensive than RFPs is twofold: firstly, 
RFQs do not require the inclusion of project specifities to fulfill their purpose as a broad 
tool to “weed out” unqualified consortiums; second, RFQs are conducted considerably 
earlier – sometimes years earlier – than RFPs, and thus the monolithic list of pre-
contractual project requirements is likely to be incomplete during the RFQ stage.	96 For 
example, the Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority’s (WDBA) RFQ for the Gordie Howe 
International Bridge left several significant sections open to further deliberation pending 
its RFP. In the 113-page document, the WDBA’s RFQ informs Project Co that its role is 
still uncertain with respect to parts of the bridge’s design and build:	97 
Project Co’s role with respect to the design of buildings and structures and 
such matters as site drainage, site servicing, location and size of storm 
water management ponds, and requirements for transformer sub-stations, 
will be provided in the RFP Process.98  
The WDBA warns Project Co that, due to incomplete land acquisitions, Project Co’s role 
and accompanying expenses are subject to change: 
The project requires the acquisition of properties in both Ontario and 
Michigan… Acquisition of the required properties has yet to be fully 
completed. The properties to be acquired will be described in the RFP 
Process. To the extent that property acquisition has not been completed 
prior to Financial Close, it is currently anticipated that the Project 
																																								 																				
96 The Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority posted an RFQ for the Gordie Howe International 
Bridge on July 20, 2015. The project’s RFP was released almost sixteen months later on 
November 10, 2016. However, according to the Conference Board of Canada, the P3 
procurement phase is generally shorter, typically lasting “16 to 18 months.” See Vijay Gill and 
Sarah Dimick, “Canada as a Global Leader: Delivering Value through Public-Private Partnerships 
at Home and Abroad,” The Conference Board of Canada (Ottawa, ON, 2013), 27, 
http://www.infrastructure.alberta.ca/documents/14-004_P3Leader_RPT_-_08_21_13.pdf. 
97 Project Co is the tentative name given during the RFQ and RFP stages to a hypothetical SPV 
that wins a P3 contract with the government before it actually chooses a private partner. 
98 Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, “Request For Qualifications: Gordie Howe International 
Bridge,” 15. 
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Agreement will provide relief to Project Co in the event that the status of 
acquisition of specific parcels materially and unavoidably impacts the 
Project schedule. The RFP will provide further details regarding the 
acquisition process and responsibilities of Project Co in connection with 
that process.99  
The WDBA informs Project Co that its planned method of payment for the project is still 
uncertain:   
A toll systems study is currently being finalized and the current indications 
are that the tolling system will be a mixed manual and electronic system 
with details to be confirmed at the RFP stage. Further details on the setting 
of toll rates, the collection and administration of tolls, and toll revenues 
will be provided in the RFP... The RFP will contain details of any 
payments during the construction phase and after construction following 
the commencement of services.100 
Finally, the WDBA reminds Project Co that its initiation of a Competitive Selection 
Process by no means presents an obligation to proceed with the project prior to Financial 
Close:  
This RFQ does not commit WDBA in any way to proceed to an RFP 
Process, award a contract or proceed with the Project and WDBA is 
entitled at any time to exercise the rights… to terminate the Competitive 
Selection Process and proceed with the Project, in whole or in part, in… 
some other manner…101  
Once three consortiums are selected from the RFQ stage, the project’s public 
governing body issues an RFP to qualified bidders. RFPs include draft project 
agreements, which constitute the planned contractual outlines and duties Project Co is 
expected to follow. These drafts delineate project output specifications in full, setting out 
																																								 																				
99 Ibid., 18. 
100 Ibid., 19 and 21. 
101 Ibid., 41. 
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detailed technical requirements for an infrastructure’s design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance. While output specifications and further project agreements set out in the 
RFP are issued by the public sector, they are often the result of rigorous consultation with 
third party advisors, both public and private (e.g. legal and financial advisors).102  
During the procurement process, RFP specifications are open to modification via 
collaborative meetings with the qualified bidders. Over the span of months, or years, 
qualified bidders are given separate, confidential audiences with public authorities to 
discuss their requests for amendments to the draft project agreements on an individual 
basis. Input from the private sector helps refine disputable areas of the RFP before the 
government selects a preferred proponent to sign the project agreement.103 The governing 
authority issues a final draft to the qualified bidders after negotiations have taken place, 
and this draft is used as the common basis for the proponents’ final RFP proposals.  
Final RFP proposals generally entail both technical and financial submissions for 
the project. Proponents’ technical submissions include a submission of their official 
approach to relevant project phases (e.g. design plans, construction management, quality 
assurance, asset operation and maintenance, among others.). Proponents’ financial 
submissions include confirmation from their funding sources that the project’s financial 
terms have been agreed to – otherwise referred to as “fully committed financing.”104 
Typically, public authorities prioritize contractor quality when selecting bidders at the 
RFQ stage (e.g. brand, history, and reputation) and bid quality when selecting a preferred 
																																								 																				
102 Watkinson, “Understanding Public Private Partnerships in Canada,” 15. 
103 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,” 
9.60.30, h. 
104 Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, “Request For Qualifications: Gordie Howe International 
Bridge,” 27-28. 
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proponent at the RFP stage (e.g. cheaper bids and greater risk-taking capabilities).105 
Thus, RFPs must be exhaustive and specific in nature. 
Following the selection of a winning bidder, the finalization of required 
documentation between the government and its preferred proponent takes place before 
the project can reach financial close. This includes “final limited discussions to customize 
the Project Agreement and other Project Documents… and… to clarify any ambiguous 
terms, so that it can be finalized for execution.”106 Should the government and its 
preferred proponent come to an impasse during final discussions, the next preferred 
proponent may be chosen for the project. Or, in extreme circumstances, it is important to 
remember that the government retains the right to terminate P3 projects during 
competitive selection stages altogether.  
Qualified firms that have made it to the RFP stage but are not awarded contracts 
receive honorariums of a pre-agreed amount for their participatory efforts in the project 
(e.g. for the Gordie Howe International Bridge, the amount is currently $5 million).107 In 
theory, the government purchases the right to own the intellectual property of 
unsuccessful proponents’ RFP proposals.108 The main purpose of this practice, however, 
is to encourage the continued participation of potential proponents in future P3 projects 
																																								 																				
105 Osama Abudayyeh et al., “Hybrid Prequalification-Based, Innovative Contracting Model 
Using AHP,” Journal of Management in Engineering 23, no. 2 (2007): 88–96, 
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)0742-597X(2007)23:2(88). 
106 Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, “Request For Qualifications: Gordie Howe International 
Bridge,” 28. 
107 Ibid. 
108 If a P3 is terminated before the project reaches financial close, governments are more likely to 
use the intellectual property purchased from unsuccessful proponents via honorariums because 
they are not using the RFP proposal by any winning firm. Thus, if a P3 project is terminated 
during the RFP stage, it is possible for governments to take methodologies proposed from 
unsuccessful RFP bids and apply them to future projects. 
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by alleviating the significant costs of preparing RFP bids. RFQ bids, conversely, are not 
eligible for government-issued honorariums. Private firms are fully liable for all expenses 
incurred during the RFQ stage of the competitive selection process. This ensures that 
only ‘serious’ bidders participate in the competitive selection process. 
2.8 Conclusion  
The end of the competitive selection process marks the end of the project 
procurement phase, which is officially completed when the preferred proponent reaches 
financial close with the public authority and subsequently signs the final project 
agreement. In theory, once the final project agreement is signed, the negotiable terms of a 
P3 contract should be settled. In practice, this is generally not the case. The duration of 
most P3 projects post financial close – i.e. during respective DBFOM phases – are mired 
in contractual disputes between public and private partners, as well as disputes between 
private partners themselves.  
Scholars note that P3s have “characteristics propitious to recurrent renegotiations; 
they represent long term, complex commercial and financial arrangements, in heavily 
regulated sectors, subject to significant political sensitivities, vulnerable to changes in 
circumstances and often grounded in uncertainty.”109 In an updated, oft-cited study in P3 
literature, recent data suggests that 78 percent of transportation P3 projects and 87 
percent of wastewater management projects face major renegotiation at some point after 
																																								 																				
109 Jeffrey Delmon, Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure: Project Finance, PPP Projects 
and Risks, 2nd ed. (Kluwer Law International, 2009), 44. 
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financial close. Further, the average time spent renegotiating project disputes for 
transportation and wastewater P3 projects is 0.9 years and 0.8 years, respectively.110 
Post-contractual renegotiation and legal mediation are common elements of P3s 
and disputes can arise due to a plethora of factors. From a post-contractual perspective, 
disputes between P3 actors arise due to the limitations of incomplete contracts, which 
often experience variance between ex ante risks and ex post risks. From a pre-contractual 
perspective, disputes between P3 actors arise due to the drawbacks of subjective 
assessment during risk allocation at the procurement stage.  
When optimal risk allocation is achieved at pre-contractual stages, variance 
between ex ante and ex post risk becomes minimal, and project risk management (PRM) 
under the incomplete P3 contract becomes easier. Thus, pre-contractual PRM directly 
affects post-contractual PRM and, accordingly, attention must be focused on achieving 
optimal risk allocation before the P3 contract is signed.  
Chapter 2 emphasizes the structures and processes involved in creating a P3 
project agreement, where risks and duties are officially transferred in a finalized contract. 
While open to renegotiation, risk transfer in P3 contracts has profound effects on the rest 
of a project’s DBFOM and PRM practices. Thus, it is integral for P3s to achieve optimal 
risk allocation during the procurement phase in order to be successful in subsequent post-
contractual project phases. Figure 2.5 presents a template timeline that delineates the 
general procurement process of P3s. 
																																								 																				
110 José Luis Guasch et al., “The Renegotiation of PPP Contracts: An Overview of Its Recent 
Evolution in Latin America,” International Transport Forum Discussion Paper, 2014, 13, 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/109159/1/818313609.pdf. 
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Figure 2. 5: Stages of the P3 Procurement111  
 
Ideally, optimal risk allocation is achieved from mutually agreed upon risk 
transfer at financial close between public and private agents. More often than not, 
however, actors disagree on what constitutes optimal risk allocation – making 
cooperative project risk management between public authorities and SPVs crucial to a 
																																								 																				
111 This is flowchart synthesizes information derived from the Federal Government of Canada. 
See Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual.” 
The section on post-procurement phase considerations is an original addition. Its concepts will be 
elucidated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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P3’s success. A final outlying factor – not considered in Chapter 2 – that spurs 
suboptimal PRM, and subsequent contractual disputes, is moral risk.  
Scholar Olufemi Vincent Tolani states that “the real success of P[3] projects 
depends on the degree to which risk is genuinely transferred from the public to the private 
sector and optimally shared.”112 His adverbs are not arbitrarily placed; while managing 
risks “optimally” can be understood from a cost-efficient perspective as risk transfer to 
the agents best equipped to handle them, managing risks ‘genuinely’ denotes the moral 
concerns of strategic and opportunistic behaviour that can affect P3 projects. Moral risks 
can erode a project’s potential VFM. Thus, its potential affects on P3s cannot be 
overlooked. This behaviour can be explained via agency theory, where the principal-
agent relationship public authorities and SPVs share is premised on self-motivated efforts 
from public authorities and their private partners.  
Chapter 3 establishes a theoretical dimension to its literature review of the P3 
process – specifically pertaining to P3 PRM under principal-agent relationships. Chapter 
4, while explicative in nature, draws from these insights to illuminate the theoretical 
factors driving the behaviour of respective P3 players during PRM. 
	
	
	
 
																																								 																				
112 Emphasis added. See Olufemi Vincent Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation 
Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” Afe Babalola University: Journal of 
Sustainable Development Law and Policy 2, no. 1 (2013): 207. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS 
3.1 Introduction 
P3 PRM can be analyzed under many different theoretical frameworks, 
methodological approaches, disciplines of study, and agents of focus. Scholarly 
assessment of risk in P3 projects has roots in neoclassical political economics. Unlike 
traditional institutional economics, neoclassical political economy extends economic 
activity to social and legal models, treating them as separate institutions that intersect 
with, and affect, economic decision-making.  
Modern political economy perspectives that work within a neoclassical 
framework – like new institutional economics, behavioural economics, and public-choice 
theory – account for social and legal complexities in political economics like bounded 
rationality, asymmetric information acquisition and sharing, opportunism, strategic 
behaviour, incomplete contracts, adverse selection, optimism bias, and asset 
specification.113  
P3 literature can be categorized in relation to its: sector of focus,114 adopted 
stakeholder perspective,115 type of research,116 data sources used,117 subject of research,118 
																																								 																				
113 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process”; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision 
of Social Infrastructure”; Rui Sousa Monteiro, “Risk Management,” in International Handbook 
on Public-Private Partnerships, ed. Graeme A. Hodge, Carsten Greve, and Anthony E Boardman 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 262–91. 
114 E.g. transportation, healthcare, water provision, education, housing, recreational facilities, 
defence and security, energy, and waste management. 
115 I.e. Solely public sector, solely private sector, public-private relations, and third parties that are 
subcontracted through JVs. 
116 I.e. quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical.  
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and methodologies used. It is of note that a large portion of P3 literature lacks explicit 
theoretical models and, in some instances, conclusive methodology.119 However, popular 
theoretical frameworks used in the literature include: agency theory, transaction cost 
theory, public choice theory, and property rights theory.120 Popular methodologies used in 
the literature include: simulation models (e.g. Monte Carlo), multiple regression, real 
options theory, game theory, data envelopment analysis, fuzzy methods, artificial 
neuronal networks, multi-attribute utility theory, network theory, cluster analysis, 
stochastic processes, analytical hierarchy process, and psychometrics.121  
Recently, a large amount of literature on renegotiation issues in P3s has surged, 
suggesting private partners are employing strategic and opportunistic behaviour when 
bidding on projects. In other words, SPVs’ ex ante pre-contractual agreements with 
public authorities are not in line with their ex post post-contractual actions.122 Scholars 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
117 E.g. secondary data, interviews, and questionnaires. 
118 E.g. P3 procurement compared to conventional procurement, P3 governance structures, ex post 
evaluations of P3 projects, key success factors to P3 projects, pre-tender stages, competitive 
selection stages, risk identification and assessment, and risk allocation.  
119 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” vii. 
120 Ibid.; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision 
of Social Infrastructure.” 
121 Maryam Darvish, Mehrdad Yasaei, and Azita Saeedi, “Application of the Graph Theory and 
Matrix Methods to Contractor Ranking,” International Journal of Project Management 27, no. 6 
(2009): 610–19, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.10.004; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk 
Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of Social Infrastructure.” 
122 Chen Yu Chang, “Understanding the Hold-up Problem in the Management of Megaprojects: 
The Case of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project,” International Journal of Project 
Management 31, no. 4 (2013): 628–37, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.10.012; Carlos Oliveira Cruz 
and Rui Cunha Marques, “Exogenous Determinants for Renegotiating Public Infrastructure 
Concessions: Evidence from Portugal,” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 
139, no. September (2013): 1082–90, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000710; Arshad Ali 
Javed, Patrick T I Lam, and Albert P C Chan, “Change Negotiation in Public-Private Partnership 
Projects through Output Specifications: An Experimental Approach Based on Game Theory,” 
Construction Management and Economics 32, no. 4 (2014): 323–48, 
doi:10.1080/01446193.2014.895846; Wei Xiong and Xueqing Zhang, “Concession Renegotiation 
48	
	
note that private contractors can employ opportunistic, strategic behaviour – like 
asymmetric information sharing – to receive excessive compensation for bearing risks.123 
Chapter 3 adopts agency theory as an explicative tool for explaining public-private issues 
during P3 risk management. Once the parameters of public authorities and SPVs are 
explained as a principal-agent relationship, the concept of risk is expounded on. Chapter 
3 concludes with an introduction to PRM, which is the centered focus of Chapter 4.  
3.2 Agency Theory  
 Like P3s, agency theory is an interdisciplinary venture. Stephen Ross describes 
agency theory as “a relationship… between two… parties when one, designated as the 
agent, acts… on behalf of… the other, designated [as] the principal, in a particular 
domain of decision problems.”124 It is used to describe and prescribe outlets for principal-
agent relations that involve delegated authority, “resulting in problems of control, which 
has been applied to a broad range of substantive contexts across different disciplines.”125 
These ‘problems of control’ stem from the distinctive – and sometimes divergent – 
interests of principals and agents.   
 Principals, or owners, cooperate with their agents, or managers, in the oversight of 
projects. Typically, P3 literature denotes public authorities with a principal role and SPVs 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Models for Projects Developed through Public-Private Partnerships,” Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management 140, no. 5 (2014): 1–9, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-
7862.0000843. 
123 Knut Sandberg Eriksen and Svenn Jensen, “The Cost of Second Best Pricing and the Value of 
Risk Premium,” Elsevier Research i, no. 30 (2010): 29–37, 
http://journals2.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/pdf/07398859/v30i0001/29_tcosbpatvor
p.xml. 
124 Stephen A. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” The American 
Economic Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134, doi:10.2307/1817064.  
125 Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria,” 208. 
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with an agent role, though multiple principal-agent perspectives can be found.126 While 
principals hire agents and retain eventual ownership of the asset in question (i.e. public 
infrastructure), they depend on agents to manage projects, thus leading to a progressive 
separation of power.127 Because P3s generally revolve around output-based contracts, 
agents retain some input-based autonomy. As agents become more autonomous in how 
they conduct business for principals, they attain more control over a project’s input. 
Agency theory frameworks adopt the realist perspective that both principals and 
agents are self-interested actors seeking to maximize their utility. Thus, as maximal 
utility agents, they may have diverse objectives that can compromise project cooperation. 
From the perspective of a principal owner – i.e. the government – the main problem of 
cooperation in agency theory is ensuring that the interests of managers fall into alignment 
with the interests of owners.128  
When applied to P3s, agency theory investigates the tasks and responsibilities of 
self-interested actors in the presence of potential moral hazard issues. P3s create 
environments conducive to moral hazards and, through research premised on agency 
theory, scholars find that P3 agents are inclined towards strategic behaviour when 
																																								 																				
126 For instance, in the case of SPVs managing JV relations, the SPV is the principal authoritative 
figure, delegating tasks to its agents, the JVs. In another example, public authorities can be 
viewed as an agent held accountable by the general public. For the purpose of this chapter, 
however, the principal-agent relationship of focus is between public authority principals and 
SPV-JV agents. 
127 Depending on the nature of the P3 contract, the private sector may retain legal ownership of 
the public infrastructure until its contract with the government runs out (see Chapter 2). However, 
private partners are still held accountable during their contractual ownership periods by the public 
sector via P3 contract stipulations. 
128 Lawrence. Freedman, Strategy: A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 527. 
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confronted with: (i) opposite objectives from their partners 129  and/or (ii) negative 
production externalities.130 Figure 3.1 presents a typical principal-agent relationship. 
Figure 3. 1: Traditional Principles of Principal-Agent Relationships 
 
3.2.1 The Principal-Agent Issue of Adverse Selection   
 Chapter 2 delineates many procurement steps of the P3 process. In particular, it 
explains the tender process, where public authorities issue RFQs and RFPs to private 
bidders in an attempt to select a preferred proponent through competitive selection. 
Public authorities (i.e. principals) provide malleable – or at least negotiable – risk 
allocation frameworks in conjunction with RFPs. Then they invite qualified bidders to 
																																								 																				
129 Francesca Medda, “A Game Theory Approach for the Allocation of Risks in Transport Public 
Private Partnerships,” International Journal of Project Management 25, no. 3 (2007): 213–18, 
doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2006.06.003; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in 
Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria.” 
130 Negative production externalities occur when “moral hazard environments… [show] that 
incentives in one task may destroy incentives in another when tasks are substitutes in the agent’s 
cost function.” Thus, where negative production externalities may occur, project tasks should be 
allocated to separate actors. See David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet, “To Build or Not to Build: 
Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 26, no. 2 (2008): 393–411, doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.004. 
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conduct their own assessments of the project risks involved. Through their own PRM 
processes – which are explained in detail in Chapter 4 – private bidders provide public 
authorities with their respective takes on: (i) risk probabilities, (ii) potential risk impacts, 
(iii) risk mitigation proposals, and (iv) associated risk premiums.131  
Competition within the P3 tender process is critically contingent on opportunistic 
possibilities of contract renegotiation. For example, if strategic private bidders expect to 
renegotiate their contract after financial close, they could renegotiate for higher risk 
premium rates or decreased project input – this leaves public authorities with less 
efficient bidders than they initially perceive at financial close.132 Consider, during the 
RFP stage, each SPV’s bid should be based on an authentic estimate of what will be the 
net cost of the project including adequate risk premiums to account for potential 
alterations in a project’s future environment.  
The preferred proponent selected after the RFP stage should be relatively efficient 
and economical compared to its competitors. However, due to the aforementioned issues 
of agency theory, bidders may provide public authorities with unsolicited bids. Two types 
of competitors present a deceptive advantage at the RFP stage: (i) subjective SPV bidders 
that evaluate future costs and risks poorly and (ii) immoral SPV bidders that assign lower 
probabilities of risk towards expensive scenarios, because these bidders are prepared to 
enact strategic methods to protect themselves from paying from such scenarios. These 
																																								 																				
131 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure.” 
132 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 274-277; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation 
Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” 210. 
52	
	
types of private bidding agents are referred to as “the fools” and “the corrupt” in P3 
literature.133 
These two seemingly efficient yet deceptive SPV bidders present an apparent 
advantage to public authorities during the tender process because they are able to 
compensate for underproduction with lower risk assessments. Thus, they are able to 
produce deceptively lower RFP bids than that of their competitors, who may have been 
more efficient.134 In this case, governments “may succumb particularly where… [they do 
not] have a clear framework for dealing with unsolicited bids or where… [they are] fully 
‘sold out’ based on the optimism bias of the private sector.”135  
While preliminary project assessments (e.g. P3 screening) and competitive 
selection procedures (e.g. RFPs) are used as means of circumventing the likelihood of 
adverse selection of project partners and risk bearers, scholars advise public authorities to 
be more prudent and judicious towards contractual negotiations with private partners.136 
3.2.2 The Principal-Agent Issue of Project Risk Management 
Once a P3 contract is signed, the public authority’s control of the project transfers 
to its SPV partner, creating issues like asymmetrical information sharing over the 
project’s DBFOM. From the SPV’s perspective, post-contractual PRM is premised on 
maximizing profits, even at the expense of a project’s DBOM (e.g. utilizing sub-standard 
resources to save money). From the public authority’s perspective, post-contractual PRM 
																																								 																				
133 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 269. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria,” 210. 
136 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 29; Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 289-290. 
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is premised on identifying conflicting goals between a government and its agents and 
implementing measures to limit the self-interested behaviour of private agents (e.g. 
through project oversight, control mechanisms, and incentive schemes). By enforcing 
contractual clauses and providing incentive schemes, public authorities inhibit 
strategically malicious conduct from private partners.137   
Unlike transaction cost theory models, agency theory places heavy emphasis on 
private agents being risk averse opposed to risk neutral.138 Thus, economic scholars note 
that contractual ex post principal-agent issues entail not only progressive separation of 
control, but risk-sharing too.139 Post-contractually, public authorities must be prudent 
about the aforementioned issues of (i) conflicting motives between public-private 
partners and (ii) managing private partner behaviour. Pre-contractually, public authorities 
must also be prudent about private agent attitudes towards risk identification and 
assessment, as their evaluations affect contractual negotiation over risk transfer before 
reaching financial close.  
In essence, differing perceptions of risk result in different recommendations over 
proposed risk mitigation tactics for a project’s DBFOM. Thus, information asymmetry 
between public authorities and SPVs may arise strategically from ‘corrupt’ agents or 
authentically from ‘fools.’140 This is why P3s benefit largely from pre-contractual PRM – 
																																								 																				
137 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 270. 
138 Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria,” 209. 
139 Edgar Kiser, “Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and 
Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation,” Sociological Theory 17, no. 2 
(1999): 146–70, doi:10.1111/0735-2751.00073. 
140 When applied to strategic behaviour, asymmetric information sharing occurs when one party 
withholds “private information” from another party willingly. When viewing contract 
management from a principal-agent model, actors “sometimes fail to obtain essential information 
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which entails negotiation between public authorities and SPVs – to arrive at “final” risk 
transfer.141 
3.3 Defining Risk 
Before explaining the pre-contractual PRM process in detail, it is important to 
develop a sound definition of risk. P3 PRM literature contains varying definitions of risk, 
some of which reference risk as a function of uncertainty. Al-Bahar and Crandall define 
risk as “the exposure to the chance of occurrences of events adversely or favorably 
affecting the project objectives as a consequence of uncertainty.”142 Dennis De Clerck 
defines risk as “a function of the uncertainty of an event and the potential loss or gain 
resulting from the event.”143 From a theoretical level, however, there are fundamental 
differences between uncertainty and risk. It is important to demarcate risk from 
uncertainty, as the two separate concepts have different applications to P3 PRM. 
3.3.1 The Problem of Uncertainty  
Uncertainty lies at the heart of managing risk in P3 infrastructure procurement 
projects, as it affects projects in a plethora of ways. There is uncertainty concerning 
adverse selection of project partners, uncertainty concerning contemporary and future 
project conditions, and uncertainty concerning asymmetric information sharing between 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
when they choose strategies.” See Fang Deng, “Information Gaps and Unintended Outcomes of 
Social Movements: The 1989 Chinese Student Movement,” American Journal of Sociology 102, 
no. 4 (1997): 1087-1088, doi:10.1086/231040. 
141 Akintola Akintoye et al., “Achieving Best Value in Private Finance Initiative Project 
Procurement,” Construction Management and Economics 21, no. 5 (2003): 461–70, 
doi:10.1080/0144619032000087285. 
142 Emphasis added. See Jamal F. Al‐Bahar and Keith C. Crandall, “Systematic Risk Management 
Approach for Construction Projects,” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 116, 
no. 3 (1990): 534, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(1990)116:3(533). 
143 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 28.  
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project partners. This includes uncertainty – both during the procurement phase and 
throughout each interim period of a contract’s lifespan – of an actor’s efficiency and 
efforts to deliver on contractually agreed upon responsibilities.144 
This risk of uncertainty concerns “hidden” actions, features, or characteristics of 
actors regarding their potential to garner maximum project benefits at minimal costs. As 
mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, when features of uncertainty are coalesced with 
asymmetric information sharing, they can culminate into problems of adverse selection 
during a P3 project’s procurement phase. Uncertainty creates concern over an agent’s 
proclivity towards moral hazards and strategic conduct or optimism bias and subjective 
projections or estimations.145  
3.3.2 Distinguishing between Risk and Uncertainty  
While the aforementioned examples of uncertainty may be considered in 
conjunction with project risks, they differ in an important respect – uncertainties are 
much more difficult to forecast with respect to both their probability of occurrence and 
potential cost or impact on a project. An uncertainty’s capacity to be empirically assessed 
and quantifiably forecasted is considerably lower than a risk’s. Unlike uncertainties, risks 
can be measured and forecasted to a degree based on past empirical observations. 
Accordingly, risks can be more appropriately mitigated through PRM strategies than 
uncertainties. 
																																								 																				
144 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere.”; 
Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
145 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 268-270, 274. 
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 A key component of PRM deals with the attempt to objectively quantify varied 
levels of chance. Objective quantification is computed by noting the empirical 
frequencies of variables and, in turn, developing a probability of occurrence for a risk. 
“Uncertainty” – conversely – has traditionally dealt with degrees of randomness.146 This 
traditional demarcation between risk and uncertainty has advanced towards a modern 
definition of risk premised on subjective distributive probabilities: “each person is able to 
represent his [or her] beliefs as to the likelihood of the different states of the world… by a 
‘subjective’ probability distribution.”147 Thus, by definition, “all probabilistic situations 
[objective or subjective] are a matter of risk.”148   
In the context of procuring infrastructure with P3s, risk is associated with 
distributive probabilities. In short, distributive probabilities link possible project risks 
with various probabilities via ‘ranges’ based on past empirical events. The main 
probabilities assessed are: (i) probability of occurrence and (ii) probability that the value 
of a variable falls within a certain range (e.g. regarding its potential cost for risk bearers 
or project impact). This is an important component of P3 PRM, which is looked at more 
specifically in Chapter 4. For now, it suffices to say that risks are broadly defined by their 
probability of occurrence and their potential to impact a project, both of which can be 
forecasted significantly more accurately for risks than for uncertainties. Accordingly, the 
potential consequences of risks can be better projected – and mitigated – through PRM. 
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For context, consider a sports betting simulation. Assume that a renowned 
professional soccer team – Team 1 – and its academy squad of youth reserves – Team 2 – 
are to play a forthcoming match against each other. Obviously, the outcome of this match 
cannot be certainly known until the final whistle blows. However, by assessing the 
reputation of each squad (i.e. their past performances and the efficacy of their players) 
through empirical observation and statistical analysis, an estimated result of the match 
can be made to propose a favoured team and an underdog team through betting odds.  
Team 1 may be given 3/17 odds, where every seventeen dollars bet for their 
victory yields a three-dollar return. Conversely, Team 2 may be given 17/3 odds, where 
every three dollars bet for their victory yields a seventeen-dollar return. Clearly, a 
successful bet on Team 2 winning yields a higher rate of return than a successful bet on 
Team 1 winning, but Team 2’s probability of winning the game is significantly lower 
than Team 1’s. From a cost-benefit perspective, a bet placed on either team will consider 
the bet’s estimated probability in conjunction with its associated payoff – this is a 
calculated risk for which distributive probabilities can be assigned based on the past 
performances of each team. 
Now consider if this soccer team decides to play a charity match comprised of an 
amalgamation of both its senior squad and academy youth reserves. Assume that the 
charity match’s two highest-contributing donors – both being fans of the team – are 
rewarded for their patronage by playing the role of manager for the charity match. Tasked 
with ‘drafting’ their own half of the team, and subsequently managing it during the 
match, Donor A and Donor B will take turns selecting players one at a time until every 
player on the squad is assigned to one of the two temporary teams.  
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If bets are placed before this draft, they will lack rationale based on empirical data 
because the teams have not been selected yet and, thus, no probabilities for a winner or 
loser can be assigned. Donor A and Donor B could select any combination of senior and 
youth squad players for their temporary charity match team. Without knowledge of which 
players are playing for which side, bets will be grounded in uncertainty. Only after the 
teams are selected will bets be grounded in risk.  
3.3.3 Assessing and Affecting Risk 
There is, however, one factor that can theoretically influence the charity match’s 
probabilities before team selections take place  – the aptitude of Donor A and Donor B to 
select and manage his or her half of the squad. If Donor A has extensive knowledge of 
the team’s players – including its youth academy – and Donor B is merely a casual soccer 
fan, than Donor A will be able to make optimal selections that take into consideration 
team chemistry, player capabilities, strategic formations, and managerial tactics. Donor A 
will be able to directly influence Team A’s odds of winning the game. Thus, the 
probability of Team A’s victory becomes more tangible and accessible to betters. 
 By the same vein, when public and private actors forecast and manage a risk, they 
must also consider expectations of: (i) their own potential to influence future situations 
and (ii) the behaviour of other influential actors. Thus, risk is assessed not only with 
reference to empirical data, but also to the capacities and proclivities of project actors 
themselves. This is important to consider, as probabilities of occurrence and potential 
costs of risks can be influenced by principals and agents over a project’s lifecycle. This 
means that P3 principals and agents have an active role in influencing the risk 
probabilities they forecast. Public authorities and private partners are actively assessing 
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probabilities while simultaneously protecting themselves against extreme events and 
pernicious strategic moves from other actors.149 
Risk probabilities change as policies or contracts change (e.g. if the capacity of an 
actor to deliver its contractual services increases or decreases). When actors assume risk, 
their assumptions are limited to the range of consequences calculated from their 
projections. All project stakeholders develop their own individual interpretations and 
measurements of risk due to the aforementioned issues of subjectivity and asymmetric 
information acquisition.150 Because of this, the assessment and allocation of subjectively 
quantified risks – along with associated risk premiums – is regularly contested in P3 
negotiations.  
Consider, for example, that a project’s risk is calculated through taking its 
estimated probability of occurrence multiplied by its estimated project impact. Suppose 
an impartial advisory unit undertakes a geological survey of a project’s site and claims 
the site has a 1/1000 chance of requiring additional geotechnical engineering before 
construction due to poor soil. Suppose the cost of mitigating this risk, if it occurs, is 1000 
units. With a cost of 1000 units and a 1/1000 chance of occurrence, the baseline 
assessment for this risk is 1.151 
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However, risk probabilities are assessed from multiple project angles and multiple 
project actors. Depending on which actor is transferring a risk and which party is 
receiving a risk, judgments over their probabilities may be swayed due to a plethora of 
variables (e.g. different parameters of measure, different calculations, subjective biases, 
strategic behaviour, etc.). Often potential risk receivers will evaluate risks with higher 
associated premium costs than risk senders.152 So, in the case of the simplified example 
provided above, the risk’s receiver may assess the risk with a greater score than one, 
indicating a higher premium for bearing it, and the risk’s sender may assess the risk with 
a smaller score than one, indicating a lower premium for bearing it. 
3.4 Conclusion 
It is important to know that if “the probability of occurrence as well as the impact 
can be quantified, this event is called a risk.”153 Conversely, uncertainties are not 
quantifiable, only foreseeable. Thus, it is difficult to transfer uncertainties, and their 
associated premiums, to private clients – public authorities will often ‘bear the brunt’ of 
most project uncertainties.154 Where risks can be transferred, public authorities attempt to 
establish well-organized contracts to regulate their principal-agent relationship with 
SPVs, acknowledging that private agents are self-interested, risk averse, and susceptible 
to bounded rationality.  
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The uncertainties of subjective assessment (e.g. optimism bias) and moral hazards 
(e.g. asymmetric information sharing) can lead to adverse selection of risk bearers and, in 
turn, suboptimal risk allocation. It is important to understand PRM as a dynamic, ongoing 
P3 process that can be viewed from many different, and often conflicting, perspectives 
between principals and agents. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT 
4.1 Introduction  
Risk allocation is typically a more complex endeavor for P3s than for 
conventional public infrastructure procurement projects because risks formerly borne by 
the government are transferred to the private sector. Thus, identifying, assessing, 
classifying, allocating, mitigating, and monitoring risk becomes a crucial component to a 
P3 project’s success. To avoid suboptimal risk treatment, scholars suggest PRM should 
invoke transparent and systematic procedures, many of which are delineated throughout 
this chapter. Chapter 4 expands on the PRM process, introducing key features in PRM 
such as the cost-oriented considerations that drive risk allocation in P3s. The two main 
factors that drive risk allocation strategies are agents’: (i) risk-bearing capacities and (ii) 
cost-effectiveness measures.155  
These “strategies” – or the specific measures adopted to manage project risks – 
are referred to as risk mitigation alternatives (RMAs), of which risk transfer is only one 
of many RMAs used to arrive at optimal risk allocation (albeit a largely significant 
one).156 Because risk management in P3s is a complex, multidimensional issue, its 
intricacies can be divided into specific sub problems, which are often propelled by 
different perspectives. PRM literature primarily focuses on the perspective of public 
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authorities. Significantly less research focuses on private stakeholders. Scholars who 
explicitly acknowledge this fact attribute it to the scarcity of empirical data on contractual 
P3 agreements, which is itself a consequence of the competitive nature of P3s: “SPVs are 
often reluctant to share information about their strategies.”157  
 Empirical research on P3s often attempts to provide descriptive models of the 
broad contexts of project risk management, demarcated project stages, and the many 
actors involved, with special focus on the conflicting motivations of agents within the 
private sector working alongside a public authority. These descriptive models can include 
decision models, where possible options and decisions for P3 actors are outlined between 
different project stages.158 Chapter 4 focuses on explaining P3 PRM through the lens of 
agency theory, which is geared towards the goal of achieving optimal risk allocation 
during a principal-agent relationship between a public authority and SPV consortium.  
4.2 The State of Research for P3 Project Risk Management 
Due to the unique nature of P3 projects – i.e. long-term, multi-agent, public-
private relations providing public infrastructure and services – their “resulting complexity 
can only be managed with an appropriate project risk management.”159  The literature 
review of PRM in P3 projects assumes that PRM can be analyzed by assessing public and 
private documents that – in conjunction – provide interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed, 
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scientific input pertaining to various takes on P3 PRM. In Canada, a central role for 
various public committees (e.g. TBS), crown corporations (e.g. PPP Canada), and non-
partisan organizations (e.g. CCPPP) is to develop common, consistent methods to 
approach risk allocation for P3s.  
The key objective for optimizing risk allocation between the public and private 
sector is, as mentioned previously, to achieve VFM with P3 projects.160 Because risk 
transfer to the private sector is among the greatest arguments in favour of P3-induced 
VFM, suboptimal allocation of risk has great potential to deteriorate a P3’s value. This is 
evident especially during risk devolution (i.e. attempts to default risk back to the 
government), and subsequent contract renegotiations or legal disputes.161  
The most commonly cited risk criterion in P3 PRM literature is the ability and 
capacity of a potential risk-bearer to manage project risks. Other significant criteria 
include: minimizing foreseeable project costs, assessing the potential impact of risks, 
ensuring proper incentive standards are in place for bearing risks, lowering risk 
premiums, and awareness of the government’s role as the residual risk holder of P3 
projects – often being held ultimately accountable when hidden liabilities arise.162 Some 
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scholars argue that broad standards and methodologies for optimal risk allocation have 
extended application to P3s in general, 163  while others argue against universally 
applicable PRM recommendations, citing that optimal risk allocation is too project and 
agent specific to develop generalized standard methodologies for PRM.164  
Scholars consider the main contributors to P3 project risk to be the long-term 
commitment of project lifecycles165 and the complex nature of contractual relationships.166 
The literature presents an overarching criticism against a lack of public transparency, as 
well as avoidable project costs associated with both excessive risk transfer and long, 
bureaucratic tender developments.167 These issues are often cited in literature aimed at 
making recommendations to improve Canada’s longstanding P3 procurement framework.   
P3 literature on project risk cites the importance of effective PRM and optimal 
risk allocation as preemptive tools against opportunistic behaviour.168 Academics have 
observed that risks are allocated for maximal efficiency in theory, but – in practice – risks 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
doi:10.4337/9781849804691; Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and 
Finance. 
163 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure”; Bing Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in 
the UK,” International Journal of Project Management 23, no. 1 (2005): 25–35, 
doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2004.04.006; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in 
Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria.” 
164 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process.” 
165 Gruneberg, Hughes, and Ancell, “Risk under Performance-Based Contracting in the UK 
Construction Sector.” 
166 Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn K. Lewis, “Evaluating the Risks of Public Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Projects,” International Journal of Project Management 20, no. 2 (2002): 107–18, 
doi:10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00040-5. 
167 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere”; 
Kwak, Chih, and Ibbs, “Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of Public Private Partnerships 
for Infrastructure Development.”; Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
168 Medda, “A Game Theory Approach for the Allocation of Risks in Transport Public Private 
Partnerships”; Monteiro, “Risk Management”; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation 
Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria.” 
66	
	
allocation is often premised on variables contributing to the bargaining strength of P3 
actors, which is often uneven during contract negotiations.169 Bargaining asymmetries 
arise due to multiple factors and, accordingly, they can negatively affect both public and 
private actors depending on their context.170 Further suggestions from the literature 
contend that all P3 risks that are not quantifiable – e.g. uncertainties – should be shared or 
solely retained by the public sector. Also, contracts should be malleable enough to allow 
risk to be assessed – and possibly modified – throughout different stages of a project’s 
timeline.171  
4.3 Pre-Contractual and Post-Contractual Project Risk Management 
The resulting complexities that can ensue within a P3 arrangement – be it DBF, 
DBFO, DBFM, or DBFOM – necessitate appropriate levels of PRM. As stated in 
Chapters 2 and 3, PRM can be defined by two distinct stages: pre-contractual and post-
contractual. In essence, pre-contractual PRM produces optimal risk management schemes 
from which public and private partners are in mutual agreeance (i.e. financial close and 
final contract), and post-contractual PRM produces managerial oversight to ensure that 
the contractual allocation of responsibilities is executed efficiently and viably.172  
 For the public sector, pre-contractual PRM begins from the moment a P3 is 
considered as a potential procurement option (e.g. P3 screening). For the private sector, 
																																								 																				
169 Delmon, Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure: Project Finance, PPP Projects and 
Risks. 
170 Monteiro, “Risk Management.”; Delmon, Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure: Project 
Finance, PPP Projects and Risks. 
171 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure”; OECD, “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Public 
Governance of Public-Private Partnerships.” 
172 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process”; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision 
of Social Infrastructure.” 
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pre-contractual PRM begins during the public sector’s preliminary development of a 
potentially forthcoming P3’s competitive selection process (e.g. RFQ). For both sectors, 
pre-contractual PRM ends once a P3 contract is signed. A signed final contract marks the 
inception of post-contractual PRM, which covers the management of both foreseen and 
unforeseen risks during a P3’s entire lifecycle, from the design of a project’s 
infrastructure to the end of the private sector’s operational responsibilities (see Figure 
2.5).173   
For post-contractual PRM, scholars conduct ex post studies of P3 PRM efficacy, 
typically focusing on the governing schemes public authorities used that contributed to 
either the success or failure of completed P3s. This includes: (i) the management of a 
project itself (i.e. the execution of DBFOM phases) and (ii) the public management of a 
project’s stakeholder relations (i.e. ensuring responsibilities of SPVs, lenders, and equity 
investors are upheld). P3 literature on the former is scarce, which suggests that P3 PRM 
literature adopts theoretical frameworks from general project management literature, 
extending theories to P3 projects as necessary.174  Scholars provide summaries of public 
sector management schemes that are conducive to successful projects.  
Public authorities are advised to: (i) provide clear output specifications during 
pre-contractual PRM (i.e. to avoid agent subjectivity), (ii) implement symmetrically 
transparent performance-monitoring checks to avoid strategic behaviour from the private 
																																								 																				
173 That is, for P3 projects that include post-construction phases for the private partner via 
infrastructure operation and/or management (e.g. DBFOM). 
174 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 33-34. 
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partner (e.g. asymmetric information sharing),175 and (iii) provide equitable payment 
schemes to incentivize private partners, establishing united project agendas between 
public and private sectors.176  
While pre-contractual PRM typically lasts only a few years, post-contractual 
PRM can potentially span decades. Despite this temporal disparity, the efforts invested in 
the former largely influence the proficiency of the latter. To achieve VFM, pre-
contractual PRM entails rigorous risk analyses to avoid consequential issues that may 
arise during post-contractual PRM. P3 practitioners adopt a cost-benefit approach to 
optimally allocate project risks, which – in theory – “allow[s] for the management of 
risks by the party best able to handle them.”177 However, scholars note that, in practice, 
past P3 projects have developed a precedent to suboptimally manage risks during pre-
contractual PRM due to the short-term pressures of project financing and timelines. Thus, 
the remainder of a project’s post-contractual phases suffers.178  
Chapters 2 and 3 elucidate broad pre-contractual arrangements between relevant 
P3 actors. Chapter 4 operates in the same vein, though with a specific focus on pre-
contractual PRM. From a holistic perspective, optimally executed P3s require proactive 
risk management during the pre-contractual phase. Because pre-contractual PRM can 
‘make or break’ a P3 project, the steps involved in achieving optimal risk allocation 
																																								 																				
175 Herbert S. Robinson and Jon Scott, “Service Delivery and Performance Monitoring in PFI/PPP 
Projects,” Construction Management and Economics 27, no. 2 (2009): 181–97, 
doi:10.1080/01446190802614163. 
176 Ibid.; H Smyth, “The Credibility Gap in Stakeholder Management: Ethics and Evidence of 
Relationship Management,” Construction Management and Economics 26, no. 6 (2008): 633–43, 
doi:10.1080/01446190801905414. 
177 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 6. 
178 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure”; Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
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before financial close are critical. Risk allocation entails the transfer of risk, which 
undergoes two main levels in P3s: first-step and second-step risk transfer.  
4.4 First-Step and Second-Step Risk Transfer 
Chapter 2 heavily revolves around the broad relationship between public 
authorities and SPV consortiums – i.e. the main ‘partnership’ in P3s. More specifically, 
Chapter 2 explains that public authorities utilize P3s to transfer many project risks to SPV 
consortiums. This broad transfer of risk, from the public sector to the private sector, is 
known as first-step risk transfer. However, P3s are monolithic, complex arrangements; 
they entail too many risks and responsibilities to hold only two main actors accountable 
for the management of various risks associated with the DBFOM of large-scale 
infrastructure projects.  
While SPVs are technically liable for risks transferred from public authorities 
during first-step risk transfer (and liable to be punished accordingly through pre-agreed 
contract stipulations), it is important to remember what an SPV is – a consortium of 
multiple joint venture (JV) companies that offer distinct expertise under an array of fields 
required to complete P3 projects (i.e. DBFOM responsibilities). While SPVs represent 
one distinct firm – in the form of a consortium – their DBFOM responsibilities, alongside 
the various risks associated with them, are allocated to various JVs on a multidimensional 
level through second-step risk transfer. 
To ensure that distinct P3 project tasks – and the risks associated with them – are 
accounted for, SPVs must transfer project risks alongside tasks. Thus, SPVs experience 
two risk transfer levels: (i) on a macro level, the initial risk transfer comes from a public 
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authority to a private SPV consortium and (ii) on a micro level, the secondary risk 
transfer comes from an SPV consortium to multiple JVs.179 Figure 4.1 represents first-
step and second-step risk transfer between a public authority, SPV, and multiple JVs.   
Figure 4. 1: Model of First-Step and Second-Step Risk Transfer180  
 
A benefit of second-step risk transfer for SPVs is that it makes it more difficult 
for private JV partners to default risks back to the SPV (i.e. second fall-back level). This 
																																								 																				
179 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 72-73. 
180 Adapted from Ibid., 73. 
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is also meant to aid in preventing risk devolution from the SPV to the public authority 
(i.e. first fall-back level). However, private parties – both SPVs and JVs – frequently 
attempt to renegotiate risk allocation post-contractually, and thus risk devolution 
frequently takes place, at least partially, in P3 projects.181 Therefore, second-step risk 
transfer necessitates careful monitoring and oversight from risk senders during post-
contractual PRM.  
After the government transfers risks and responsibilities to the SPV, the SPV will 
allocate as many risks amongst its JVs as possible (i.e. specific risks dealing with design, 
construction, financing, and – if the P3 contract permits – the continued operation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure). This protects the SPV, making JVs liable for potential 
mishaps or suboptimal performances that fall under their specific responsibilities.182 
However, even after transferring risks, primary risk senders are still primary risk 
holders.183 As Jennifer Firmenich and Marcus Jefferies note, even “after risk transfer, the 
risk sender bears the ultimate responsibility.”184 
While concerted efforts are put into pre-contractual PRM to achieve optimal risk 
allocation,185 risk recipients may still default risks back onto risk senders. This creates the 
potential for legal conflicts between JVs, SPVs, and public authorities. These issues can 
last for years – well after the completion of a project’s construction phase – and they can 
																																								 																				
181 Monteiro, “Risk Management”; Patrick X.W. Zou, Shouqing Wang, and Dongping Fang, “A 
Life‐cycle Risk Management Framework for PPP Infrastructure Projects,” Journal of Financial 
Management of Property and Construction 13, no. 2 (2008): 123–42, 
doi:10.1108/13664380810898131. 
182 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure.”, 72. 
183 I.e. public authorities during first-step risk transfer and SPVs during second-step risk transfer.  
184 Ibid., 87. 
185 E.g. insurable risks are insured, appropriate risk mitigation strategies for risks are adopted, and 
risk senders and risk recipients consider the risk-bearing capacities of agents.  
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be very expensive, costing millions of dollars. Consider, for example, an SPV needing to 
replace constructed girders for a highway because one of its JVs fails to meet the public 
sector’s quality regulations. This issue arose during the construction of a P3 project in 
Windsor, Ontario – the Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway. 
4.4.1 Case Study: The Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway  
During the construction of the Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway, the 
engineering and construction firm Freyssinet Canada Ltd. – a JV under the project’s SPV 
consortium, the Windsor Essex Mobility Group (WEMG) – produced 500 girders for the 
project that were deemed unacceptable by the government’s Independent Expert Review 
Committee (IERC).186 The IERC cited “serious financial implications, time delays, and 
impacts associated with the [girder] issues.”187 There were also issues with connector 
bearings not meeting the Ontario Ministry of Transportation’s (MTO) standards.188  
These construction mishaps led to larger financial problems down the line for the 
WEMG. Because construction controversies threw the parkway’s schedule “out of 
kilter,” the WEMG failed to meet its deadlines with the government, putting the SPV “in 
a penalty situation and paying in the order of $100 000 plus per day to Infrastructure 
Ontario.”189 Unfortunately, due to the respective levels of bureaucracy and transparency 
in P3 contracts – that is, the extensive amount of the former and the general lack of the 
																																								 																				
186 CTV Windsor, “Province Wants to Salvage Parkway Girders after Report Says Hundreds 
Don’t Meet Standards,” CTV News, 2013, http://windsor.ctvnews.ca/province-wants-to-salvage-
parkway-girders-after-report-says-hundreds-don-t-meet-standards-1.1479902. 
187 Ibid., par. 9. 
188 Adelle Loiselle, “Parkway Allegations Met With Anger,” Blackburn News, 2014, 
http://blackburnnews.com/windsor/windsor-news/2014/04/30/parkway-allegations-met-with-
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189 Dave Battagello, “Herb Gray Parkway Contractor Facing Penalty of $100K per Day for 
Missing Deadline,” Windsor Star, 2015, par. 17 and 4, http://windsorstar.com/news/local-
news/parkway-contractor-facing-penalty-of-100k-per-day-for-missing-deadline. 
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latter – this project is presently still in dispute with little knowledge divulged to the 
general public regarding the status of these heavy fines.  
A WEMG spokesperson responded to this incident with secrecy, stating that the 
SPV’s “construction team does not discuss internal contractual matters.”190 That being 
said, if “Infrastructure Ontario lets the penalty slide, it would set a dangerous precedent 
for other… [P3] projects should they also not be completed on time.”191 Freysinet, the 
WEMG’s JV company responsible for the parkway’s faulty girders, “may be targeted 
legally by [the] WEMG to take some financial responsibility for the penalties owed to the 
government.”192 
Because of second-step risk transfer between the WEMG and Freysinet, the 
WEMG is not immediately responsible for paying the government fines associated with 
the project. However, ultimate accountability for the project’s mishaps must be settled in 
court proceedings, which have been ongoing for roughly half a decade. This short case 
study outlines the potential for dispute between public authorities, SPVs, and JVs by 
adverse risk threats being realized during post-contractual PRM. Due to discrepancies 
between parties over pre-contractual agreements and post-contractual occurrences (i.e. ex 
ante risk allocation and ex post risk treatment), legal disputes like this are common 
during P3 project lifecycles.193  
																																								 																				
190 Ibid., par. 10.  
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Thus, pre-contractual PRM does not preclude post-contractual renegotiation, 
mediation, or – in this case – legal dispute. Further, this case study highlights the 
importance of optimally mitigating risks early on by transferring responsibilities only to 
actors that have the capacity to manage them.194 Often, it is safer for SPVs to pay 
appropriate insurance and risk premium fees than it is to take chances transferring risks to 
JVs that may default on them due to insufficient risk-bearing capacities.195  
4.5 Risk Identification, Assessment, Classification, and Mitigation  
 The oversight of P3 infrastructure projects that necessitate lifecycle PRM must 
constantly consider various project actors, phases, and assignments. Foreseeable risks, 
which are assigned distributive probabilities of occurrence, will have generally known 
causes and measurable impacts. Hypothetically, if a P3 project’s planned phases and 
assignments carry out ideally without risk-induced deviation, this project would mirror its 
“reference scenario.”196 Practically all P3 projects experience some form of deviation 
from their original reference scenario, however, so reference scenarios are used as 
benchmarks to calculate the degree to which certain risks have impacted a project.  
Potential deviations may be positive (i.e. opportunities) or negative (i.e. threats). 
While ‘risk’ is often connoted with adversity in P3 literature, it can also present 
opportunities to increase project profitability beyond original reference scenario 
																																								 																				
194 ‘Manage,’ in this case, does not denote an accident-free operation. Rather, it implies that, 
should a JV run into project mishaps, it is equipped to handle those mishaps without defaulting 
risk back onto other JVs, its SPV, or public authorities.  
195 Robinson and Scott, “Service Delivery and Performance Monitoring in PFI/PPP Projects.” 
196 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 80.  
75	
	
estimations.197 This double-sided nature of risk provides potential for P3 actors to 
experience a higher rate of returns than original reference scenarios predict due to, for 
example, higher-than-expected efficiency gains (e.g. through innovation or 
entrepreneurship). To comprehend a risk – and its potential to present an opportunity or 
threat – its cause and impact must be assessed in relation to the project’s different actors, 
phases, and assignments. More specifically, a risk must be measured in relation to which 
actors, phases, and assignments are likely to affect, or be affected by, it.  
Once risks are identified in infrastructure projects, they are assessed either 
qualitatively or quantitatively.198 Literature on P3 project trends suggests that the latter is 
used in most risk assessments.199 For quantitative risk assessment, a P3’s reference 
scenario and its various levels of risk analyses are combined to facilitate optimal risk 
allocation. Different levels of risk analyses between the public and private sector include 
PSCs or shadow bids. The deterministic method is a simplified means of quantitatively 
assessing risk, where the probability of event A occurring (0 < A < 1) and its potential 
cost or impact (C) are multiplied to determine the risk’s value (V). Thus, V = A x C. This 
deterministic methodology can be applied to the hypothetical site from Chapter 3, where 
poor ground conditions may require extra geotechnical engineering. The risk value of 1 is 
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derived from a risk assessment where the probability of the risk occurring is 1/1000 and 
its cost, or impact on the project, is 1000. Thus, V = 0.001 x 1000 = 1.200  
The probabilistic method of assessing risk – which is both more complex and 
accurate than the deterministic method – is the prevailing means of risk assessment in 
P3s. First, P3 practitioners determine a risk’s probability of occurrence akin to that of the 
deterministic method (e.g. the probability of a site’s soil being poor is 1/1000). Second, 
the risk’s potential cost, or impact, on the project is assessed by expert estimates using 
three separate values – opposed to just one value in the deterministic method – pertaining 
to the potential impact’s: minimal value, modal value, and maximal value. Third, 
practitioners utilize computational software by inputting the three separate risk impact 
values and turning them into aggregated distributive probability functions. The 
aggregated values associated with each individual risk, a combination of risks, or the 
whole project itself can then be derived via computational simulations (e.g. Monte 
Carlo).201 
Both scholars and practitioners use computational simulations like Monte Carlo to 
assess the plethora of probabilities associated with P3 risks. They require advanced 
expertise as well as advanced software and are conducted throughout a project’s lifecycle 
to account for the constantly malleable landscape of P3 PRM. During risk assessment – 
																																								 																				
200 This is a simplified mathematical procedure using a universal unit of measurement to indicate 
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or, more broadly, PRM in general – misconceptions often arise due to humanity’s 
cognitive, error-prone limitations.202 The principal-agent relationship between public 
authorities and SPVs faces many limiting impediments against optimal risk allocation, 
especially pertaining to subjective assessment (e.g. optimism bias) and strategic 
behaviour (e.g. asymmetric information sharing). 
Thus, to achieve optimal risk allocation, P3 PRM requires the interdisciplinary 
input of both public and private sector practitioners to develop systematic, standard 
procedures for risk assessment and, accordingly, risk allocation. 203  Of course, risk 
allocation must still consider the self-interest of principals and agents. For risk 
assessment and allocation specifically, finding middle ground can be a timely and costly 
endeavor mired in conflicting motives. Opportunism – be it through willful ignorance or 
intentionally pernicious strategy – remains a genuine concern for both public and private 
actors. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the pre-contractual PRM process, which mitigates the 
potential for suboptimal risk treatment in P3 projects.  
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Figure 4. 2: Pre-Contractual Project Risk Management Cycle204  
 
																																								 																				
204 Summative adaptation of Ibid., 82 and VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A 
Guide,” 16.  
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 Figure 4.2 illustrates the typical processes taken by public and private sector 
actors in identifying, assessing, classifying, and mitigating risks so that they can be 
properly accounted for before a P3 contract is signed. Because only identified risks can 
be assessed and managed, PRM typically begins with identifying risks. Following the 
identification of risks is risk assessment. As mentioned above, risk assessment can be 
complex and multifarious, especially when developing aggregated probabilities and 
appropriate premiums for risks. Final risk assessment proposals to project partners should 
be “as detailed, as necessary and as simple as possible.”205 Because P3s generally require 
long lifecycles and complex agreements, they benefit from early risk assessments using 
refined quantitative methods such as probabilistic assessment and Monte Carlo 
simulations.206  
 After risks are identified and assessed, they are classified. Risk classification 
associates risks with their respective probability of occurrence, potential for project 
impact, and – subsequently – a range of appropriate premiums for potential risk bearers. 
This process hastens risk transfer by providing the information necessary to begin 
considering risk mitigation alternatives and, accordingly, relevant parties that may bear 
respective risks. In summation, risk classification schemes alleviate public authorities 
from the potential of recurrent renegotiation and mediation pertaining to which parties are 
responsible for – and the degree to which parties are responsible for – specific risks.207  
																																								 																				
205 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 81. 
206 In lieu of deterministic assessment methods, for example. 
207 Kwak, Chih, and Ibbs, “Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of Public Private 
Partnerships for Infrastructure Development.”; Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
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Together, risk identification, assessment, classification, and mitigation proposals 
represent the pre-contractual risk management cycle, which deals with a party’s ability to 
assess risks based on their current knowledge of the project’s landscape. In practice, 
many of these steps do not occur in isolation. 208 Nonetheless, Figure 4.2 serves as a useful 
framework in providing a template for pre-contractual P3 PRM steps. These steps occur 
repeatedly throughout a project’s phases well before contract negotiation and financial 
close (e.g. during preliminary testing, PSCs, and shadow bids). The aforementioned 
principal-agent issues of moral risks and optimism bias are common threats during the 
pre-contractual risk management cycle.  
Figure 4.3 presents more in-depth explanations for the pre-contractual PRM 
cycle’s stages. As a P3 project gets closer to financial close, these steps become more 
meticulous and detailed to ensure discrepancies between public and private parties over 
risk treatment can be mediated accordingly. Scholars vary in their identification and 
demarcation of PRM steps, but their alternative titles label the same general practices.209  
Ultimately, the pre-contractual PRM cycle’s main goal is to elicit the appropriate 
treatment of risks. The official treatment option for a risk is referred to as its selected 
‘risk mitigation alternative’ (RMA). After the contract is signed, proactive RMAs are 
implemented and reactive RMAs for future risks are prepared. Different RMA strategies 
are delineated in Figure 4.4.  
																																								 																				
208 For example, “risk allocation does not simply take place on a ‘risk by risk’ basis detached from 
the output specifications, payment structure, government policies, and the contract itself.” See 
VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 16. 
209 For instance, Al-Bahar and Crandall summarize the PRM cycle for construction projects as 
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Al‐Bahar and Crandall, “Systematic Risk Management Approach for Construction Projects,”535. 
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Figure 4. 3: Pre-Contractual Project Risk Management Cycle – Clarified Steps210 
STEP Risk Identification Risk 
Assessment 
Risk  
Classification 
Risk Mitigation  
Objective Consider all plausible 
risks and their costs 
Evaluate 
identified risks 
Structure risks 
relative to 
their cost 
Develop optimal risk 
mitigation and 
allocation options 
Input Information (i.e. global, 
project’s, and agent’s) 
Risk inventory Assessed risk 
inventory 
Assessed risk invent- 
tory (aggregated)   
Output An exhaustive risk 
catalogue/inventory  
Risk impact 
and probability 
Potential RMA 
derived from 
organized risks 
Optional RMA  
Process RATIONALIZING PROCESS ELEMENTS  
i.e. documentation; project analysis; HR qualification check; selection of methods 
Risk structuring; 
project-specific risk 
analysis;  
team composition   
Identify risk 
factors; 
aggregate data; 
repeat 
Methodical 
analyses of 
project risks 
(computation) 
Methodically identify 
risk mitigation 
factors based on risk 
probability/impact 
Methods Contract analysis;  
Risk checklists 
Subjective 
expert analysis 
Analyses:* 
ABC; equi-
risk-contour; 
impact; 
sensitivity 
Methods:** 
decision table; 
decision-tree, utility 
analysis, simulations 
(e.g. Monte Carlo) 
Threats Unidentified risks Inaccurate risk 
assessment 
Misinterpretat- 
ion of risk 
severity 
Inappropriate risk 
assessment/allocation 
due to strategic 
behaviours or 
bounded rationality 
* Various methodical analyses used in P3 projects. These processes are not made public; like 
most pre-contractual work in P3s, their distribution is tightly constrained under contractual 
agreements between and within government entities and private companies.  
** Various methodical identification schemes used in P3 projects. This process is also mired in 
transparency issues, though scholars have applied such schemes to their publications on P3 risk 
assessment and allocation for hypothetical projects.  
 
For pre-contractual PRM, risk assessment is not conducted with finite numbers 
and variables. While PRM benefits from repeated expert correspondence, which is 
continually aggregated and reappraised, it still ultimately relies on subjective judgments. 
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Conference (Preston, UK, 2013), 233, http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/11996/1/FINAL PROCEEDINGS 
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This requires the acquisition of qualitative information that, upon continual assessment 
and data aggregation, becomes progressively quantitative. Figure 4.3 presents a general 
outline of the methodologies utilized in pre-contractual PRM. These steps present their 
own unique objectives and processes, which are critical to developing optimal RMAs.  
PRM requires RMAs for most risks, and a RMA should be developed for any 
relevant risk taker to ensure that risk is optimally allocated. More specifically, by 
providing RMAs for all potential risk bearers, the risk bearing capacity of competing risk 
takers – as well as their accompanying risk premium offers – can be compared. This is 
how optimal risk allocation is achieved; the actor best equipped to handle a risk is 
considered via its risk-bearing capabilities and its associated risk premium costs.211 Thus, 
RMAs are considered in conjunction with: (i) a risk’s probability of occurrence, (ii) a 
risk’s potential to impact a project, (iii) the capacity of potential risk senders and bearers 
to influence a risk, and (iv) the risk premium associated with transferring a risk to 
potential bearers. The main strands of RMAs include risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk 
transfer, and risk acceptance.  
The underlying assumption during pre-contractual PRM is that the government 
retains all risks by default until risks are transferred.212 Though, in some instances, public 
authorities may make contractual clauses that stipulate that the private sector must bear 
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212 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere”; 
De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
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unforeseen or unspecified risks.213 If the government transfers a risk to an SPV, the SPV 
transfers all risks it can amongst its various JVs under the consortium through second-
step risk transfer. The processes involved in each main type of RMA are outlined in 
Figure 4.4.  
Figure 4. 4: Risk Mitigation Alternatives for a P3214 
Risk Mitigation 
Alternative 
Risk Consequence Net Risk Risk 
Sender’s 
Fees 
Differen- 
tiation 
Risk 
Type 
Avoid Risk  Risk’s probability of 
occurrence is zero 
Eliminated Cost of risk 
mitigation 
Cause 
oriented 
Active 
Measures to Reduce 
Risk: 
• HR 
• Technical 
• Organizational 
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Ultimately, some party must accept each project risk. If a risk has not undergone 
specific RMA treatment in the P3 contract – i.e. residual risk – the government typically 
assumes responsibility for bearing it.215 If risk transfer is chosen to be the optimal RMA 
for a risk, its bearer will try to decrease its potential impact, or cost, and probability of 
occurrence, if possible. In theory, each RMA action – be it avoidance, transfer, reduction, 
																																								 																				
213 For example, the VDTF stipulates, “the private party bears all risks which government does 
not expressly take back under the contract… This puts beyond doubt… the risk allocation implicit 
in the payment mechanism.” See VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 123. 
214 Retrieved from Firmenich, “Risk Allocation Decision-Making Concept for PPP Projects,” 4. 
215 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere.” 
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or acceptance – should be less costly to the risk sender than the sum of gross risk cost 
subtracted by net risk cost.216  
4.5.1 Risk Transfer  
As shown in figure 4.4, risk transfer is just one of several RMA options under P3 
PRM; avoidance, reduction, and acceptance are also feasible RMAs that are implemented 
aside from – or alongside – risk transfer. If risk transfer is selected as an optimal RMA, 
its sender – be it a public authority, SPV, or JV – should assume that the risk has been 
allocated optimally and at a fair cost. 217 The more risks a project transfers optimally, the 
more likely it will achieve VFM.  
In theory, all plausible RMAs should be evaluated for every individual project 
risk so that: (i) all plausible RMAs for all potential risk recipients can be compared and 
(ii) the best RMA can be adopted to achieve optimal risk allocation. In practice, however, 
a thorough evaluation of plausible RMAs only transpires for risks that are: (i) 
quantifiable and (ii) able to be influenced by potential risk recipients.218 The reason for 
this is because thorough pre-contractual PRM cycles – i.e. repeated risk identification, 
assessment, classification, and mitigation considerations – is expensive and time-
consuming. The procedures outlined in Figures 4.2 And 4.3 require repeated data 
aggregation before optimal RMAs become apparent. 
																																								 																				
216 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 81. 
217 I.e. during first-step risk transfer from the government to SPV, second-step risk transfer from 
the SPV to JVs, and – through relatively smaller-scale subcontracting – a form of third-step risk 
transfer from JVs to third party contractors, respectively. See VDTF, “Risk Allocation and 
Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 31.  
218 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 27-31. 
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From a cost-benefit perspective, the resources required to select a preferred RMA 
should not outweigh that RMA’s eventual payoff for being managed optimally. If a risk 
is not quantifiable and unable to be influenced by risk recipients, there is little point in 
investing the resources required to develop an optimal RMA strategy during pre-
contractual PRM stages. In fact, if a risk is not quantifiable, it is considered an 
uncertainty and it is unlikely that it has a foreseeably optimal RMA strategy to begin 
with.219 In Chapter 3, risk was distinguished from uncertainty because it could be 
quantified using distributive probabilities. More specifically, risk is quantified in relation 
to both its probability of occurrence and potential project costs or impact, both of which 
are measured between risk senders and risk bearers.  
Uncertainties may be foreseeable (e.g. hypothetically conceiving that a natural 
disaster would damage a P3 infrastructure project during post-contractual PRM); these 
are referred to as first-degree uncertainties. If a first-degree uncertainty is identified as a 
potential threat to the project, it will still likely lack thorough RMA consideration 
because of its unpredictable probability of occurrence and impact on the project.220 
Second-degree uncertainties are uncertainties that remain unidentified and, accordingly, 
left out of a P3’s contract altogether. Second-degree uncertainties leave projects 
susceptible to increased contract mediation and legal disputes depending on the severity 
of their impact.221  
																																								 																				
219 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 272-273. 
220 That is, in comparison to the RMAs provided for quantifiable risks.  
221 James Stone, “A Theory of Capacity and the Insurance of Catastrophe Risks,” The Journal of 
Risk and Insurance 40, no. 2 (1973): 241, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/stable/pdf/252115.pdf. 
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In theory, to reduce the potential impact of project uncertainties, P3 scholars 
advise the insurance of all insurable risks and first-degree uncertainties.222 In practice, 
some insurable risks and first-degree uncertainties are overlooked due to cost-oriented 
strategies on behalf of public and private actors.223 Public authorities pay risk premiums 
and insurance fees indirectly through their payment mechanisms with SPVs.224 SPVs pay 
risk premiums and insurance fees directly through monetary agreements with project 
lenders and equity investors.225  
If project risks or uncertainties are uninsurable, the next step is to assess if they 
are quantifiable.226  As stated previously, uncertainties are unquantifiable and risks are 
quantifiable. The general principle in P3 PRM is that public authorities should retain the 
threats of all uncertainties to a degree – either the public authority solely bears the 
uncertainty or it shares this responsibility with the private SPV. If a project uncertainty is 
shared, it should contain a risk cap for the private actors involved.227   
The last main consideration for risk transfer pertains to the ability of potential risk 
senders and receivers to influence the risk or uncertainty (i.e. measurable means of 
reducing their impact, cost, and/or probability of occurrence). With regard to 
uncertainties, as stated above, the public sector should bear an uncertainty’s potential 
																																								 																				
222 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 158-159. 
223 Howard Kunreuther, “The Role of Insurance in Managing Extreme Events: Implications for 
Terrorism Coverage,” Risk Analysis, 2002, 434-435, doi:10.1111/0272-4332.00054.  
224 For example, through availability payments, milestone payments, full tolls, or shadow tolls. 
See Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
225 NTSA, “National Treasury Ppp Manual - Module 4 : PPP Feasibility Study National Treasury 
Ppp Practice Note,” 29; VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 11. 
226 With regard to its respective probability of occurrence and potential impact on – or cost 
towards – a P3 project.  
227 Peter E. D. Love et al., “Risk/Reward Compensation Model for Civil Engineering 
Infrastructure Alliance Projects,” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 137, no. 
2 (2011): 134, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000263. 
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‘opportunities’ or ‘threats’ in all instances, and the private partner should only share this 
responsibility with the public sector if it has the capacity to influence potential 
outcomes.228 Risks that cannot be influenced by either party, which are generally taken by 
the public sector, are considered “exogenous risks.”229 The aforementioned considerations 
for uninsurable risks and uncertainties – during first-step risk transfer – are expressed in 
Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4. 5: Risk Transfer Principles for Uninsurable Risks and Uncertainties in P3s 
Risk/Uncertainty Risk Risk Risk Risk Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Insurable 
Quantifiable 
✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Public Influence* ✔ ✕ ✔ ✕ --- --- 
Private Influence ✕ ✔ ✔ ✕ ✕ ✔ 
Preferred Means  
of Allocation 
Public 
authority 
Private 
SPV/JV 
Compare 
RMAs** 
Shared; 
no cap 
Public 
authority 
Shared; 
private cap 
* These general principles relate to first-step risk transfer between the public and private sector. 
To apply to second-step risk transfer, the figure’s considerations would have to be modified so 
that the default risk sender is an SPV in lieu of a public authority. 
** Further assessment of potential RMAs is required. Potential RMAs are compared so that an 
optimal RMA is selected.  
 
The treatment of risks and uncertainties expressed in Figure 4.5 can be visualized 
by a decision-tree, which is one of the RMA methodologies expressed in Figure 4.3. 
Decision-trees are commonly used during pre-contractual PRM for classifying multiple 
variables that must be considered before selecting an optimal RMA for P3 risks. Figure 
4.6 provides a broad template for P3 decision-tree methodology in pre-contractual PRM 
for first-step risk transfer.  
																																								 																				
228 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 86. 
229 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 30. 
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Figure 4. 6: P3 Decision-Tree for First-Step Risk Transfer 
 
 
Risk decision-trees, along with a multitude of other PRM methodologies, are used 
to rationally choose RMAs after continuously aggregated quantitative expert input.230 
While Figure 4.6 deals with first-step risk transfer, this methodology applies to both: (i) 
first-step risk transfer, to decide which risks are allocated to which sector, and (ii) 
second-step risk transfer, to decide which risks are allocated to which JVs within an SPV 
consortium. Figure 4.7 represents the final steps taken before allocating P3 risks in pre-
contractual PRM (i.e. first-step risk transfer).  
																																								 																				
230 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 68. 
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Figure 4. 7: Broad Risk Allocation Template for Pre-Contractual P3 PRM231  
 
The consideration of actors’ risk-bearing capacities is especially applicable during 
second-step risk transfer because the list of potential risk recipients increases from a mere 
public-private demarcation to an array of competing JVs. Remember, in second-step risk 
transfer, the default risk senders are SPVs instead of governments and potential risk 
recipients expand to include all applicable JVs under the SPV consortium. Thus, there are 
more potential risk bearers brought into consideration for risk transfer.  
																																								 																				
231 Adapted from Bing et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the 
UK,” 27.  
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 The respective capacities of potential risk recipients are contingent on their ability 
to handle risks and the risk premium fees they negotiate. As stated previously, a risk’s 
associated premiums are generally contingent on the risk’s probability of occurrence and 
its potential for impact. Save for deviations in the assessment of a risk’s premium value 
between actors, these two factors have the largest effect on a risk’s associated premiums. 
If a risk premium is too high, either: (i) the risk transfer should be increased or (ii) fees 
should be decreased. If a risk premium is too low, either: (i) the risk transfer should be 
decreased or (ii) fees should be increased.232  
 To avoid risk defaults, and subsequent legal disputes, risk senders should only 
transfer risks to recipients that can handle them ‘best.’ 233 While cost-optimization is a 
large consideration for arriving at the ‘best’ risk transfer, risk senders should not be 
parsimonious and merely allocate risks to agents willing to bear them at the lowest cost. 
Suitable risk premiums should be paid to suitable risk bearers who in turn will do a 
suitable job of post-contractual PRM.234 Risk defaults have harmful impacts on P3 
projects and should be avoided through appropriate payment and accountability 
mechanisms. Unfortunately, it is difficult to gain contextual insight into how 
																																								 																				
232 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 87. 
233 Depending on the project’s stage, risk senders could be public authorities (during first-step risk 
transfer), SPVs (during second-step risk transfer), or JVs (during third-step risk transfer, more 
commonly referred to as subcontracting).  
234 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 34; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the 
Provision of Social Infrastructure.” 87; Robinson and Scott, “Service Delivery and Performance 
Monitoring in PFI/PPP Projects,” 182-183. 
91	
	
governments create risk pricing and risk premium models, as “risk compensation 
calculations in the particular P[3] context are lacking.”235 
4.5.2 Insuring Risk  
 Typically, both public and private parties are required to maintain insurance 
policies with respect to a large portion of P3 project risks. P3 contracts stipulate required 
insurance coverage up to a minimum amount for both public and private parties, and 
sometimes a maximum amount for private parties (i.e. insurable risk caps). As noted in 
Section 4.5.1, not all P3 project risks are insurable; these risks are heavily borne by 
public authorities. For risks that are insurable, it is “common practice… [to include] 
minimum insurance package[s]” during early stages of P3 PRM.236 In fact, public 
authorities request that SPVs include proposed insurance policies for transferrable risks 
as early as the RFQ stage. SPVs are typically asked to include cost estimations for their 
respective insurance partners on insurable risks that cover “physical damage during 
construction, loss of revenue due to delays… third-party liabilities, as well as 
performance guarantees required by the P[3] contract” in their RFP submissions.237  
The involvement of insurance companies is not limited to a financier role; they 
are often included in the provision of RMAs as risk management consultants. Thus, 
insurance practitioners provide specialized insurance advice that transcends its field and 
permeates into the fields of risk delegation itself and PRM as a whole. During pre-
contractual PRM, insurers may assume a consultant role over risk transfer and RMA 
																																								 																				
235 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 33. 
236 APMG International, “PPP Certification Program Guide” (Buckinghamshire, England: APM 
Group Ltd., 2016), Section 9.5, par. 14. 
237 Ibid., Section 6.2, par. 7. 
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selection. During post-contractual PRM, insurers will provide advice over the treatment 
of risks associated with insurance costs. Insurance risk “refers to the risk of the price for 
the insurance developing in a different way than anticipated, such that it is not 
compensated for by the indexation of the service payment.”238 When insurable coverage 
requirements deviate significantly from final contract projections, insurance policies 
present a risk threat or risk opportunity to public and private partners.239  
Pending provisions in the final P3 contract, where insurance costs present a risk 
threat (i.e. insurance costs exceed projections by a stipulated amount), private partners 
are entitled to compensation equivalent to the amount insurance costs exceed initial 
projections with reference to a benchmark. Similarly, where insurance costs present a risk 
opportunity (i.e. insurance costs fall short of projections by a stipulated amount), public 
authorities are entitled to symmetrically equivalent compensation in the form of a credit 
paid back by private partners who received insurance premiums in excess of what was 
required.240  
4.6 Conclusion 
In theory, a P3 achieves optimal risk allocation through the selection of 
appropriate RMAs – derived from a thoroughly exhaustive pre-contractual PRM cycle – 
followed by post-contractual PRM, where each actor manages its project responsibilities 
and risks as expected. Under the principal-agent framework, the interdependency of a 
P3’s execution between public principals and private agents requires trust and 
																																								 																				
238 Ibid., Section 1.2.9, par. 14. 
239 This deviation is considered when the costs of insurance premiums exceed projections by a 
stipulated percentage, typically expressed in the range of 50 to 100 percent.  See Ibid., Section 
1.2.9, par. 16. 
240 Ibid. 
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cooperation. To be charitable to the P3 process, most public and private actors have the 
mutual incentive of creating optimal risk transfer under a “common destiny…[where] 
every player has an interest in the other players not failing.”241 
While a ‘common destiny’ – a reciprocal objective to create a sound project 
through the optimal treatment of risk – is a theoretical ideal, it is mired in obstructive 
constraints. During pre-contractual PRM, optimal risk allocation is threatened by issues 
like bounded rationality (e.g. asymmetric information acquisition), subjectivity (e.g. 
optimism bias), and moral hazards (e.g. strategic behaviour).242  Together, these threats 
can spur opportunistic behaviour from private partners, whereby project bids and pre-
contractual agreements do not align with post-contractual performance. In turn, 
premeditated contract renegotiations can occur. 243  To this end, governments must 
promote incentive schemes, aligning and uniting the strategic motivations of private 
partners and public authorities. 
 As mentioned earlier, it is important for governments to ensure that P3 projects 
are conducted with transparency. To this end, it is difficult to offer further insight on 
moral risk. Scholars regularly note that issues of this vein – for example, moral hazards 
and adverse selection – exist in P3s, but they are difficult to identify due to a general lack 
of contractual transparency.244 Legal disputes and contractual renegotiations of P3s are 
																																								 																				
241 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure,” 87. 
242 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere”; 
Eriksen and Jensen, “The Cost of Second Best Pricing and the Value of Risk Premium”; 
Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
243 Mohamed, Khoury, and Hafez, “Contractor’s Decision for Bid Profit Reduction within 
Opportunistic Bidding Behavior of Claims Recovery”; Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
244 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 29. 
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tightly confined procedures. Major disputes eventually become publicly known (e.g. 
between the Canadian Government, WEMG, and multiple JVs over the Right Honourable 
Herb Gray Parkway’s faulty girders). However, their legal intricacies and financial 
resolutions remain elusive to the general public. 
Moral risks aside, the success of a P3 project is also threatened by subjectivity in 
PRM; decision-making modules for P3s necessitate the subjective, albeit expert, input of 
practitioners. Scholars offer various measures to combat practitioner subjectivities that 
hamper PRM procedures and RMA selection: (i) systematic decision-making modules; 
(ii) transparent documentation of decisions; (iii) exhaustive qualification measures to 
validate the status of experts that quantify risk and risk premiums; (iv) adequate size of 
expert teams; (v) the use of multiple methodologies during pre-contractual PRM; and, 
most relevant to the next chapters, (vi) a multidimensional, interdisciplinary approach to 
risk allocation.245   
Ultimately, considering the treatment of risk over a P3 project’s lifecycle, it is 
imperative that this interdisciplinary procurement method is studied through an 
interdisciplinary vein.246 Successful P3s require the coalescence of multiple agents from 
diverse areas of expertise. Further, the development of P3 literature stands to benefit from 
a holistic approach that considers the expertise and concerns of practitioners and scholars 
																																								 																				
245 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process”; Nora M. El-Gohary, Hesham Osman, and Tamer E. El-Diraby, “Stakeholder 
Management for Public Private Partnerships,” International Journal of Project Management 24, 
no. 7 (2006): 595–604, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2006.07.009; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk 
Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of Social Infrastructure”; Bent Flyvbjerg, 
“What You Should Know about Megaprojects and Why: An Overview,” Project Management 
Journal, 2014, doi:10.1002/pmj.21409. 
246 El-Gohary, Osman, and El-Diraby, “Stakeholder Management for Public Private Partnerships,” 
604. 
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from a multitude of disciplines: political science, law, engineering, mathematics, finance, 
business, management science, geography, and economics, among others.247   
PRM, as an applied science, must utilize cooperative efforts to present diverse 
expert input that can be readily transferred to the P3 industry itself. PRM literature should 
develop a systematic transfer of knowledge to real-life P3 infrastructure procurement – 
one that considers the input of all aforementioned fields. In light of this idea, the 
following chapters present research that revolves around original input from public and 
private P3 practitioners from a wide range of professional backgrounds. Their input 
specifically pertains to risk allocation preferences during first-step risk transfer. 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
																																								 																				
247 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 9; El-Gohary, Osman, and El-Diraby, “Stakeholder Management for Public Private 
Partnerships,” 601; Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the 
Provision of Social Infrastructure,” 88. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RISK ALLOCATION RECOMMENDATIONS IN P3 LITERATURE 
5.1 Introduction  
The centered focus of Chapter 5 deals with risk allocation during the P3 
procurement phase. This entails either: (i) the public sector retaining risks or (ii) first-step 
risk transfer – either fully or partially – to SPVs. As noted in Chapters 2 and 4, the P3 
procurement phase requires years of pre-contractual considerations from the public sector 
– i.e. P3 screening processes – and negotiations both within and between public and 
private sectors. Poor pre-contractual PRM, resulting in suboptimal risk allocation, has the 
potential to create irreparable opportunity costs in P3s. The significance of planning and 
managing risk allocation during this phase cannot be overestimated.248  
Chapter 5 complements P3 literature on risk allocation by offering theoretical 
insight, and potential guidance, towards first-step risk transfer during the procurement 
phase. Research on the public-private relationship is steered by expert practitioner 
feedback in Chapter 6, drawing from an interdisciplinary research network of both public 
and private sector P3 practitioners. Thus, this research’s strength lies in its multifaceted 
focus on risk allocation between public authorities and SPVs.  
To recap, the literature reviews of Chapters 3 and 4 – which draw from scholarly 
insights and principal-agent considerations – provide broad guidelines for first-step risk 
transfer: (i) risks that are solely influenced by the public sector should be retained by the 
public client; (ii) risks that are solely influenced by the private sector should be 
																																								 																				
248 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 40. 
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transferred to the private client; (iii) risks that are partially influenced by both clients can 
be shared; and (iv) regardless of the private sector’s influence on uncertainties, the public 
client should bear them either in full or to a degree.249 Further, when a risk is being 
allocated through an optimal RMA, risk bearers should be able to foresee the risk, gauge 
the risk’s potential project impact or cost, mitigate the chances of the risk occurring, 
assess whether it can bear the risk if it arises, and receive a reasonable risk premium for 
bearing it.250 
With gained insight on P3 procurement and PRM processes – supplemented by 
principal-agent risk allocation frameworks – Chapter 5 builds on previous chapters by 
presenting a core literature database comprised of a dozen articles that focus on risk 
allocation between public and private P3 partners. This core database is used to execute 
an original study premised on the allocation of contentious risks in P3 projects in Canada. 
A cross-comparative analysis of the core literature is conducted to arrive at sound risk 
preferences and contentious risk preferences.  
In this study, ‘sound’ risk preferences are defined as those that were given the 
same allocation preferences across all articles where they are mentioned in the core 
literature database.251 Sound risks are not assessed for further research; it is assumed that 
their conclusive allocation preferences within the literature signifies a lessened need to 
																																								 																				
249 I.e. if the private client has no influence, the public client should bear an uncertainty in full; if 
the private client has some influence, it may share the uncertainty with a pre-agreed risk cap. See 
Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of Social 
Infrastructure,” 86. 
250 A.P.C. Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private 
Partnership Projects in China.,” Journal of Management in Engineering 27, no. July (2010): 143-
144, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000049. 
251 While the twelve pieces of literature that comprise the core database share similar thematic 
scopes, they do not all focus on identical risks. Thus, not every risk is mentioned in every piece of 
literature.   
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conduct original research on their allocation. Conversely, contentious risk preferences are 
defined as those risks that have been allocated to different preferential sectors at least 
once amongst the articles where they are mentioned in the core database. 252  The 
preferential sectors of allocation for risks in the P3 literature include a spectrum denoting: 
sole public allocation, different degrees of shared allocation, and sole private 
allocation.253  
5.2 Literature Review  
  The dozen pieces of P3 literature in the core database – comprised of ten 
scholarly articles and two central government agency primers – were selected and cross-
referenced to arrive at common risk allocation preference schemes and a common 
methodological framework for the study. The selected pieces of literature all evaluate P3 
risk allocation schemes and were published between 1998 and 2013. Figure 5.1 presents a 
geographical depiction of the literature consulted. 254  Figure 5.2 classifies the core 
literature database according to the research’s sector of interest, stakeholder perspective, 
type of research used, data sources used, subject of study, and methodologies used.  
 
																																								 																				
252 Content analysis of the literature was used to ensure identified risks could be compared across 
the literature. For example, if an identified risk is named ‘legal/regulatory changes’ in one article 
and named ‘change in law’ in another, both of these titles – albeit different – denote the same risk 
and are treated accordingly.  
253 Due to variance in methodologies, some pieces of literature in the core database employ 
different means of labeling risk allocation preferences. Specifically, not all pieces of literature 
demarcate the extent to which public or private parties should share risks (e.g. some articles 
suggest allocation preferences where a risk should be borne either solely by the public or private 
sector or simply ‘shared,’ while articles offer degrees of sharing preferences where one sector 
bears a larger fraction of a risk than the other).  
254 Some pieces of literature in the core database extrapolate their findings to make global P3 
recommendations. Thus, the location where research was conducted is not always a relevant 
factor when assessing every author’s recommended risk allocation scheme. 
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Figure 5. 1: Geographical Representation of Core Literature Database’s Origins 
 
Figure 5. 2: Classification of Core Literature Database 
 
Author 
Classification 
Sector of 
Interest 
Stake-
holder 
Persp-
ective 
Type of 
research 
Data 
sources 
Subject of study Methodology 
 
Arndt (1998)  Transportation 
Public-
Private   Qualitative  Secondary Risk Allocation 
Summative Content 
Analysis of Case 
Study 
Wang & Tiong 
(2000) 
 
Energy 
Public-
Private Qualitative 
 
Secondary Risk Allocation 
Factor analysis of 
Case Study 
 
VDTF (2001)  n/a 
Public-
Private 
Qualitative 
and 
Quantitative 
 
Secondary 
P3 Procurement 
(exhaustive) n/a 
 
NTSA (2004)  Health 
Public-
Private 
Qualitative 
and 
Quantitative 
 
Secondary 
P3 Procurement 
(exhaustive) n/a 
 
Li et al. (2005)  n/a 
Public-
Private 
 
Quantitative 
 
Primary Risk Allocation 
Content Analysis of 
Expert 
Questionnaire 
 
Shen et al. (2006)  Recreation 
Public-
Private 
 
Qualitative 
 
Secondary 
Risk Allocation 
and 
Risk Assessment 
Factor analysis of 
Case Study 
Ng & Loosemore 
(2007) 
 
Transportation 
Public-
Private 
 
Qualitative 
 
Secondary Risk Allocation 
Factor analysis of 
Case Study 
 
Lam et al (2007) 
 
Transportation 
Public-
Private 
 
Quantitative 
 
Primary Risk Allocation 
Fuzzy Logic applied 
to Expert Input 
 
Ke et al (2010)  n/a 
 
Public-
Private 
 
Quantitative 
 
Primary Risk Allocation 
Content Analysis of 
Expert 
Questionnaire 
 
Chan et al (2011)  n/a 
 
Public-
Private 
 
Quantitative 
 
Primary 
Risk Allocation 
and 
Risk Assessment 
Content Analysis of 
Expert 
Questionnaire 
 
Hwang et al 
(2013) 
 
n/a 
 
Public-
Private 
 
Quantitative 
 
Primary 
Risk Allocation 
and 
Risk Assessment 
Content Analysis of 
Expert 
Questionnaire 
 
Tolani (2013)  n/a 
 
Public-
Private 
 
Quantitative 
 
Primary Risk Allocation 
Content Analysis of 
Expert 
Questionnaire 
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5.2.1 Risk Allocation in the Melbourne City Link Project 
Ardnt analyzes a transportation P3 project – the Melbourne City Link (MCL), 
worth 1.8 billion dollars255 – from a public-private stakeholder perspective. He assesses 
the MCL’s risk allocation scheme using secondary sources under the widely-accepted 
principle that “the government intends to allocate risks to those parties it considers best 
positioned to assess and manage them.”256 Arndt adopts a qualitative methodological 
approach, assessing the project’s risk allocation in light of the MCL’s material adverse 
effect (MAE) regime, which “is a tool that helps allocate and share risks.”257  
By accessing reports on ministerial portfolios, Arndt notes that “a closer reading 
of the documents indicates a further shift of risk to the private sector” compared to 
previous P3 projects in Australia.258 He develops an MCL risk matrix for the project’s 
risks, noting where the public authority and private partner have: (i) accepted the majority 
of a risk, (ii) partially accepted a risk, or (iii) not taken a risk. 
In line with the MCL’s MAE clauses, Arndt identifies the following risk 
categories: design and construction risks (e.g. design, construction, site, approvals, and 
completion); operation risks (e.g. production, asset upgrades, maintenance, 
environmental, and insurance); market risks (e.g. demand, volume, and revenue); sponsor 
risks (e.g. consortium, commercial, finance, default, and condition at transfer); sovereign 
risks (e.g. legislation, policy, and residual value); network risks (e.g. access regime and 
linked infrastructure); and external risks (e.g. force majeure and financial). In total, 26 
																																								 																				
255 In American dollars. 
256 Raphael Henry Arndt, “Risk Allocation in the Melbourne City Link Project,” The Journal of 
Project Finance, no. 2 (1998): par. 17, doi:10.1007/s13398-014-0173-7.2. 
257 Ibid., par. 28. 
258 Ibid., par. 90. 
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risks – along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these 
categories.  
5.2.2 Case Study of Government Initiatives for PRC's BOT Power Plant Projects 
Wang and Tiong analyze an energy infrastructure project – the Laibin B Power 
Plant – from a public-private stakeholder perspective. While the cost of the project is not 
publicly available, the project was solely financed by the private sector.259 It uses the 
power plant as a case study to conduct qualitative research on the risk allocation schemes 
of build-operate-transfer (BOT) concessions in China. The study adopts a factor analysis 
methodology to assess the Laibin B Power Plant’s risk allocation scheme.260 Wang and 
Tiong draw from the following data sources: (i) secondary sources (i.e. Laibin B’s 
concession agreement, power purchase agreement, and fuel supply and transportation 
agreement); (ii) interviews with Laibin B project practitioners (i.e. public officials and 
private managers); (iii) literature reviews on BOT-esque procedures and regulations (e.g. 
BOT, BOO, and BOOT projects); and (iv) an expert questionnaire.261  
After a case study on the Laibin B Power Plant, Wang and Tiong create a risk 
allocation matrix for the project. They identify the following risk categories: political 
risks, construction completion risks, operating risks, market and revenue risks, finance 
risks, legal risks, and competition risk (i.e. adverse selection during project tender). In 
																																								 																				
259 The World Bank, “Laibin B Power Plant Snapshots - Private Participation in Infrastructure 
(PPI) - World Bank Group,” Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, 1997, 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/snapshots/project/laibin-b-power-plant-270. 
260 S. Q. Wang and L. K. Tiong, “Case Study of Government Initiatives for PRC’s BOT Power 
Plant Project,” International Journal of Project Management 18, no. 1 (2000): 69–78, 
doi:10.1016/S0263-7863(98)00072-6. 
261 Ibid., 70. 
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total, 53 risks – along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these 
categories.  
5.2.3 Partnerships Victoria: Risk allocation and Contractual Issues 
The Government of Victoria’s Department of Treasury and Finance (VDTF) 
provides an exhaustive three-part primer to guide practitioners in implementing P3s 
under the Partnerships Victoria policy framework. The primer’s scope encompasses a 
wide range of P3 procurement matters relating to risk allocation and contractual 
practices.  
Throughout the primer, multiple stakeholder perspectives are considered (i.e. 
public-private, public, private, and subcontracted third parties), multiple subjects of study 
are considered (e.g. P3 governance, ex post evaluations, key success factors, pre-tender 
and tender stages, risk identification and assessment, and risk transfer), multiple 
approaches to research are used (i.e. quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical), and 
multiple methodologies are adopted (e.g. financial analysis via usage fee reduction [UFR] 
formulas and common area payment reduction [CAPR] formulas). For the sake of 
brevity, only relevant sections of this primer are identified and classified in Figure 5.2.262  
Part One establishes a policy framework with reference to guiding principles for 
providing public infrastructure via P3s. Part Two provides the foundations of risk 
identification, assessment, and allocation with reference to generic examples of past P3 
projects. Part Three focuses on the main contractual concerns of P3 project risk 
																																								 																				
262 Due to its relatively wide scope in comparison to the rest of the core literature database, only 
select chapters are focused on. If the primer were assessed in full, it would cover a considerably 
larger amount of factors than those identified in Figure 5.2. 
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allocation. Special attention is paid to Part One, Chapter 4, which develops a risk 
allocation framework, and Part Two, Chapters 8-17, which identify a plethora of P3-
related project risks alongside their respective allocation preferences.  
Part Two, Chapters 8-17 proves useful for identifying and defining various 
contentious risks for the forthcoming study. Part One, Chapter 4 summarizes much of 
what has already been covered in this thesis. Specifically, its covers risk allocation 
concepts such as: optimal risk allocation, risk-bearer influence, risk premiums, risk 
‘threats’ and ‘opportunities,’ pre-contractual PRM, post-contractual PRM, and the factors 
influencing RMA selection.263  
Part One, Chapter 4 concludes with reference to an appended standardized risk 
matrix that provides a framework for the Victorian Government’s risk allocation 
preferences. The following risk categories are identified: site risks; design, construction, 
and commissioning risks; sponsor and financial risks; operating risks; market risks; 
network and interface risks; industrial relations risks; legislative and government policy 
risks; force majeure risks; and asset ownership risks.264 In total, 42 risks – along with 
their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these categories.  
5.2.4 PPP Manual Module 4: PPP Feasibility Study, South Africa 
In the same vein as the VDTF, the National Treasury of South Africa (NTSA) 
provides another comprehensive primer – National Treasury’s PPP Manual – as a 
systematic guide to regulate the practices of both public and private P3 practitioners 
																																								 																				
263 While these concepts are covered in the VDTF’s primer, it uses different naming schemes (e.g. 
risk “threats” and “opportunities” are called “liabilities” and “upside benefits”; “PRM” is not 
explicitly mentioned as a concept). These discrepancies are merely rhetorical in nature. VDTF, 
“Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 19-23. 
264 Ibid., 178-192. 
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during P3 project lifecycles. The manual contains nine modules in total. However, 
Module 4 is the focus of this literature review. Similar to the VDTF’s primer – which 
models its risk allocation recommendations with reference to the Partnership Victory 
policy framework – Module 4 of the NTSA’s primer models its risk allocation 
recommendations with reference to a national policy framework: Treasury Regulation 16 
of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999.265 Treasury Regulation 16 is the chief 
legislation governing national and provincial P3s in South Africa. It provides 
practitioners with meticulously crafted legal parameters and contains hundreds of 
provisions for public and private actors to follow during P3 project delivery.266 
Thus, the NTSA’s Module 4 is largely explicative in nature; it provides readers 
with precise, detailed instructions on P3 procurement with the goal of aiding in “the 
effective and efficient management and use of financial resources.” 267  Module 4 
summarizes much of what has already been covered in this thesis. It considers: 
preplanning and options analysis (e.g. needs analysis, feasibility analysis, P3 screening, 
PSCs, and preliminary VFM using shadow bids); preliminary project drafts (e.g. 
developing output specifications, a project reference scenario, and early competitive 
process documents); competitive selection processes (e.g. due diligence from the private 
sector, developed VFM tests, and RFPs); and, eventually, a final risk allocation scheme. 
																																								 																				
265 NTSA, “National Treasury PPP Manual - Module 4 : PPP Feasibility Study National Treasury 
Ppp Practice Note,” iii. 
266 H.K. Yong, Public-Private Partnerships Policy and Practice: A Reference Guide, 2010, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=tnuFUUjP9f8C&pgis=1. 
267 Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal 
Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007): 261, 
https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HKqL-
ZyF1oAC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=The+Manipulation+of+Choice:+Ethics+and+Libertarian+Pater
nalism&ots=RvS-buK8qN&sig=0fK_ydEins-a_P8vGapytIAwuYs. 
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Like the VDTF’s primer, the NTSA’s Module 4 covers multiple stakeholder 
perspectives, subjects of study, approaches to research, and methodologies. While the 
module covers the P3 process broadly, it draws a specific sector of interest – the health 
sector – via a case study of a construction project for a hypothetical hospital.268 Specific 
attention is paid to the module’s matrix approach “to weigh up the evaluation of… 
option[s]… to assist in the choice of the best one[s].”269 The module considers possible 
project impacts on both public and private stakeholders when constructing the matrix. 
The NTSA notes the value of risk matrices during all P3 procurement phases: “A 
comprehensive risk matrix is a fundamental component of P[3] procurement as it is used 
to identify and track risk allocation throughout the drafting of the P[3] agreement, the 
bidding process, P[3] agreement negotiation and financial closure.”270  
Its standardized P3 risk matrix for the hypothetical hospital identifies the 
following risks: availability risks, completion risks, cost overrun risks, design risks, 
environmental risks, exchange rate risks, force majeure risks, inflation risks, insolvency 
risks, insurance risks, interest rate risks, latent defect risks, maintenance risks, market 
demand and volume risks, operating risks, planning risks, political risks, regulatory risks, 
residual value risks, resource input risks, subcontractor risks, tax rate change risks, 
technology risks, and utilities risks. Unlike most pieces of literature in this study’s core 
database, the NTSA does not classify project risks under broad categories. Thus, the 
																																								 																				
268 For example, Module 4 uses financial analysis to arrive at the net present value (NPV) of the 
hospital’s projected cash flow during the PSC phase. Its PSC reference model of the case study 
adopts a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to arrive at an NPV calculation to determine the 
case study’s project costs. See NTSA, “National Treasury PPP Manual - Module 4 : PPP 
Feasibility Study National Treasury PPP Practice Note,” 55. 
269 Ibid., 13. 
270 Ibid., 27. 
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aforementioned 24 risks – along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified 
independently.271 
5.2.5 The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK 
Li et al. take a generalized focus on P3s without a specific industry of interest. 
They develop a risk allocation framework for public authorities under the United 
Kingdom’s private finance initiative (PFI), adopting a public-private stakeholder 
perspective. They use an expert questionnaire to arrive at risk allocation preferences for 
various P3 project risks (i.e. between public, private, and shared sectors of allocation). 
Their respondent pool comprises expert practitioners from both the public and private 
sector.272 They adopt a meta-classification approach to risk identification, assorting risks 
by their respective levels: macro, meso, and micro.  
Macro level risks are exogenous risks (i.e. external project risks that cannot be 
influenced). Meso level risks are project-related risks occurring within a P3’s “system 
boundaries” (e.g. foreseen project risks during DBFOM implementation processes). 
Micro level risks are party-related risks that arise due to stakeholder relationships during 
PRM (e.g. moral hazards or optimism bias); these risks arise due to the aforementioned 
principal-agent relationship between public authorities and SPVs, where it is assumed 
that the public principal is driven by providing social services and the private agent is 
driven by maximizing profits. 273 
																																								 																				
271 Wang and Tiong, for example, identify 53 risks under seven broad categories; the VDTF, for 
example, identifies 42 risks under ten broad categories. The NTSA, however, identifies and 
allocates 24 risks separately without categorizing them. 
272 Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,” 29. 
273 Ibid., 27. 
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 The three meta-classification categories contain sub-categories that classify risks 
of a specific nature (i.e. akin to the previous literature from Arndt, Wang and Tiong, and 
the VDTF). Li et al. note that, by adopting these sub-categories to classify project risks, 
“it facilitates a strategic approach to risk management for public and private sector 
project stakeholders… [and] indicate[s] situations where common approaches to risk 
analysis, risk treatment, and subsequent risk monitoring and control, can be adopted in 
the risk management process.”274  
Li et al’s risk catalogue classifies macro level risks as: political risks (e.g. 
unstable government), macroeconomic risks (e.g. inflation and interest rates), legal risks 
(e.g. legislation changes), social risks (e.g. public opposition to a project), and natural 
risks (e.g. force majeure). It classifies meso level risks as: project selection risks (e.g. 
land acquisition), project finance risks (e.g. potential investor attraction), residual risk,275 
design risks (e.g. delay in project approvals and permits), construction risks (e.g. 
construction cost overrun), and operation risks (e.g. operational revenues below project 
projections). It classifies micro level risks as: relationship risks (e.g. organization and 
coordination risk) and third party risks (e.g. third party tort liability). In total, 46 risks – 
along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these categories.  
5.2.6 Role of PPPs to Manage Risks in Public Sector Projects in Hong Kong 
From the onset of their study, Shen et al. note how the complex, interdisciplinary 
nature of P3 megaprojects puts a premium on achieving optimal risk allocation for 
project success. Further, they note how potentially divisive principal-agent relationships 
																																								 																				
274 Ibid. 
275 Residual risk is both its own risk category and risk factor; there are no other risk factors 
associated with residual risk’s category. 
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between public authorities and private partners compound the significance of optimal risk 
allocation:  
… construction activity is usually subject to more risk than other business 
activities because of its complexity particularly in coordinating a wide 
range of disparate and interrelated skills and activities. This complexity is 
further compounded in implementing public sector projects where multiple 
project objectives are expected by a wide range of stakeholders who have 
different interests associated with the projects.276   
Shen et al. analyze the Hong Kong Disneyland (KDLD) P3 project from a public-private 
stakeholder perspective. They assess the KDLD’s PRM scheme, with particular focus on 
its risk allocation framework, to “examin[e]… the ways that the application of P[3s] can 
effectively manage risks in project delivery.”277 They adopt a qualitative methodological 
approach, assessing the KDLD’s risk allocation framework by means of semi-structured 
interviews with senior public officials, followed by factor analysis on the KDLD case 
study to provide recommendations on risk allocation preferences for P3 projects in the 
recreational sector in Hong Kong.  
Akin to Chapter 4 of this thesis, Shen et al. review pre-contractual and post-
contractual P3 PRM. They arrive at similar conclusions over the mutual incentive of 
collaboration between P3 actors, noting that P3 partners “have an incentive to work 
together at an early stage to decide the best way to deliver the required service over the 
contract life… This results in minimum lifecycle cost… and… less [project] changes… 
during the construction process.”278 Through their own literature review, Shen et al. 
																																								 																				
276 Li Yin Shen, Andrew Platten, and X. P. Deng, “Role of Public Private Partnerships to Manage 
Risks in Public Sector Projects in Hong Kong,” International Journal of Project Management 24, 
no. 7 (2006): 587, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2006.07.006. 
277 Ibid., 588. 
278 Ibid., 591. 
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identify the following major risk categories: project-related risks, government-related 
risks, client-related risks, design-related risks, contractor-related risks, consultant-related 
risks, and market-related risks.279 In total, 13 risks – along with their preferred allocation 
schemes for the KDLD – are identified under these categories.280 
5.2.7 Risk Allocation in the Private Provision of Public Infrastructure 
 Ng and Loosemore conduct an ex post case study on a transportation P3 project – 
the New Southern Railway (NSR), worth 920 million dollars281 – from a public-private 
stakeholder perspective. They analyze the rationale behind the NSR’s risk allocation 
scheme, highlighting the project’s “complexity and obscurity of risks… and the 
difficulties in distributing them appropriately.” 282  They employ a qualitative factor 
analysis methodology by highlighting the main risks associated with the NSR project and 
critiquing the RMAs selected during PRM. Ng and Loosemore utilize a range of data 
sources, including: semi-structured interviews with senior public and private 
practitioners, primary analysis of publicly available contract documentation, secondary 
analysis of public and private sector reports and documents, conferences, newspaper 
reports, and P3 journal articles.283   
 This literature review focuses specifically on Ng and Loosemore’s risk 
identification and allocation schemes. Instead of allocating project risks to a sector of 
preference (i.e. public or private), they recommended risk transfer to specific project 
																																								 																				
279 Ibid., 590. 
280 Ibid., 592-593. 
281 In American dollars. 
282 A. Ng and Martin Loosemore, “Risk Allocation in the Private Provision of Public 
Infrastructure,” International Journal of Project Management 25, no. 1 (2007): 66, 
doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2006.06.005. 
283 Ibid., 72. 
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actors (e.g. government, construction contractor, insurer, etc.). By demarcating JVs, 
equity investors, and lenders as separate actors under the private sector, Ng and 
Loosemore arrive at more specific risk allocation recommendations than their peers. 
 They adopt major risk categories from Grimsey and Lewis, who identify the 
following main types of risk categories: site risks, technical risks, construction risks, 
operating risks, revenue risks, financial risks, force majeure risks, political risks, project 
default risks, and asset risks.284 In total, Ng and Loosemore identify 36 risks – along with 
their preferred allocation schemes for the NSR – under these categories.  
5.2.8 Modeling Risk Allocation Decision in Construction Contracts  
 From the onset, Lam et al. recognize the unavoidable issue of subjective expert 
assessment – mentioned in Chapter 4285 – in allocating P3 project risks: “allocation of risk 
among the contracting parties… requires qualitative judgment and experiential 
knowledge of construction experts. However, it is subjective and implicit.”286 To mitigate 
the widely recognized issue of expert subjectivity, Lam et al. deploy a systematic fuzzy 
logic analysis, converting private expert input into quantitatively based risk allocation 
preferences between the public and private sector. Thus, Lam et al. adopt a public-private 
stakeholder perspective, using private stakeholder input and fuzzy logic methodology to 
provide a template quantitative model for P3 project risk allocation.  
																																								 																				
284 Grimsey and Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure 
Provision and Project Finance. 
285 To recap a major theme of Chapter 4, no matter how many quantitative PRM methodologies 
are adopted – and no matter how many times data is aggregated – risk allocation schemes are 
always subject to expert input and interpretation, which suffer from degrees of subjectivity. See 
Eriksen and Jensen, “The Cost of Second Best Pricing and the Value of Risk Premium,” 36; 
Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of Social 
Infrastructure,” 88; Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 269. 
286 Lam et al., “Modelling Risk Allocation Decision in Construction Contracts,” 485. 
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 Lam et al. also note the significance of pre-contractual PRM in providing optimal 
RMAs, so that “litigation of contractual claims… [do not] come after… in court. The 
allocation of risks is thus one of the important decision-making processes leading to 
project success.”287 Expert input during pre-contractual PRM suffers from issues like 
linguistic vagueness, imprecision, and partiality. 288  Fuzzy logic tackles project 
complexities that arise from these issues by taking natural language and computing it 
quantitatively to arrive at precise, certain variables based on semantics.  
 Lam et al. take expert practitioner input – i.e. linguistic variables, which are 
imprecise qualitative values – and convert it to precise quantitative values by means of 
“membership functions.” Membership functions denote “various degrees of membership” 
– from 0 to 1 – to a variable (e.g. inflation risk) and a member (e.g. public authority). 
Because membership functions are non-binary, Lam et al. are able to model risk 
allocation preferences by degrees.289 For example, if fuzzy logic is applied to personal 
risk allocation preferences of expert practitioners for inflation risks, and inflation risk’s 
membership function is calculated to be 0.20 for the private sector and 0.80 for the public 
sector, then it follows that the public sector should retain inflation risks either majorly or 
solely. 
 Lam et al. use a case study model of a railway P3 project issued by the Hong 
Kong Government. They assess a contract issued by a private railway company 
responsible for the project’s DBFO. The authors obtain expert input for each risk 
																																								 																				
287 This assertion signifies the importance of optimal risk allocation during pre-contractual PRM 
as a means of mitigating risks during post-contractual PRM. See Ibid., 485-486. 
288 As noted in Chapter 4, this is especially prevalent during the pre-contractual PRM cycle. 
Transparency issues like information asymmetry should also not be ignored. See Ibid., 486. 
289 Ibid. 
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stipulated under the contract before fuzzifying the data.290 The contract identifies five 
main risk categories: capability risks, contractual and legal risks, economic risks, physical 
risks, and political and societal risks. In total, 16 risks – along with their preferred 
allocation schemes for the railway project – are identified under these categories. 
5.2.9 Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s PPP Projects 
 Ke et al. adopt a public-private stakeholder perspective to analyze risk allocation 
preferences in Chinese P3 projects. Similar to scholars before them, they note “each risk 
should be allocated to the party best able to manage it and at the least cost.” Ke et al. 
conduct a comprehensive literature review to identify common P3 project risks. Their 
literature review is supplemented by telephone interviews with P3 practitioners to collect 
data on sixteen P3 projects in China.291 
Based on the risks identified in their literature review and interviews, Ke et al. 
administered a two-round Delphi questionnaire survey to P3 practitioners in China. The 
first round asked participants to allocate risks between public and private sectors based 
on a five-point scale.292 The second round asked first round respondents to reassess their 
original scores after being provided with feedback of the first round’s results.293  
Ke et al. apply various quantitative methods (e.g. mean score methodology) to the 
survey results to arrive at respective risk allocation preferences to aid public and private 
																																								 																				
290 This includes the degree to which a risk is foreseeable, assessable, controllable, manageable, 
and sustainable to a contractor. See Ibid., 490. 
291 Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” 
483. 
292 Where 1 = “government takes sole responsibility,” 2 = “government takes the majority of 
responsibility,” 3 = “both parties take equal responsibility,” 4 = “private sector takes the majority 
of responsibility,” and 5 = “private sector takes sole responsibility.” See Ibid., 484. 
293 This includes each risk item’s: (i) mean score, (ii) frequency of selection between the five 
points, and (iii) the respondent’s original selections from the first round. See Ibid. 
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sector partners in achieving “a balance of distribution of responsibilities and risks and 
thus reduce the time and cost of contract negotiation.”294 They identify seven risk 
categories: political risks, construction risks, operation risks, legal risks, market risks, 
economic risks, and “other” risks.295 In total, 37 risks – along with their preferred 
allocation schemes – are identified under these categories. 
5.2.10 Empirical Study of Risk Assessment and Allocation of PPP Projects in China 
Chan et al. adopt a public-private stakeholder perspective to identify, assess, and 
allocate principle risks during P3 project delivery in China. They conduct a literature 
review of previous studies on P3 PRM, identifying two broad risk classifications: 
systematic/country risks and specific project risks. Systematic/country risks include 
macroeconomic variables that are beyond the scope of SPV influence. Specific project 
risks include microeconomic variables of a specific project that are within the scope of 
SPV influence.296 Once all project risks are identified, Chan et al. administer an expert 
questionnaire to measure each risk’s weighted significance to P3 projects and arrive at a 
preferred allocation scheme.  
Each risk’s weighted significance is calculated by multiplying its probability of 
occurrence with its potential impact on a project, both of which are measured using a 
five-point Likert scale.297 Each risk’s preferred allocation scheme is calculated via mean 
																																								 																				
294 Ibid., 491. 
295 Ibid., 485. 
296 A.P.C. Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private 
Partnership Projects in China.,” Journal of Management in Engineering 27, no. July (2010): 139, 
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000049. 
297 The probability of occurrence and potential project impact are both measured with the same 
scale:  “1 = very low, 2  = low, 3 = average, 4 = high, and 5 = very high.” See Ibid., 140. 
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score methodology from a three-point semantic differential scale.298 Chan et al. note that 
the questionnaire’s empirical results provided a “general consensus” among public and 
private sector practitioners, with slight deviations regarding the degree to which some 
risks should be allocated to their respective sectors.299 
Chan et al. identify subcategories within the two broad classifications of 
systematic/country risks and specific project risks. Systematic/country risks deal with: 
political risks, economic risks, legal risks, social risks, and nature risks. Specific project 
risks deal with: construction risks, operation risks, market risks, relationship risks, and 
“other specific project risks.”300 In total, 34 risks – along with their preferred allocation 
schemes – are identified under these categories. 
5.2.11 PPP Projects in Singapore: Critical Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation  
 The purpose of Hwang et al.’s research is twofold. First, they conduct ex post 
research on P3 projects in Singapore, identifying positive and negative risk factors that 
influence their national feasibility.301 Second, they employ an expert questionnaire survey 
to identify both the degree of each identified risk’s criticality and the preferred sector of 
allocation for each risk. 302  Thus, the research takes a public-private stakeholder 
perspective. Hwang et al. use quantitative methodology to conduct a content analysis, 
along with statistical hypothesis testing, on critical success factors and risk allocation 
preferences for P3 projects. 
																																								 																				
298 Where “1 = mainly to the public sector, 2 = equally shared between the public and private 
sectors, and 3 = mainly to the private sector.” See Ibid., 144. 
299 Ibid., 136. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Based on ten completed P3 projects where facilities are under current operation. See Hwang, 
Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical Risks and 
Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 424. 
302 Ibid., 425. 
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Hwang et al. note that appropriate risk allocation and PRM is “critical for both 
public and private parties in P[3] projects to attain their objectives.”303 As is the case with 
most literature on P3 risk allocation, they explicitly note the widely accepted principle 
that a risk should be allocated “to the party best able to manage it at least cost.”304 They 
provide a literature review and subsequent research on: (i) the status of P3s in Singapore, 
(ii) the critical success factors of P3s, (iii) positive and negatives factors of using P3s to 
provide public infrastructure in lieu of conventional procurement models, (iv) risk 
identification, and (v) risk allocation. 305 Specific attention is paid to the latter two 
sections – i.e. risk identification and risk allocation – because they are directly relevant in 
scope to the forthcoming research. 
After creating a catalogue of P3 project risks through their literature review, 
Hwang et al. administer their expert questionnaire. Their respondent pool consists of P3 
																																								 																				
303 Note that risk allocation is merely one element of PRM, albeit a largely significant one. At 
times, Hwang et al. refer to risk allocation as a separate entity from the risk management process. 
This suggests that sometimes, when they refer to risk management, they refer to post-contractual 
PRM (i.e. after risks have already been allocated). At other times, however, they refer to risk 
management in the same vein as pre-contractual PRM: “Risk identification is a critical phase in a 
project risk management process.” See Ibid., 424-425. Thus, Hwang et al. conflate ‘project risk 
management’ with both pre-contractual and post-contractual PRM without providing a contextual 
demarcation between the two separate stages of PRM. 
304 Ibid., 425. 
305 (i) On the status of P3s in Singapore, Hwang et al. present a generally favourable review. For 
instance, they note a “clear accountability” from the private sector when delivering services. 
However, they also note the “confidentiality of information” available from P3 projects; (ii) on 
critical success factors, they identify: a well-organized public agency, appropriate risk allocation 
and sharing, a strong private consortium, transparency in the procurement process, clearly defined 
responsibilities and roles, clarification of contract documents, favourable legal frameworks, and a 
shared authority between the public and private sector; (iii.a) on positive P3 factors, they note: 
better value for money, improved risk profile, cost-effective innovation, improved quality and 
services, tap on private sector expertise, and optimal resource allocation; (iii.b) on negative P3 
factors, they note: lengthy delays in negotiation, high participation costs, confusion on 
government objectives and criteria evaluation, lack of experience or appropriate skills, high 
project costs, high risk relaying on the private sector, and excessive restriction on participation.  
See Ibid., 425, 427-428. 
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practitioners whose positions include: project directors, senior managers, junior 
managers, quantity surveyors, and “others.”306 The respondents evaluate each risk’s 
criticality by means of a five-point Likert scale and select a sector of preference for each 
risk’s allocation. 307 Hwang et al. identify four risk allocation categories: (i) public sector 
allocation, (ii) private sector allocation, (iii) shared sector allocation, and (iv) negotiable 
risks based on circumstantial project conditions.308 In total, 42 risks are identified and 
allocated between these categories. 
5.2.12 An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in PPPs in Nigeria 
 Tolani analyzes risk allocation preferences of P3 actors through a public-private 
stakeholder perspective.309 Early on, he stresses that a P3’s VFM hinges on optimal risk 
allocation, or “allocating risks to the party best able to manage them optimally.”310 He 
also notes agency theory’s affects on risk allocation between public authorities and 
private partners. His principal-agent analysis, however, also considers the role of 
taxpaying citizens in addition to public authorities and SPVs.311 This observation opens 
up a new theoretical framework for conceptualizing principle-agent relationships under 
P3s. Moreover, it presents an alternative means of assessing the forthcoming study. This 
observation is considered in detail in Chapter 7. 
Tolani’s quantitative study utilizes expert P3 practitioner feedback through a 
questionnaire. He employs a convenience sampling method to obtain suitable expert 
																																								 																				
306 Ibid., 427. 
307 Where 1 = lowest; 2 = low; 3 = moderate; 4 = high; 5 = extreme. See Ibid., 427. 
308 Ibid., 430. 
309 Tolani demarcates private SPV-JV practitioners from private financiers in his research. 
310 Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria,” 206. 
311 Ibid., 209. 
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participants ranging from the fields of banking, construction, and public sector agencies. 
Tolani notes that public and private practitioners have different perceptions of risk due to 
different “risk priorities and mitigation strategies.”312 Accordingly, Tolani demarcates 
public and private expert feedback on each risk’s: allocation preference, probability of 
occurrence, and potential for impact.  
Tolani uses an ordinal scale to measure each identified risk’s preferred sector of 
allocation, probability of occurrence, and potential project impact. 313  Like Ng and 
Loosemore before him, Tolani distinguishes financiers from SPVs as separate potential 
risk bearers.314 However, his study’s risk allocation categories remain broad; Tolani’s 
ordinal scale for measuring risk allocation preferences provides the selection options of: 
the public sector, the private sector, or “equally shared.”315 In total, 46 risks – along with 
their preferred allocation schemes – are identified and allocated between these categories. 
5.3 Conclusion 
 After an extensive review of the core literature database, seven broad risk 
categories have been adopted: political risks, construction risks, operation risks, legal 
risks, market risks, macroeconomic risks, and ‘other’ risks. A content analysis of the core 
database presents 54 identified project risks under these broad categories. To fit the 
criterion of an identified risk, a risk must appear in at least two of the dozen pieces of 
literature examined. 
																																								 																				
312 Ibid., 208. 
313 Ibid., 211. 
314 Ng and Loosemore are even more specific in their demarcation of private sector actors by 
differentiating equity investors from lenders. Tolani does not do this; he denotes both actors 
under the broader cloak of general ‘financiers.’ 
315 Ibid., 214. 
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The average identified risk appears in half of the literature examined.316 One 
identified risk appears in all twelve of the literature pieces examined.317 Two identified 
risks appear in just two of the twelve literature pieces examined.318 A comparative 
analysis of the literature shows that, of the 54 identified risks, exactly half – 27 – were 
found to be controversial. Controversial risks are described as risks that do not have 
conclusive allocation recommendations throughout the core database in which they 
appear. Figure 5.3 presents these results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
316 I.e. The average risk is mentioned six times throughout the dozen pieces of literature 
comprising the core database. This statistic is rounded up from 5.98/12. 
317 I.e. ‘change in law.’ 
318 I.e. ‘protection of geological/historical objects’ and ‘condition of facility.’ 
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Figure 5. 3: Comparing Risk Allocation Preferences in Core Literature Database 
A = Arndt (1998); B = Wang & Tiong (2000); C = VDTF (2001); D = NTSA (2004); E = Li et al. 
(2005); F = Shen et al. (2006); G = Ng & Loosemore (2007); H = Lam et al. (2007); I = Ke et al. 
(2010); J = Chan et al. (2011); K = Hwang et al. (2013); L = Tolani (2013). 
Subgroup Risk	 A B C D E F G H I J K L Same Total
Political	 Termination	of	concession	by	government	 Public Public Public Public √ 4
Expropriation	and	nationalization	 Public Public Public Private Public Public Public Public x 8
Political/public	opposition	 Public Public Share Public Public Public x 6
Change	in	law Share Share Public Share Share Public Private Share Public Public Public Public x 12
Unstable	government	 Public Public Public Public Public Public Public √ 7
Project	approval	and	permit	 Share Private Share Private Public Public Share Public x 8
Land	acquisition	 Public Public Public Share x 4
Influential	economic	events Private Private Share x 3
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices Share Private Share Private Private Share x 6
Construction Availability	of	finance Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 7
Improper	design Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 10
Insolvency	of	subcontractors Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 6
Quality	risk Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 9
Site	safety Private Private Private √ 3
Availability	of	labour/materials Public Private Private Private Private Private Private x 7
Ground	conditions	 Private Private Public Private Public Share Private Private Private x 9
Site	availability Share Private Public Private Public Public x 6
Construction/design	changes Public Public Private Public Private Private Private Private x 8
Environmental	Protection Private Share Share Private Share x 5
Labour	disputes	and	strikes Private Private Private √ 3
Land	use Public Public Public √ 3
Waste	of	materials Private Private Private √ 3
Construction	cost	overrun Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 9
Construction	completion	 Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 11
Supporting	utilities	risk Share Share Public Public x 4
High	financial	cost Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 6
Unproven	engineering	techniques Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 8
Protection	of	geological/historical	objects	 Private Private √ 2
Operation Operation	cost	overrun	 Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 8
Organization	and	coordination	risk Private Private Private Private √ 4
Operator	default	 Private Private Private Private √ 4
Quality	of	operation Private Private Private Private Private √ 5
High	maintenance	cost Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 6
Frequency	of	maintenance Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 6
Low	operating	productivity Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 6
Residual	value	risk	 Private Public Private Private Share Private x 6
Residual	assets	risk Private Public Private x 3
Condition	of	facility Private Private √ 2
Legal Excessive	contract	variation Share Public Share Private Share Private x 6
Third	party	tort	liability Private Public Share Private x 4
Asset	ownership	 Share Share Private Private x 4
Insolvency	of	Concession	company	 Private Private Private Private √ 4
Market Income	risk Private Private Private Private Share Private x 6
Public	fluctuation	of	material	costs Public Public Public Public √ 4
Private	fluctuation	of	material	costs Private Private Private Private Private Private √ 6
Tariff	change Private Private Private Private Private Private Share x 7
Tax	Regulation	Changes	 Public Public Public Public √ 4
Market	demand	change Share Private Share Private Private Private Share Private x 8
Exclusive	right/competition	 Share Private Public Public x 4
Macroeconomic Inflation	risk	 Share Share Share Private Share Share Share Private Share Share x 10
Interest	rate	 Share Private Private Share Share Private Share x 7
Foreign	currency	risk		 Public Private Share Private x 4
Other Force	majeure	 Share Share Share Share Share Share Share Public Share Share x 10
Weather	conditions Public Public Private Share Share Private Private Private x 8
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CHAPTER 6 
RISK ALLOCATION PREFERENCES OF P3 PRACTITIONERS 
6.1 Introduction   
The main purpose of Chapter 5 is twofold: firstly, through content analysis of the 
core literature database, it develops a risk identification catalogue of 54 project risks; 
second, through cross-referencing of the database, it evenly demarcates ‘sound’ and 
‘contentious’ risks, where contentious risks are subject to further analysis. Figure 6.1 
presents the list of contentious risks assessed for further study.  
Figure 6. 1: Contentious Risks Definitions 
 
Contentious	Risk	 Risk	Definition	
Expropriation	and	nationalization	 Due	to	socioeconomic	pressures,	the	government	overtakes	a	project	before	the	end	of	its	lifecycle.	The	private	consortium	is	subsequently	not	compensated	in	full.
Political/public	opposition	 Project	experiences	prejudicial	backlash	from	factions	in	local	community	
Change	in	law New	laws	and	regulations	result	in	their	inconsistent	application	to	project	
Project	approval	and	permit	 Unanticipated	delay	or	refusal	of	required	project	approvals	and/or	permits	
Land	acquisition	 Unanticipated	delay	in,	or	refusal	against,	procuring	land	that	is	required	for	project	
Influential	economic	events Macroeconomic	anomalies	on	a	national	or	global	scale	adversely	affect	local	market
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices Amendments	or	revisions	to	industrial	code	of	practice	affect	project’s	development	
Availability	of	labour/materials Subcontractors	and/or	suppliers	are	unable	to	supply	staff	and/or	materials	punctually	
Ground	conditions	 Unforeseen	poor	ground	conditions	result	in	additional	geotechnical	engineering	
Site	availability Unanticipated	delay	in	accessing	land	and/or	resources	already	procured	for	project	
Construction/design	changes Changes	to	project	terms	due	to	poor	preliminary	investigation/improper	design	
Environmental	protection Project	impinges	on	environmental	regulations;	legal	ramifications	ensue	
Supporting	utilities	risk Required	local	utilities	(e.g.	electricity	and	gas)	are	unavailable	or	unfairly	priced	
Residual	value	risk	 After	concession	period,	assets	transferred	from	private	to	public	hands	are	impaired	
Residual	assets	risk After	concession	period,	some	assets	on	project	land	remain	undesignated	in	contract	
Excessive	contract	variation Inappropriate	contract	delegation	at	financial	close,	subsequently	resulting	in	excessive	contract	mediation/arbitration	during	the	project
Third	party	tort	liability A	third	party	breaches	project	obligations;	compensation	for	damages	is	required	
Asset	Ownership Costs	for	owning,	operating,	and	maintaining	infrastructure	during	concession	period	
Income	risk Projected	income	for	private	sector	(toll	revenue	or	government	payout)	is	not	met	
Tariff	change Insufficient	project	income	due	to	improper	and/or	inflexible	tariff	design	framework	
Market	demand	change Demand,	and	price,	for	a	service	transcends	forecasted	levels	resulting	in	less	revenue	
Exclusive	right/competition	 Government	revokes	exclusivity	rights	from	its	selected	private	consortium,	creating	a	new	competitive	project	with	open	to	other	competitor	firms
Inflation	risk	 Unanticipated	rise	in	inflation	rates	under	local	economy	
Interest	rate	 Unanticipated	rise	in	interest	rates	under	local	economy	
Foreign	currency	risk		 Exchange	rate	fluctuations	create	unforeseen	difficulties	converting	currencies	
Force	majeure	 Severe	events	outside	of	a	party’s	control	(e.g.	natural	disasters,	terrorism,	war,	etc.)	
Weather	conditions Unfavourable	weather	conditions	result	in	project	delay	and/or	impairment	
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The general principle driving risk allocation scholarship in P3 literature has been 
repeated throughout Chapter 5: every risk should be allocated to the party best able to 
manage it and at the least cost. In theory, this concept seems rational and simple. In 
practice, as previous chapters have indicated, it can be difficult to follow. Several reasons 
have been provided to explain why suboptimal risk allocation occurs (e.g. bounded 
rationality, asymmetric information sharing, opportunism, strategic behaviour, 
incomplete contracts, optimism bias, etc.), however none explicitly factor into the 
research reviewed in Chapter 5. 
While these impediments to P3 PRM are frequently cited in the core literature 
database, they are not an explicit function of the database’s actual research. The dozen 
pieces of literature reviewed do not replicate conditions conducive to – for example – 
moral hazards or asymmetric information sharing, because they are conducted in a low 
stakes environment with the impartial goal of obtaining scholarly insight into P3 risk 
allocation frameworks. In short, the scholars and P3 practitioners who contributed to the 
core database’s findings were not operating under principal-agent relationships.  
Thus, the bulk of optimal risk allocation impediments linked to agency theory do 
not apply to the research findings. Yet, exactly half of the 54 identified project risks are 
deemed contentious via cross-examination of the core literature database. This suggests 
another major influence is at hand – differing perceptions and, accordingly, differing 
preferences amongst P3 practitioners. The literature review from Chapter 5 provides a 
solid foundation for identifying contentious P3 risks. It both develops and validates the 
selection of the 27 risks included in the expert questionnaire so that their selection for 
assessment in Chapter 6 is non-arbitrary.    
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6.2 Research Design 
Chapter 6’s research adopts psychometric methodology to arrive at a proposed 
risk allocation decision model through a diverse research network of P3 practitioners via 
expert questionnaire. Insight gained on risk allocation preferences from the core literature 
database is supplemented by the interdisciplinary, multifaceted input of in-field public 
and private practitioners. Tolani notes, “Questionnaire survey is the most common 
research method used to obtain risk allocation scheme[s] in P[3]s.”319 However, this type 
of scholarly assessment has yet to take off in Canada.320 The expert questionnaire was 
conducted from February 2017 to April 2017 with a sampling frame comprised of 
Canadian P3 practitioners equally divided between public and private sector positions.  
6.2.1 Application of Expert Questionnaire 
A non-probability purposive sampling method was used to develop the sampling 
frame of recognized expert practitioners qualified to take part in the study.321 To fulfill 
the eligibility criterion, participants had to have in-field experience as a P3 practitioner 
from at least one of an array of applicable fields, many of which are identified in Chapter 
4 (e.g. financial, legal, political, among others). Potential respondents were sought out 
through membership directories of P3 organizations,322 P3 certification programs,323 and 
																																								 																				
319 Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria,” 211. 
320 This is to the author’s knowledge based on an extensive literature review of studies providing 
P3 risk allocation decision models premised on expert questionnaire input.  
321 This is also known as convenience sampling technique, where the principal investigator knows 
the identity of his or her potential sampling frame. One of its benefits – compared to probability 
sampling – is that expert respondents can be recruited who are recognized as knowledgeable in 
specialized fields. Thus “purposive sampling… can… focus on quality over quantity” when 
developing a smaller sampling frame to extract data. See Lisa O’Halloran et al., “Doing 
Descriptive Phenomenological Data Collection in Sport Psychology Research,” Sport in Society, 
2016, 6, doi:10.1080/17430437.2016.1159199. 
322 For example, the CCPPP membership directory.  
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known partners under Canadian SPV consortiums or public authorities.324 Practitioners all 
hold, or previously held, various roles dealing with P3 risk allocation from distinct 
stakeholder perspectives and from distinct industries of expertise.325  
In total, 58 practitioners were invited to participate in the research and 24 
completed the expert questionnaire. This represents a 41 percent response rate. While 24 
samples do not cover a large respondent pool, the number is comparably sufficient when 
considering previous studies of a similar nature. For example, Li et al. collected 53 valid 
responses with an 11 percent response rate;326 Ke et al. collected 47 responses with a 23 
percent response rate; Hwang et al. collected 48 responses with a 40 percent response 
rate; and Tolani collected 45 responses with a 16 percent response rate.327 
It is believed this study’s high response rate is attributed to the personal method 
employed when reaching out to participants. Great care was taken to research the 
backgrounds of potential respondents before contacting them, and emails explaining the 
study’s purpose and scope included personalized additions explaining why each 
practitioner was singled out as an eligible candidate for the project. To encourage a 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
323 For example, the list of program directors and faculty for the ‘Osgoode Certificate in P3s.’ 
324 For examples from the private sector – JV practitioners under the Gordie Howe Bridge’s three 
SPV bidders: Bridging North America, CanAmGateway, and Legacy Link Partners. For examples 
from the public sector – statespersons under crown corporations like Infrastructure Ontario or the 
aforementioned WDBA. 
325 Respondents have direct experience with managing roles, consulting roles, or regulating roles 
– among others – for risk allocation in P3 projects from a variety of industries of expertise (e.g. 
legal, financial, political, etc.). 
326 Li et al. collected 61 completed questionnaires, but only “53 provided suitable data for the 
section of the[ir] questionnaire relating to risk allocation preferences.” See Li et al., “The 
Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,” 29. 
327 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 427; Ke et al., 
“Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” 484; Tolani, 
“An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” 210. 
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higher respondent rate, participants were given the option of remaining anonymous; 11 of 
the 24 respondents chose to remain unidentified.  
For respondents who filled out personal identifiers, the sampling frame’s 
practitioner positions include: a Certified Public Accountant, Chief Administration 
Officers, a Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Financial Officer, Chief Procurement 
Officers, a Contract Innovations Engineer, Executive Directors, Managing Directors, 
Project Directors, a Canadian Senator, and Vice Presidents of firms. To respect the 
privacy of participants who withheld their personal information, their specific 
occupations have been withheld from this study. The respective profiles of respondents, 
regarding their sectors of affiliation, years of experience, and general fields of 
specialization, are presented in Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6. 2: Background Information of Sampling Frame 
Respondent 
Profiles 
Category  Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
Sector of 
Employment 
Public 12 50% 
Private 12 50% 
Years of 
Experience 
Withheld 4 16.67% 
1-5 4 16.67% 
6-10 4 16.67% 
11-15 9 37.50% 
16-20 2 8.33% 
20 < 1 4.16% 
Private 
Experience 
 
Advisory/consulting/legal 2 8.33% 
Design/build/operate/maintain 3 12.50% 
Financing/investing/insurance 7 29.17% 
Public 
Experience 
P3 Agency Employee 4 16.67% 
Public Servant 6  25% 
Other 2  8.33% 
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The questionnaire was divided into three main sections. The first section briefly 
explained the research’s scope, purpose, and instructions. The second section obtained 
profiles of respondent backgrounds. Optional background questions included the 
respondent’s name and years of P3 industry experience. Mandatory background questions 
included the respondent’s sector of employment and general field of specialization. The 
third section asked respondents to allocate the 27 contentious P3 risks identified from the 
study’s core literature database to a sector of preference according to a five-point public-
private spectrum on a semantic differential scale.   
Due to aforementioned issues related to risk allocation in Chapter 4 – namely, the 
subjectivity and potential vagueness of risk assessment – a psychometric methodology 
was employed to apply quantitative values to the otherwise qualitative linguistic 
terminology used to garner expert opinion.328 Thus, the five-point semantic differential 
scale was adopted to evaluate the degree to which contentious risks should be allocated 
between public and private sectors (i.e. 1 = solely public; 2 = mostly public; 3 = equally 
shared; 4 = mostly private; and 5 = solely private).329 Definitions for each project risk 
were provided alongside their respective five-point allocation scales to ensure uniformed 
comprehension of each risk amongst respondents (see Figure 6.1).  
6.2.2 Assuming Equidistance of Semantic Differential Scales  
Several methodologies – both parametric and nonparametric – were applied to the 
questionnaire’s results, which were calculated via mean score analyses. Mean score 
																																								 																				
328 Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of 
Social Infrastructure”; Lam et al., “Modelling Risk Allocation Decision in Construction 
Contracts.” 
329 There was also a sixth option offered for each question: ‘not applicable’ (n/a). 
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analysis on Likert scales and semantic differential scales necessitates an assumed 
equidistance between variables.330 However, Likert and semantic differential scales use 
ordinal levels of measurement, which do allow variable values to be rank ordered, but not 
in a way that the “distances between the values of… variable[s] are equal and 
mathematically meaningful.” Equidistant variables include interval levels of 
measurement, where each point on a scale represents a quantifiably equal numerical 
difference, contra ordinal variables.331  
Dispute over the use of mean score analyses on ordinal data – i.e. the assumed 
equidistance of ordinal data – is longstanding between scholars. Because this issue 
continues to be “extensively debated among researchers,” the use of mean score analyses 
on this study’s ordinal respondent input is recognized as a methodological limitation in 
Chapter 7. However, psychometrician Stanley Smith Stevens himself – founder of the 
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio levels of measurement taxonomy – deemed the 
interval treatment ordinal data as permissible, stating that “in numerous instances it leads 
																																								 																				
330 Almost all P3 literature employing point scale methods to assess risk allocation claim the use 
of a ‘Likert scale’ to gauge a risk’s association with the public and private sector (e.g. on either a 
three-point or five-point scale where lower numbers indicate public allocation and higher 
numbers indicate private allocation). However, P3 scholars are using the term Likert scale 
incorrectly; Likert scales traditionally gauge “levels of agreement and disagreement” with a 
specific statement. While the public-private demarcation is bipolar, it does not reflect a direct 
“attitude statement… for agreement or disagreement.” Thus, scales akin to this study’s – and to 
those of Chan et al.’s, Hwang et al.’s, Ke et al.’s, Li et al.’s, and Tolani’s – should be referred to 
as “semantic differential” scales, not Likert scales. See Jonathan E. Brill, “Likert Scale,” 
Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods (SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), 427-429, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412963947. 
331 For example, in a five-point Likert scale, the ‘distance’ between point 1 – strongly agree – and 
point 2 – partially agree – cannot be objectively quantified, because the scale adopts ordinal 
levels of measurement. See Amy R. Gershkoff, “Level of Measurement,” Encyclopedia of Survey 
Research Methods, 421-423. 
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to fruitful results.” Thus, this study affirms the use of mean score analyses on its ordinal 
data, recognizing the practice as a “pragmatic sanction,” in the words of S.S. Stevens.332  
6.2.3 Methodologies for Data Analyses  
To calculate the mean scores and standard deviations for each risk according to 
public respondents and private respondents, an independent two-sample t-test was 
conducted. Before combining the total mean scores of both public and private 
respondents to arrive at a total mean score for each risk, the degrees of agreeance within 
the public and private sector sample groups had to be assessed to ensure the 
questionnaire’s feedback was valid.  
The degrees of agreement within both independent sample groups (i.e. public 
respondents and private respondents) were measured using nonparametric statistics. 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance (W) and Chi-square tests validated the hypothesis 
that both groups contained significant agreement patterns between their respective 
respondents over the allocation preferences of the 27 contentious P3 project risks. 
Statistically significant agreement within respondent groups is a necessary prerequisite to 
conducting further analysis using the group’s total mean scores as valid data.333  
Once the mean values within both public and private sector samples were 
verified, the degrees of agreement between these groups was also measured using 
nonparametric statistics to see which risks, if any, held statistically significant differences 
of perspective between public and private respondents. A Mann-Whitney U test showed 
																																								 																				
332 S S Stevens, “Mathematics, Measurement, and Psychophysics,” in Handbook of Experimental 
Psychology, 1951, 26. 
333 Gregory W Corder and Dale I Foreman, Nonparametric Statistics: A Step-by-Step Approach, 
2nd ed. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014). 
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that 5 out of 27 contentious P3 risks held statistically significant differences between the 
public and private sector. The independent two-sample t-test identified a sixth risk with 
statistically significant sectorial disagreement. This suggests a future research opportunity 
in settling the preferred allocations of these six risks. The Kendall’s W, Chi-square, and 
Mann-Whitney U, and t-tests were all performed at a 95 percent confidence level. 
To arrive at a proposed risk allocation decision model, four types of analyses were 
considered: majority opinion analysis, half-adjusting principle analysis, a formula based 
on an assumed normal distribution curve, and an original hybrid adjusting principle 
model in conjunction with lower and upper confidence levels for each risk. Ultimately, 
the latter was adopted in lieu of the first three analyses, all of which are still included in 
this study to reflect the limitations they pose for future literature that may otherwise 
consider adopting these methods. 
Of selected questionnaire-based articles within the core literature database, Li et 
al. and Hwang et al. employed a majority opinion analysis to arrive at a proposed risk 
allocation decision model for P3s in the United Kingdom and in Singapore, respectively. 
These studies recognize four possible risk allocation categories: (i) public sector risks, (ii) 
private sector risks, (iii) shared risks, and (iv) negotiable risks contingent on “project 
circumstances.” Based on majority opinion analysis, if more than 50 percent of 
respondents choose to allocate a risk to either the public sector, private sector, or ‘equally 
shared’ categories, then the risk is put in that category. If none of a risk’s percentages 
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reach over 50 percent, then its proposed allocation preference is ‘negotiable’ based on 
specific project circumstances.334 
Majority opinion analysis was one of several methodologies applied to this study. 
However, scholars question the reliability and accuracy of studies that use majority 
opinion analysis to identify risk preferences between sample groups. Both Chan et al. and 
Tolani criticize majority opinion analysis, which is premised on “preponderance of 
opinion,”335 arguing that it is “hypothetical and does not [accurately] reflect the industry 
practice.”336  
Both Li et al. and Hwang et al. use a three-point semantic differential scale to 
conduct a majority opinion analysis – without ‘mostly public’ or ‘mostly private’ 
allocation options – because lower scales are more conducive to definitive selection 
preferences. While higher-point scales provide more information than lower-point scales, 
a higher percentage of respondents are inclined to “discriminate among categories” with 
lower-point scales because options are less dispersed.337  Due to the aforementioned 
limitations of majority opinion analysis, its inclusion is not the focal point of this study. 
																																								 																				
334 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 430; Li et al., “The 
Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,”  
335 Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria,” 212. 
336 Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership 
Projects in China,” 145; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-
Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” 212. 
337 Sara L McLafferty, “Conducting Questionnaire Surveys,” in Key Methods in Geography, ed. 
Nicholas Clifford, Shaun French, and Gill Valentine, 2nd ed. (London: London: SAGE, 2010), 
81, 
https://is.muni.cz/el/1431/jaro2015/Z0132/um/54979481/_Nicholas_Clifford__Gill_Valentine__
Key_Methods_in_BookFi.org_.pdf#page=100. 
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Thus, while three-point scales are more suited for this type of analysis, this study’s five-
point scale was retained as the basis for all analysis methods, including majority opinion. 
Ke et al. employed a half-adjusting principle to their five-point semantic 
differential scale questionnaire to arrive at a risk allocation framework for Chinese P3s. 
For their study, risks with total mean scores falling under 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5 should be 
allocated solely to the public sector, mostly to the public sector, equally between sectors, 
and mostly to the private sector, respectively. Finally, risks with a total mean score above 
4.5 should be allocated solely to the private sector.338 Like majority opinion analysis, the 
half-adjusting principle relies on relatively rudimentary methodology and, ultimately, 
presents a lack of conclusive evidence for proposed risk allocation decision models.  
The most glaring limitation of using the half-adjusting principle to propose a risk 
allocation decision model is that it only allots the ‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ risk 
categories with half a point of space on the five-point scale’s spectrum while allotting a 
full point of space to ‘mostly public,’ ‘equally shared,’ and ‘mostly private’ risk 
categories. This means that ‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ each only account for 12.5 
percent of the five-point scale’s space while ‘mostly public,’ ‘equally shared,’ and 
‘mostly private’ each account for 25 percent of the five-point scale’s space. 
This uneven distribution between risk categories becomes blatantly evident when 
reviewing Ke et al.’s results. Only one risk out of a possible 37 fell into the ‘solely 
public’ category and no risk fell into the ‘solely private’ category. The remaining 36 risks 
fell between the other three categories with a full point allotted on the spectrum.  Ke et al. 
																																								 																				
338 Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects.” 
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do not address this limitation. Firstly, they do not directly address the peculiarity of the 
‘solely public’ category receiving only one project risk. Second, they suggest that the 
‘solely private’ category potentially received zero risks because “respondents may still 
believe that private investors will encounter many problems caused by government or 
government officers and their actions… [or] due to the sample of survey respondents.”339  
To arrive at their risk allocation decision model, Chan et al. and Tolani adopt a 
formula based on the assumed distribution of a normal distribution curve: 
X10% = U ± Z*σ 
Under this formula, X10% = the upper and lower limits within the range from which a risk 
should be allocated to either the public sector, private sector, or shared between sectors. 
U = the population’s mean value. Z = the corresponding mean value taken from the 
normal curve table. Finally, σ = the prescribed standard deviation for the population.340  
Here, Chan et al. and Tolani both ‘force’ a normal distribution of their assessed P3 
project risks, where a range for categorizing ‘equally shared’ risks is applied, 
demarcating an equal share of public and private sector risks to either side of the 
distribution curve.341 
 There are two issues with Chan et al.’s and Tolani’s methodology. First, it 
necessitates an arbitrary range (i.e. X10%) of a selected percentage of risks – in this case 10 
percent – to be categorized as ‘equally shared.’ Thus, while the means of risks deemed 
																																								 																				
339 Ibid., 487. 
340 Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership 
Projects in China,” 144; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-
Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” 211-212. 
341 Unless, of course, an odd number of risks are being assessed. In this case, one sector – e.g. 
public – will contain exactly one more risk category than the other sector – e.g. private. 
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‘equally shared’ in both studies do gravitate towards the middle of both studies’ scales, 
the ‘cut-off’ point between an equally shared category and a public-private category is 
based on the personal selection of the researcher.  
Second, this methodology requires the assumption that the data analyzed is 
normal; that is, the assumption that the combined scores of every risk’s mean equal their 
median, that 68 percent of the data falls under one standard deviation, and that the first 
and second half of the distribution, on either side of the median, are symmetrical. Neither 
Chan et al.’s nor Tolani’s study contain an authentic normal distribution of data. The 
fundamental issue with assuming a normal distribution on non-normally distributed mean 
values is that it ‘forces’ an equal share of risks to fall into either public or private 
categories.  
To understand the implications of a forced distribution, consider an extreme 
instance where over three quarters of a study’s risks are given a value above 4. Clearly, 
over three quarters of the study’s risks should fall under categories denoting a major 
degree of private allocation. However, under a forced normal distribution, a third of these 
‘private’ risks will be ‘pushed’ to the left of the curve, falling under either ‘shared’ or 
‘public’ categories depending on the size of the study’s arbitrary selected range (e.g. 
X10%). 
To account for the methodological flaws of works cited in the core literature 
database, this study employs a hybrid adjusting principle analysis on the upper and lower 
confidence levels for each risk. The methodological flaw of using majority opinion 
analysis – i.e. preponderance of opinion – is bypassed by analyzing mean scores in lieu of 
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their modes. To account for the issue of variance when assessing means, each risk’s range 
based on its lower confidence level (LCL) and upper confidence level (UCL) is analyzed 
opposed to using a crisp mean value on its own (e.g. for the risk of ‘influential economic 
events,’ its LCL/UCL range of 2.610 – 3.473 is applied to the proposed risk allocation 
decision model opposed to its mean value of 3.042).  
To account for the methodological flaw of using the half-adjusting principle on a 
five-point scale – namely, that the ‘extreme’ risk categories of 1 and 5 are each allotted 
half the space allotted to their central counterparts, 2, 3, and 4 – this study’s categorical 
demarcations are equally divided so that each point receives 20 percent of the space on 
the five-point scale. Accordingly, (i) < 1.8, (ii) 1.8 < 2.6, (iii) 2.6 < 3.4, (iv) 3.4 < 4.2, and 
(v) 4.2 < represent the categories of (i) ‘solely public,’ (ii) ‘mostly public,’ (iii) ‘equally 
shared,’ (iv) ‘mostly private,’ and (v) ‘solely private,’ respectively.  
This hybrid adjusting principle, in conjunction with LCL/UCL ranges, also avoids 
the methodological limitations of employing a formula based on an assumed normal 
distribution of means. Firstly, there is no arbitrary range for which risks should be placed 
under an ‘equally shared’ category. Second, because each risk is assessed based on its 
own independent mean value and variance, the proposed risk allocation decision model 
represents an ‘authentic’ distribution of risks that does not ‘force’ an equal distribution 
between publicly and privately allocated risks.342 
																																								 																				
342 Consider, for example, the aforementioned hypothetical situation where over three quarters of 
risks are given combined mean values over 4. By assessing each risk independently – opposed to 
a forced distribution where risk categorization is dependent on the mean values of other risks – 
the distribution of risks, based on expert respondent opinion, can be authentically displayed.  
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Despite their methodological flaws, the majority opinion analysis, half-adjusting 
principle, and forced normal distribution formula are all left in this study’s analysis 
because of their potential contribution – namely, to start a precedent for future P3 risk 
allocation literature to eradicate such imprecise methods from their proposed risk 
allocation decision models. This study should catalyze the notion that such analyses are 
outdated means of arriving at proposed risk allocation decision models based on expert 
questionnaire input, despite the popularity of using such methods in P3 literature.343 Stark 
comparisons of results derived between these three methods and this study’s hybrid 
distribution model should illuminate the respective shortcomings of the former. 
6.3 Assessment of Respondent Groups 
 Results presented throughout the remainder of this chapter have been calculated 
using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and StatPlus software. Microsoft 
Excel was also used to: (i) calculate the total mean scores for each risk after calculating 
their independent mean scores for public sector respondents and private sector 
respondents and (ii) present figures for SPSS and StatPlus-derived results. 
																																								 																				
343 Andi, “The Importance and Allocation of Risks in Indonesian Construction Projects,” 
Construction Management and Economics 24, no. 1 (2006): 69–80, 
doi:10.1080/01446190500310338; Yosr Badran, “Risk Analysis and Contract Management for 
Public Private Partnership Projects in Egypt” (School of Sciences and Engineering, 2013), 
http://dar.aucegypt.edu/bitstream/handle/10526/3559/isA Compiled-28-05-13.pdf?sequence=1; 
N. Carbonara et al., “Risk Management in Motorway PPP Projects: Empirical-Based Guidelines,” 
Transport Reviews 35, no. 2 (2015): 162–82, doi:10.1080/01441647.2015.1012696; Sameh 
Monir El-Sayegh, “Risk Assessment and Allocation in the UAE Construction Industry,” 
International Journal of Project Management 26, no. 4 (2008): 431–38, 
doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2007.07.004; Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects 
in Singapore: Factors, Critical Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of 
Contractors”; Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private 
Partnership Projects in China.”; Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction 
Projects in the UK.” 
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6.3.1 Mean Values within and between Sectors  
 The independent two-sample t-test does more than provide the 54 independent 
and 27 combined mean scores for the 27 contentious P3 risks between sample groups. It 
provides context into the degree to which: (i) mean value responses within public and 
private respondent groups are similar (i.e. through standard deviations for each mean 
score); and (ii) mean value responses between public and private respondent groups are 
significantly different (i.e. through the t-statistic and test significance levels). Performed 
at a 95 percent confidence level, the t-test shows 6 of 27 risks fall below the significance 
level of 0.05. This is shown on the last column of Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6. 3: Independent Two-Sample t-Test for Risk Allocation Preferences 344 
 
																																								 																				
344 Figures are presented up to three decimal places. 
Risk Group N Mean SD Mean	Dif. Mean	Total t	Statistic Sig.
Public 12 2.167 0.937
Private 12 1.25 0.622
Public 12 2 0.853
Private 12 1.917 0.669
Public 12 2.333 0.888
Private 12 1.75 0.866
Public 12 2.917 0.996
Private 12 2.583 1.084
Public 12 1.917 0.793
Private 12 1.75 0.754
Public 12 3.416 0.996
Private 12 2.667 1.371
Public 12 3.5 1.087
Private 12 2.5 1.087
Public 12 4.083 1.084
Private 12 4.583 0.515
Public 12 2.917 0.515
Private 12 2.75 1.215
Public 12 2.667 0.985
Private 12 1.75 0.754
Public 12 3.083 1.379
Private 12 3.167 1.337
Public 12 3.083 1.311
Private 12 3 1.044
Public 12 3.583 0.793
Private 12 2.417 1.165
Public 12 3 1.128
Private 12 2.75 1.288
Public 12 2.833 0.577
Private 12 2.25 1.288
Public 12 2.833 0.389
Private 12 2.583 0.793
Public 12 3.833 0.718
Private 12 3.083 0.515
Public 12 4.083 0.793
Private 12 4.333 0.651
Public 12 4 0.853
Private 12 3.917 0.793
Public 12 3.583 0.996
Private 12 3.417 1.084
Public 12 3.417 0.9
Private 12 3.75 0.965
Public 12 2.833 0.937
Private 12 1.333 0.651
Public 12 3.833 1.03
Private 12 3.583 1.379
Public 12 3.917 1.084
Private 12 3.917 1.379
Public 12 4 1.044
Private 12 4.167 0.937
Public 12 2.5 0.674
Private 12 2.333 0.985
Public 12 3.417 0.793
Private 12 3.5 1.243
-0.411
0.484
-0.196
0.392
-0.875
4.552
0.503
0
1.432
0.98
2.941
-0.844
0.248
0.633
0.847
2.823
0.266
1.629
0.784
0.528
1.533
2.253
-1.444
0.437
2.561
-0.15
0.172
2.869
0.506
0.391
0
0.62
1
0.685
0.338
0.008
0.408
0.807
0.699
0.882
0.865
0.01
0.618
0.166
0.139
0.035
0.163
0.666
0.018
0.011
0.792
0.117
0.441
0.603
3.458
3.583
2.083
3.708
3.917
4.083
2.417
3.5
2.833
2.208
3.125
3.042
3
2.875
2.542
2.708
3.458
4.208
3.958
0.25
0
0.167
0.083
0.5
0.167
0.917
0.083
0.083
1.167
0.25
1.708
1.958
2.042
2.75
1.833
3.042
3
4.333
0.167
Foreign	currency	risk		
Force	majeure	
Weather	conditions
0.917
0.083
0.583
0.333
0.167
0.75
1
Income	risk
Tariff	change
Market	demand	change
Exclusive	right/competition	
Inflation	risk	
Interest	rate	
Asset	ownership
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices
Availability	of	labour/materials
Ground	conditions	
0.167
0.083
0.333
1.5
Residual	value	risk	
Residual	assets	risk
Excessive	contract	variation
Third	party	tort	liability
Influential	economic	events
0.583
0.25
0.75
0.25
Expropriation	and	nationalization	
Political/public	opposition	
Change	in	law
Project	approval	and	permit	
Land	acquisition	
Site	availability
Construction/design	changes
Environmental	protection
Supporting	utilities	risk
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6.3.2 Agreement within Respondent Groups 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was conducted to measure the internal 
agreement of both public and private respondent groups on their respective ratings of risk 
allocation. Kendall’s W is a nonparametric test that evaluates the degree of association or 
agreement amongst mean values assigned by different respondents (e.g. P3 practitioners) 
over the same variables (e.g. P3 project risks). If the value for W exceeds its 
corresponding critical value, then there is significant agreement amongst the group in 
question over its risk allocation preferences. The critical value is found by connecting the 
value’s degrees of freedom (DOF) and significance level. Critical values for Kendall’s W 
are presented in Siegel and Castellan’s textbook on page 365.345  
At 26 DOF346 and a 0.05 significance level,347 the critical value for W is 0.280. 
Kendall’s W for the public and private sector respondent groups is 0.365 and 0.527, 
respectively. Thus, while the private sector group of respondents shows more agreement, 
both results show significant agreement among respondents over risk allocation 
preferences at a 95 percent confidence level. Siegel and Castellan warn that, when the 
number of variables being assessed – in this case, risks – exceeds seven, Chi-square is a 
more accurate method of gauging the degree of agreement amongst respondent groups.348  
Because 27 risks are being assessed, Chi-square analysis was also conducted to 
ensure both the public and private sector respondent groups showed significant 
																																								 																				
345 Sidney Siegel and N J Castellan, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd 
Ed.), Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1988), 365. 
346 Found by subtracting the total number of controversial risks by one (i.e. 27 – 1 = 26). 
347 Because the test was conducted at a 95 percent confidence level, this translates to a 0.05 
significance level. 
348 Ibid. 
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agreement at a 95 percent confidence level. If the Chi-square value for a respondent 
group is higher than its corresponding critical value, then there is significant agreement 
amongst the group in question over its risk allocation preferences. Like the critical value 
for Kendall’s W, the critical value for Chi-square is also found with reference to a table 
of critical values connecting DOF with significance levels.  
At 26 DOF and a 0.05 significance level, the critical value for Chi-square is 
38.885.349 The Chi-square value for the public and private sector respondent groups is 
113.988 and 164.283, respectively. This reinforces the results from Kendall’s W; there is 
statistically significant agreement within the public and private sector respondent groups. 
Accordingly, both sample groups can be assessed further under the assumption that they 
contain risk allocation preferences indicative of the views of their respective sectors.  
6.3.3 Agreement between Respondent Groups 
 A Mann-Whitney U test was conduced to evaluate whether significant differences 
exist between the risk allocation preferences of this study’s public sector respondents and 
private sector respondents. Mann-Whitney U is a nonparametric test that takes mean 
values assigned to ordinal data (e.g. P3 project risks) from two independent samples (e.g. 
public and private P3 practitioners) and tests whether the two independent samples 
represent two distinct populations with significantly different perceptions of the data. 
Referring back to Figure 6.3, 6 of 27 risks fell below the significance level of 0.05 based 
on the independent two-sample t-test. This means, according to the t-test, 6 risks show a 
significant statistical difference between public and private sector respondents at a 95 
percent confidence level. These risks are: (i) expropriation and nationalization, (ii) 
																																								 																				
349 Ibid. 
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changes in industrial code of practice, (iii) site availability, (iv) supporting utilities risk, 
(v) third party tort liability, and (vi) exclusive right/competition.  
 According to the Mann-Whitney U test, if the significance level (p-value) falls 
below the significance level of 0.05, then there is significant disagreement between the 
two independent groups over a risk’s allocation preference at a confidence level of 95 
percent. Figure 6.4 shows that, according to the Mann-Whitney U test, 5 of 27 risks show 
a statistically significant difference between the public and private sector over their 
allocation preferences based on the five-point semantic differential scale questionnaire 
(i.e. 5 risks have a p-value under 0.05). Every risk that was statistically significant 
according to the t-test – except ‘changes in industrial code of practice’ – was statistically 
significant for the Mann-Whitney U test. Figure 6.4 shows the mean ranks of risks 
according to the public sector respondents and private sector respondents alongside the 
results of the Mann-Whitney U test.350  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
350 Regarding each risk’s ‘mean rank,’ the closer a risk’s rank leans towards 1, the more inclined 
respondents are to allocate it to the public sector; the closer a risk’s mean rank leans towards 27, 
the more inclined respondents are to allocate it to the private sector. 
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Figure 6. 4: Mann-Whitney U Test for Risk Allocation Preferences 
 
* This risk lies just above the 0.05 significance level for the Mann-Whitney U test, but below the 
0.05 significance level for the independent two-sample t-test.  
Public	Sector Private	Sector
Mean	Rank Mean	Rank
Asset	ownership
Residual	value	risk	
Residual	assets	risk
Excessive	contract	variation
Third	party	tort	liability
Influential	economic	events
Expropriation	and	nationalization	
Political/public	opposition	
Change	in	law
Project	approval	and	permit	
Land	acquisition	
Site	availability
Construction/design	changes
Environmental	protection
Supporting	utilities	risk
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices
Availability	of	labour/materials
Ground	conditions	
0.713
0.671
Foreign	currency	risk		
Force	majeure	
Weather	conditions
Income	risk
Tariff	change
Market	demand	change
Exclusive	right/competition	
Inflation	risk	
Interest	rate	
0.371
-0.439
0.476
0.755
0.843
0.755
19.83
21.5
11
17.92
-0.329
0.215
18.75
0.63
0.178
0.052*
0.378
0.671
0.024
0.932
0.932
0.02
0.63
0.101
0.443
0.02
0.478
0.799
0.713
0.347
0.001
-0.527
-1.393
-2.024
1.023
-0.507
-2.348
0.119
-0.12
-2.405
-0.535
-1.735
-0.974
-2.574
0.784
-0.334
-0.391
1.027
-3.403
19.29
19.92
9.42
15.75
7.5
12.08
12.54
24.08
13.38
7.54
16.42
14.42
11.54
13.88
10.92
12.5
15.58
22.79
20.5
16.75
19.46
5.13
18.38
12.25
10.75
11.54
18.46
20.29
20.08
16.54
15.58
12.08
6.04
15.33
15.88
19.96
11.75
10.63
12.46
14.13
16.96
Risk p-valueZ	Statistic
7.63
5.33
8.75
12.46
4.5
8.5
7.04
12.33
-2.674
-0.065
-1.55
-0.78
0.014
0.977
0.143
0.478
141	
	
It is of note that the Mann-Whitney U test and independent two-sample t-test 
present slightly different results at a 95 percent confidence level. The t-test reveals 6 risks 
with contentious allocation preferences, all falling under the test’s 0.05 significance level. 
The Mann-Whitney U test, however, recognizes only 5 of these 6 risks falling under its 
0.05 significance level. The sixth ‘would be’ significantly different risk – ‘changes in 
industrial code of practices’ – just exceeds the Mann-Whitney U test’s significance level 
of 0.05 by 0.002 with a p-value of 0.052. Previous studies that have yielded a p-value of 
0.052 at a 95 percent confidence level have referred to that value as “approaching 
prognostic significance.”351 Because the t-test’s results were more sensitive at a 95 
percent confidence level, its results have been adopted for further analysis over the 
Mann-Whitney U test to account for the sixth risk that shows a relatively weak degree of 
agreement over its allocation between public and private sector respondents. 
6.4 Previous Methodologies used to propose a Risk Allocation Decision Model  
 After the mean scores of risks were analyzed both within and between sample 
groups via t-test, Kendall’s W, Chi-square, and Mann-Whitney U, the risks could be 
assessed further to prescribe a risk allocation decision model based on expert 
questionnaire input. Two important factors were learned in Section 6.3: (i) both the 
public and private sector respondent groups provided enough statistical significance to be 
assessed as ideologically unified, representative samples; and (ii) at least 6 of 27 risks 
should be assessed with caution when proposing a risk allocation model due to 
statistically significant disagreement between sectors over their allocation. 
																																								 																				
351 Rajan Sarin et al., “Treatment Results and Prognostic Factors in 101 Men Treated for 
Squamous Carcinoma of the Penis,” International Journal of Radiation Oncology Biology 
Physics 38, no. 4 (1997): 713, doi:10.1016/S0360-3016(97)00068-0. 
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6.4.1 Majority Opinion Analysis  
 As noted in Section 6.2, majority opinion analysis – when risks are allocated to 
categories where they have received more than 50 percent of sample votes – has been 
criticized by scholars. Further, it is usually deployed alongside a three-point ordinal scale 
in lieu of a five-point scale because lower-point scales are more conducive to definitive 
selection preferences.352 When used in conjunction with higher-point scales, majority 
opinion analysis may be less effective due to sparser selection preferences. This appears 
to be the case with this study’s majority opinion analysis, as only 8 out of 27 risks are 
given a definitive risk allocation preference, as shown in Figure 6.5. 
Figure 6. 5: Majority Opinion Analysis for Risk Allocation Preferences 
 
																																								 																				
352 McLafferty, “Conducting Questionnaire Surveys,” 81. 
Suggested
SPu	% MPu	% ESh	% MPr	% SPr	% SPu	% MPu	% ESh	% MPr	% SPr	% SPu	% MPu	% ESh	% MPr	% SPr	% Risk	Allocation
Expropriation	and	nationalization	 25 41.66 25 8.33 83.33 8.33 8.33 54.16 25 16.66 4.16 Solely	Public
Political/public	opposition	 25 58.33 8.33 8.33 25 58.33 16.66 25 58.33 12.5 4.16 Mostly	Public
Change	in	law 16.66 41.66 33.33 8.33 50 25 25 33.33 33.33 29.16 4.16 Negotiable
Project	approval	and	permit	 8.33 25 33.33 33.33 16.66 33.33 25 25 12.5 29.16 29.16 29.16 Negotiable
Land	acquisition	 33.33 41.66 25 41.66 41.66 16.66 37.5 41.66 20.83 Negotiable
Influential	economic	events 16.66 41.66 25 16.66 25 25 16.66 25 8.33 12.5 20.83 29.16 25 12.5 Negotiable
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices 16.66 41.66 16.66 25 16.66 41.66 16.66 25 8.33 29.16 29.16 20.83 12.5 Negotiable
Availability	of	labour/materials 8.33 25 16.66 50 41.66 58.33 4.16 12.5 29.16 54.16 Mostly	Private
Ground	conditions	 16.66 75 8.33 16.66 25 33.33 16.66 8.33 8.33 20.83 54.16 12.5 4.16 Equally	Shared
Site	availability 8.33 33.33 50 8.33 41.66 41.66 16.66 25 37.5 33.33 4.16 Negotiable
Construction/design	changes 8.33 33.33 25 8.33 25 8.33 33.33 8.33 33.33 16.66 8.33 33.33 16.66 20.83 20.83 Negotiable
Environmental	protection 8.33 33.33 16.66 25 16.66 8.33 25 25 41.66 8.33 29.16 20.83 33.33 8.33 Negotiable
Supporting	utilities	risk 8.33 33.33 50 8.33 25 33.33 16.66 25 12.5 20.83 25 37.5 4.16 Negotiable
Residual	value	risk	 8.33 25 33.33 25 8.33 16.66 33.33 16.66 25 8.33 12.5 29.16 25 25 8.33 Negotiable
Residual	assets	risk 25 66.66 8.33 33.33 33.33 16.66 8.33 8.33 16.66 29.16 41.66 8.33 4.16 Negotiable
Excessive	contract	variation 16.66 83.33 8.33 33.33 50 8.33 4.16 25 66.66 4.16 Mostly	Private
Third	party	tort	liability 33.33 50 16.66 8.33 75 16.66 4.16 54.16 33.33 8.33 Equally	Shared
Asset	ownership	 25 41.66 33.33 8.33 50 41.66 16.66 45.83 37.5 Negotiable
Income	risk 8.33 8.33 58.33 25 8.33 8.33 66.66 16.66 8.33 8.33 62.5 20.83 Mostly	Private
Tariff	change 16.66 25 41.66 16.66 25 25 33.33 16.66 20.83 25 37.5 16.66 Negotiable
Market	demand	change 16.66 33.33 41.66 8.33 16.66 8.33 58.33 16.66 16.66 20.83 50 12.5 Negotiable
Exclusive	right/competition	 8.33 25 41.66 25 75 16.66 8.33 41.66 20.83 25 12.5 Negotiable
Inflation	risk	 8.33 33.33 25 33.33 8.33 16.66 16.66 25 33.33 4.16 12.5 25 25 33.33 Negotiable
Interest	rate	 8.33 33.33 16.66 41.66 8.33 8.33 16.66 16.66 50 4.16 8.33 25 16.66 45.83 Negotiable
Foreign	currency	risk		 8.33 25 25 41.66 33.33 16.66 50 4.16 29.16 20.83 45.83 Negotiable
Force	majeure	 8.33 33.33 58.33 25 25 41.66 8.33 16.66 29.16 50 4.16 Negotiable
Weather	conditions 75 8.33 16.66 8.33 8.33 33.33 25 25 4.16 4.16 54.16 16.66 20.83 Equally	Shared
	Public	Sector	Respondents Private	Sector	Respondents Total	RespondentsContentious	Risk	
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 The risks with definitive selection preferences based on majority opinion analysis 
– i.e. those with over 50 percent of its respondents in favour of allocating the risk to a 
particular sectorial category – are as follows: ‘expropriation and nationalization,’ 
‘political/public opposition,’ ‘availability of labour/materials,’ ‘ground conditions,’ 
‘excessive contract variation,’ ‘third party tort liability,’ ‘income risks,’ and ‘weather 
conditions.’ Their suggested risk allocation preferences, based on majority opinion 
analysis, are: solely public, mostly public, mostly private, equally shared, mostly private, 
equally shared, mostly private, and equally shared, respectively.  
6.4.2 Half-Adjusting Principle  
 As noted in Section 6.2, Ke et al.’s “half-adjusting principle” – like majority 
opinion analysis before it – rests on questionable methodology. This is made most 
apparent when perusing their proposed risk allocations. Based on a five-point semantic 
differential scale assessment of 37 P3 project risks, only one risk is allocated solely to the 
public sector and zero risks are allocated solely to the private sector; the remaining 36 
risks are dispersed throughout the remaining three risk allocation categories: ‘mostly 
public,’ ‘equally shared,’ and ‘mostly private.’353 
 Similar articles that employ the half-adjusting principle to develop risk allocation 
models also present comparably imbalanced results. 354  It is hypothesized that this is due 
in part to the aforementioned issue of uneven distribution between risk categories while 
																																								 																				
353 Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” 
487-488. 
354 Y Chen, “Pricing Mechanism and a Framework of Public-Private Partnership Financing Risk 
Allocation for Public Rental Project,” Applied Mechanics and Materials, 2013, 
doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.256-259.2989; Akintayo Opawole and Godwin Onajite 
Jagboro, “Benchmarking Parties’ Obligations in the Execution of Concession-Based PPP Projects 
in Nigeria,” Journal of Place Management and Development 9, no. 1 (2016): 27–46, 
doi:10.1108/JPMD-08-2015-0029. 
144	
	
employing the half-adjusting principle. For instance, ‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ 
each make up 12.5 percent of a five-point scale’s space, while the remaining three 
categories comprise 25 percent of a five-point scale’s space. Thus, Figure 6.6, like Figure 
6.5 before it, presents an alternative means of arriving at a proposed risk allocation 
decision model, but it rests on flawed methodology.  
Figure 6. 6: Half-Adjusting Principle for Risk Allocation Preferences 
 
Figure 6.6 (i.e. half-adjusting principle) does present more conclusive results than 
Figure 6.5 (i.e. majority opinion analysis) in that it does not categorize any risk as 
‘negotiable’ based on specific project circumstances. ‘Negotiable’ risks aside, there is 
discrepancy between the majority opinion analysis’ risk allocation scheme and the half-
Contentious	Risk	 Total	Mean Public	Mean Private	Mean Suggested	Allocation
Expropriation	and	nationalization	 1.708 2.167 1.25 Mostly	Public
Political/public	opposition	 1.958 2 1.917 Mostly	Public
Change	in	law 2.042 2.333 1.75 Mostly	Public
Project	approval	and	permit	 2.75 2.917 2.583 Equally	Shared
Land	acquisition	 1.833 1.917 1.75 Mostly	Public
Influential	economic	events 3.042 3.417 2.667 Equally	Shared
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices 3 3.5 2.5 Equally	Shared
Availability	of	labour/materials 4.333 4.083 4.583 Mostly	Private
Ground	conditions	 2.833 2.917 2.75 Equally	Shared
Site	availability 2.208 2.667 1.75 Mostly	Public
Construction/design	changes 3.125 3.083 3.167 Equally	Shared
Environmental	protection 3.042 3.083 3 Equally	Shared
Supporting	utilities	risk 3 3.583 2.417 Equally	Shared
Residual	value	risk	 2.875 3 2.75 Equally	Shared
Residual	assets	risk 2.542 2.833 2.25 Equally	Shared
Excessive	contract	variation 2.708 2.833 2.583 Equally	Shared
Third	party	tort	liability 3.458 3.833 3.083 Equally	Shared
Asset	ownership	 4.208 4.083 4.333 Mostly	Private
Income	risk 3.958 4 3.917 Mostly	Private
Tariff	change 3.5 3.583 3.417 Mostly	Private
Market	demand	change 3.583 3.417 3.75 Mostly	Private
Exclusive	right/competition	 2.083 2.833 1.333 Mostly	Public
Inflation	risk	 3.708 3.833 3.583 Mostly	Private
Interest	rate	 3.917 3.917 3.917 Mostly	Private
Foreign	currency	risk		 4.083 4 4.167 Mostly	Private
Force	majeure	 2.417 2.5 2.333 Mostly	Public
Weather	conditions 3.458 3.417 3.5 Equally	Shared
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adjusting principle’s risk allocation scheme: (i) ‘expropriation and nationalization’ is 
given a ‘mostly public’ allocation preference according to the half-adjusting principle and 
a ‘solely public’ allocation preference according to majority opinion analysis and (ii) 
‘excessive contract variation’ is given an ‘equally shared’ allocation preference according 
to the half-adjusting principle and a ‘mostly private’ allocation preference according to 
majority opinion analysis. 
Figure 6.6’s results, like other half-adjusting principle-derived results before it, 
present an imbalanced risk allocation decision model where ‘solely public’ and ‘solely 
private’ categories remain vacant as risk means congregate towards the ‘middle’ three 
categories of the five-point scale, each taking up double the allotted space over the 
‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ categories. As mentioned in Section 6.2, this study 
requires a more reliable and accurate means of developing a risk allocation model based 
on mean ratings from expert questionnaire input.  
6.4.3 Hypothetical Normal Distribution Curve Formula  
A formula based on an assumed normal distribution curve – presented in Section 
6.2 – is applied to calculate a specified range that allocates contentious P3 risks under: (i) 
‘mostly public,’ (ii) ‘equally shared,’ and (iii) ‘mostly private.’ Based on the formula’s 
calculated range, risks falling under the range should be borne mostly by the public 
sector, risks falling within the range should be borne equally by both sectors, and risks 
falling over the range should be borne mostly by the private sector. It is important to 
relay that this methodology forces a normal distribution on non-normally distributed data, 
which does not reflect the true distribution of this study nor the true distributions of other 
questionnaire-based studies in the core literature database.  
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Figure 6.7 presents a normal distribution curve and its associated standard 
deviations (i.e. the ’68-95-99.7’ rule). A normal distribution is a continuous probability 
distribution that represents the distribution of variables through a symmetrical bell-
shaped curve on a graph. In short, approximately 68 percent of observations fall within 
one standard deviation of the mean, 95 percent of observations fall within two standard 
deviations of the mean, and 99.7 percent of observations fall within three standard 
deviations of the mean under a normal distribution. Further, in an authentic normal 
distribution, both the mean and median are equal because data under and above the 
median are symmetrically opposed to one another under a continuous probability 
distribution.355 
Figure 6. 7: Normal Distribution Curve 
 
The formula used to arrive at Chan et al.’s and Tolani’s proposed risk allocation 
decision model is again as follows:  
																																								 																				
355 S. Narayan Rao, Educational Psychology (New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, 
2002), 399, https://books.google.ca/books?id=Huz5gasACqEC. 
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X10% = U ± Z*σ 
With reference to Figure 6.7, this formula provides a specified range over an assumed 
normal distribution curve (i.e. finding X10%) where X10% = the upper and lower values of 
the set range on the normal distribution curve, filling an area comprising 10 percent of the 
distribution near the centre of the curve as demonstrated in Figure 6.8.  
Figure 6.8’s mean value (U) remains steady at 3 to reflect a five-point scale’s 
median of 3 (i.e. ‘equally shared’ risks).356 To find X10%, the range must occupy an area of 
the curve that covers 5 percent of the distribution below U and 5 percent of the 
distribution above U. In order to find this range, a table of normal distribution must be 
consulted to arrive at a corresponding Z value for 45 percent of a normal distribution 
curve (i.e. X10%’s lower limit) and 55 percent of a normal distribution curve (i.e. X10% ‘s 
upper limit) to arrive at a 10 percent range evenly distributed between the hypothetical 
normal distribution curve’s mean. Because Chan et al. and Tolani both use one standard 
deviation to conduct their analyses, their corresponding Z value for the formula is 
0.125.357 Neither article provides reference to how they arrived at this Z value, but it is 
understood that they consulted a table of normal distribution to arrive at the 
corresponding 0.125 Z value for a standard deviation of one.  
																																								 																				
356 Though they do not explicitly explain their justifications for using their respective U values, 
this point makes it clear that Chan et al. use a mean population value of three because their risk 
allocation scheme is premised on a five-point semantic differential scale and Tolani uses a mean 
population value of two because his risk allocation scheme is premised on a three-point semantic 
differential scale. 
357 Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership 
Projects in China,” 143; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-
Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” 211-212. 
148	
	
After perusing the normal distribution table, however, it is found that a standard 
deviation of one actually presents a Z value of 0.1256613. Thus, Chan et al. and Tolani 
incorrectly used 0.125 for their formulae’s Z values when they should have used a Z 
value of 0.126. Statisticians at the University of Windsor have verified this misstep, 
which has the potential to contaminate study results. Thus, while this thesis criticizes the 
use of forced distribution methodology, it still aims to bolster academic literature that 
employs forced distribution models by setting a precedent for rounding Z values correctly 
where previous studies by established authors with scholarly influence have rounded 
incorrectly.358  
Figure 6.8 provides a standard normal distribution curve with a 10 percent range 
equally distributed between a mean of 3 over one standard deviation, thus providing a 
range of 2.874 – 3.126 on a five-point scale. Again, this range is found by adding and 
subtracting a 0.126 Z value – which has been multiplied by one to account for the 
standard deviation of one – to a mean of 3.  
Figure 6. 8: X10% over Normal Distribution Curve at One Standard Deviation 
 
																																								 																				
358 For example, Tolani’s study is based in large part on Chan et al.’s. Thus, his incorrect use of 
0.125 as a corresponding Z value for one standard deviation under the normal distribution 
formula is not surprising, as Chan et al. set a precedent to copy this miscalculation. It is important 
to correct misshapes like this early, because scholars may continue to be influenced by the flawed 
methodologies of their established peers without questioning their peer’s practices or results.  
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With reference to Figure 6.8, the assumed normal distribution formula mentioned 
in Section 6.2 is applied as follows:  
X10% = U ± Z*σ  
X10% = 3 ± 0.126*1 
X10% = 3 ± 0.126 
X10% = 2.874 – 3.126   
Because 3 is the value attributed to an ‘equally shared’ risk allocation on a five-point 
scale, by adopting a standard deviation of 1 and its corresponding Z value of 0.126, the 
mean range limits for this calculation are 2.874 to 3.126, as shown in Figure 6.9. 
Figure 6. 9: X10% over Forced Normal Distribution at One Standard Deviation 
 
Sector	of	Allocation Contentious	Risk N Mean N Mean N Mean
Public Expropriation	and	nationalization	 24 1.708 12 2.167 12 1.25
Land	acquisition	 24 1.833 12 1.917 12 1.75
Political/public	opposition	 24 1.958 12 2 12 1.917
Change	in	law 24 2.042 12 2.333 12 1.75
Exclusive	right/competition	 24 2.083 12 2.833 12 1.333
Site	availability 24 2.208 12 2.667 12 1.75
Force	majeure	 24 2.417 12 2.5 12 2.333
Residual	assets	risk 24 2.542 12 2.833 12 2.25
Excessive	contract	variation 24 2.708 12 2.833 12 2.583
Project	approval	and	permit	 24 2.75 12 2.917 12 2.583
Ground	conditions	 24 2.833 12 2.917 12 2.75
Equal Residual	value	risk	 24 2.875 12 3 12 2.75
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices 24 3 12 3.5 12 2.5
Supporting	utilities	risk 24 3 12 3.583 12 2.417
Influential	economic	events 24 3.042 12 3.417 12 2.667
Environmental	protection 24 3.042 12 3.083 12 3
Construction/design	changes 24 3.125 12 3.083 12 3.167
Private Third	party	tort	liability 24 3.458 12 3.833 12 3.083
Weather	conditions 24 3.458 12 3.417 12 3.5
Tariff	change 24 3.5 12 3.583 12 3.417
Market	demand	change 24 3.583 12 3.417 12 3.75
Inflation	risk	 24 3.708 12 3.833 12 3.583
Interest	rate	 24 3.917 12 3.917 12 3.917
Income	risk 24 3.958 12 4 12 3.917
Foreign	currency	risk		 24 4.083 12 4 12 4.167
Asset	ownership 24 4.208 12 4.083 12 4.333
Availability	of	labour/materials 24 4.333 12 4.083 12 4.583
All	Respondents Public	Sector Private	SectorRisk	Allocation	Scheme
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Due to the aforementioned limitations of forced distribution methodology – 
namely, the (i) arbitrary selection of a range to indicate ‘equally shared’ results and (ii) 
the assumed normal distribution of non-normally distributed data – Figure 6.9 does not 
represent an ‘authentic’ output of expert questionnaire input. It is worth noting that, for 
this particular study, the mean values of each risk do represent a quasi-normal 
distribution (see Figure 6.10): the mean value is 3.01 (opposed to 3), twelve risks fall 
below the mean and thirteen risks fall above the mean (opposed to an even split of 
thirteen risks falling both below and above the mean),359 and 59 percent of variables fall 
within one standard deviation of the mean (opposed to 68 percent of variables). Thus, this 
particular distribution of risks passes the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality.  
Nonetheless, a forced normal distribution still does not accurately reflect this 
study’s true respondent input and – more importantly – this methodology still suffers 
from the selection of an arbitrary range to demarcate public, private, and equally shared 
risk categories. Further, this method necessitates the use of only three risk allocation 
categories, which detracts from the level of sectorial allocation specificity offered by this 
study’s five-point scale. More specifically, this approach fails to account for the different 
degrees of preferred risk sharing offered by the five-point scale, where point two’s 
‘mostly public’ allocation preference and point four’s ‘mostly private’ allocation 
preference allow respondents to differentiate between allocating risks solely and 
allocating risks partially. Thus, a forced normal distribution should not be adopted to 
assess this study’s questionnaire-based mean scores. 
																																								 																				
359 The reason for this study’s uneven split of twelve risks falling below the mean and thirteen 
falling above the mean is because two risks – ‘changes in industrial code of practice’ and 
‘supporting utilities risk’ – opposed to one risk, each share a mean of 3. 
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Figure 6. 10: Distribution of Total Mean Scores for Contentious P3 Risks360 
	
																																								 																				
360 The x-axis represents this study’s selected P3 risks and the y-axis represents their total mean 
scores based on the expert questionnaire’s respondent input. To represent the quasi-normal 
distribution intuitively, the risk mean scores have been organized as such: the lowest mean score 
is placed in the left-most column, the second lowest mean score is placed in the right-most 
column, the third lowest mean score is placed in the second left-most column, the fourth lowest 
mean score is placed in the second-right most column, and so on until the risk with the highest 
mean score – ‘availability of labour/materials’ – is placed directly in the middle. 
152	
	
6.5 Proposed Risk Allocation Decision Model: Hybrid Adjusting Principle with Ranges 
 In light of the aforementioned drawbacks to using majority opinion analysis, the 
half adjusting principle, and a forced normal distribution curve, this study adopts a hybrid 
adjusting principle in conjunction with risk ranges based on their LCLs and UCLs. As 
noted in Section 6.2, this preferred methodology bypasses the key limitations offered in 
previous questionnaire-based studies on P3 risk allocation, and it accounts for both the 
size and input variance of this study’s respondent pool by offering a proposed risk 
allocation decision model based on confidence intervals for each risk’s mean score.  
By incorporating ranges based on confidence intervals, it is proposed that this 
study’s risk allocation decision model reflects the potential views of the population of P3 
practitioners more accurately than previous studies (i.e. rather than merely the views of 
the sample of P3 practitioners consulted). Confidence intervals are estimations of a 
population’s parameters based samples. Thus, it is estimated that the population’s mean 
score for every risk would fall above each LCL and below each UCL. Figure 6.11 shows 
the LCL and UCL of each risk at a 90 percent confidence level alongside the sectorial 
categories each risk’s range falls into based on the adjusted scale where values falling 
under: < 1.8 = solely public allocation; 1.8 < 2.6 = mostly public allocation; 2.6 < 3.4 = 
equally shared allocation; 3.4 < 4.2 = mostly private allocation; and 4.2 < = solely private 
allocation.  
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Figure 6. 11: Lower and Upper Confidence Levels of Contentious P3 Risks 
* Risks that showed significant sectorial disagreement between public and private practitioners 
based on the independent two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test. 	
As previously stated, the proposed allocation of the six risks that showed 
significant sectorial disagreement should be viewed more skeptically than the risks that 
passed both the independent two sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a 95 percent 
confidence level. To gauge sectorial disagreement over the allocation of these six risks, 
their LCLs and UCLs are computed independently between sectors. Figure 6.12 reveals 
the preferred sector of allocation between public and private respondents based on ranges 
derived from the LCLs and UCLs of public and private sector respondents separately at a 
90 percent confidence level.  
Contentious	Risk Mean LCL-UCL Sector	of	Allocation
Expropriation	and	nationalization* 1.708 1.391	-	2.026 Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public
Land	acquisition	 1.833 1.567	-	2.100 Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public
Political/public	opposition	 1.958 1.696	-	2.221 Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public
Change	in	law 2.042 1.724	-	2.359 Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public
Exclusive	right/competition	* 2.083 1.698	-	2.468 Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public
Site	availability* 2.208 1.867	-	2.550 Mostly	Public
Force	majeure	 2.417 2.126	-	2.707 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Residual	assets	risk 2.542 2.185	-	2.899 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Excessive	contract	variation 2.708 2.490	-	2.927 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Project	approval	and	permit	 2.75 2.389	-	3.111 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Ground	conditions	 2.833 2.513	-	3.154 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Residual	value	risk	 2.875 2.458	-	3.292 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices* 3 2.587	-	3.413 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Supporting	utilities	risk* 3 2.600	-	3.400 Equally	Shared
Influential	economic	events 3.042 2.610	-	3.473 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Environmental	protection 3.042 2.636	-	3.448 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Construction/design	changes 3.125 2.660	-	3.590 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Third	party	tort	liability* 3.458 3.206	-	3.711 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Weather	conditions 3.458 3.101	-	3.815 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Tariff	change 3.5 3.143	-	3.857 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Market	demand	change 3.583 3.258	-	3.908 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Inflation	risk	 3.708 3.290	-	4.127 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private
Interest	rate	 3.917 3.492	-	4.341 Mostly	Private;	Solely	Private
Income	risk 3.958 3.676	-	4.240 Mostly	Private;	Solely	Private
Foreign	currency	risk		 4.083 3.742	-	4.424 Mostly	Private;	Solely	Private
Asset	ownership 4.208 3.956	-	4.461 Mostly	Private;	Solely	Private
Availability	of	labour/materials 4.333 4.030	-	4.637 Mostly	Private;	Solely	Private
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Figure 6. 12: Separate Ranges for Risks with Significant Sectorial Disagreement 
 
At least one of the proposed sectors of allocation for every risk with significant 
sectorial disagreement in Figure 6.11 falls under the proposed sectors of allocation from 
both public and private respondents in Figure 6.12. For half these risks, all proposed 
sectors of allocation offered in Figure 6.11 fall under the proposed sectors of allocation 
offered by both public and private respondents in Figure 6.12 (i.e. site availability, 
changes in industrial code of practices, and supporting utilities risk).  
To be charitable to the risk allocation decision model proposed in Figure 6.11, 
this partial congruity can be viewed as a redeeming sanction. While the risks assessed in 
Figure 6.12 may require additional negotiation between sectors to arrive at optimal – or at 
least agreeable – RMAs, the public-private divide over their preferred allocation is close 
enough to expect relatively straightforward sectorial compromise between public and 
private P3 practitioners. Like any partnership, compromise is at the heart of P3 
agreements. Further, the 27 risks assessed in this study are deemed contentious based on 
the core literature review. Thus, it is unsurprising that sectorial compromise is necessary 
to arrive at a proposed risk allocation decision model; unanimous agreement between 
sectors over the treatment of all contentious P3 project risks should not be expected.  
Public Private Public Private Public Private
Expropriation	and	nationalization 2.167 1.25 1.681	-	2.653 1.000	-	1.572 Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared Solely	Public
Exclusive	right/competition	 2.833 1.333 2.347	-	3.319 1.000	-	1.671 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared Solely	Public
Site	availability 2.667 1.75 2.156	-	3.177 1.359	-	2.141 Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared Solely	Public;	Mostly	Public
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices 3.5 2.5 2.936	-	4.064 1.936	-	3.064 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Supporting	utilities	risk 3.583 2.417 3.172	-	3.994 1.813	-	3.020 Equally	Shared;	Mostly	Private Mostly	Public;	Equally	Shared
Third	party	tort	liability 3.833 3.083 3.461	-	4.205 2.816	-	3.350 Mostly	Private;	Solely	Private Equally	Shared
Contentious	Risk	 Mean LCL-UCL Sector	of	Allocation
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6.5.1 Membership Functions and Membership Degrees 
Now that preferred sectors of allocation for each risk have been proposed, the 
degree to which P3 practitioners associate these risks with their preferred sectors of 
allocation should be analyzed. By doing so, this study recaptures information otherwise 
lost by merely proposing allocation categories for risks based on crisp mean values.  Each 
risk allocation category can be viewed as a “membership function” (m) to which each risk 
carries an associated agreement level – or “membership degree” – between 0 to 1.361 
Thus, each risk’s range – based on LCLs and UCLs at a 90 percent confidence level – can 
be assessed under pairs of values denoting five possible membership functions alongside 
their associated membership degrees. Let mSpub = solely public, mMpub = mostly public, mES 
= equally shared, mMpri = mostly private, and mSpri = solely private.  
For example, land acquisition risk’s range, at a 90 percent confidence level, is 
1.567 to 2.1. Thus, it falls under both ‘solely public’ (< 1.8) and ‘mostly public’ (1.8 < 
2.6) risk allocation categories. Land acquisition’s LCL, 1.567, falls under mSpub at 0.233 
units (i.e. 1.8 – 1.567 = 0.233). Land acquisition’s UCL, 2.1, falls above mSpub at 0.3 units 
(i.e. 2.1 – 1.8 = 0.3). Because 0.3 + 0.233 = 0.533, and 0.233 divided by 0.533 = 0.437, 
44 percent of land acquisition risk’s range falls within the ‘solely public’ category, 
representing a membership degree of 0.44 to membership function mSpub. Because 0.3 
divided by 0.533 = 0.563, 56 percent of land acquisition risk’s range falls within the 
‘mostly public’ category, representing a membership degree of 0.56 to membership 
function mMpub. Because none of land acquisition risk’s range of 0.533 falls within 
membership functions mES, mMpri, or mSpri, its membership degree for all three is 0. 
																																								 																				
361 Qing Li, “A Novel Likert Scale Based on Fuzzy Sets Theory,” Expert Systems with 
Applications 40, no. 5 (2013): 1611, doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2012.09.015. 
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Where CI = the confidence interval – or range – based on each risk’s LCL and 
UCL, land acquisition risk’s membership degrees can be modeled as follows: 
mSpub(CI) = 0.44;  mMpub(CI) = 0.56;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; and  mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
Here, land acquisition’s range of 0.533 was found by: (i) subtracting land acquisition’s 
LCL (1.567) from mSpub’s limit (1.8) to arrive at 0.233; (ii) subtracting mSpub’s limit (1.8) 
from land acquisition’s UCL (2.026) to arrive at 0.3; and (iii) adding the results, 0.233 
and 0.3, to arrive at a range – or confidence interval – of 0.533 at a 90 percent confidence 
level. Land acquisition risk’s range can be verified by simply subtracting its LCL from its 
UCL: 2.1 – 1.567 = 0.533.  
By demarcating land acquisition’s range of 0.533 into two segments, that which 
falls under 1.8 and that which falls between 1.8 and 2.6, its membership degrees towards 
‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ membership functions are found. Note that these 
degrees are relative to the size of land acquisition’s range of 0.533. This means, no matter 
how high a risk’s range is, its combined membership degrees for all membership 
functions will always equal 1 (e.g. 0.44 + 0. 56 + 0.0 + 0.0 + 0.0 = 1).  
Because all risks’ combined membership degrees will equal 1 regardless of the 
size of their range, the size of their range must be noted when assigning them to risk 
allocation categories. The higher a risk’s range between its LCL and UCL, the higher its 
variance will be. Respondent variance shares an inverse relationship with the 
conclusiveness and confidence of population predictions based on a sample’s input. Thus, 
the higher a risk’s range is, the less conclusive its results are for this study. Conversely, 
the lower a risk’s range is, the more conclusive its results are for this study. 
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 Because each risk’s range is directly tied to its membership degrees for the five 
membership functions, the range of risks with high variance can encompass a greater 
portion of a risk allocation category (e.g. ‘equally shared’) under this study’s adjusted 
scale while simultaneously holding a comparably lower or equal membership degree 
towards membership functions than risks with a lower variance.  
For example, Figure 6.11 shows that site availability risk and supporting utilities 
risk both fall under one risk category, thus both hold a membership degree of 1.0 for their 
respective membership functions. However, because site availability risk’s range and 
variance are lower than supporting utilities risk’s range and variance, it encompasses less 
of its risk category’s space on the adjusted five-point scale. Site availability risk’s range 
falls within 85 percent of the ‘mostly public’ allocation category (i.e. 1.8 < 2.6) with an 
LCL of 1.867 and a UCL of 2.55. Supporting utilities risk’s range perfectly falls within 
100 percent of the ‘equally shared’ allocation category (i.e. 2.6 < 3.4) with an LCL of 2.6 
and a UCL of 3.4.362 
At first blush, it may appear counterintuitive to believe that, by encompassing a 
smaller portion of the adjusted scale’s ‘mostly public’ section, site availability risk shares 
a stronger relationship with the membership function mMpub than supporting utilities risk 
does with mES. An observer may say that site availability risk and supporting utilities risk 
both share an equally strong relationship with their respective membership functions on 
account of both holding a sole membership degree of 1. However, site availability risk’s 
lower range and variance provides more conclusivity over the confidence with which it is 
																																								 																				
362 Site availability risk’s range and variance are 0.683 and 0.955 respectively, while supporting 
utilities risk’s range and variance are 0.8 and 1.304 respectively.  
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allocated to its respective membership function. If this concept does not seem readily 
apparent, it is because that – in this instance – membership degrees and functions do not 
provide this information on their own.363 They do, however, in the following example. 
The effect range and variance have on risk membership degrees is made blatantly 
apparent when comparing the risk of changes in industrial code of practices with 
supporting utilities risk and site availability risk. The risk of changes in industrial code of 
practices presents a unique situation where it holds three membership degrees above zero 
for three separate membership functions. Unsurprisingly, its range and variance are both 
higher than the range and variance of site availability risk and supporting utilities risk.364 
With an LCL of 2.587 and a UCL of 3.413, the risk of changes in industrial code of 
practice’s range falls within 100 percent of the ‘equally shared’ allocation category and 
less than a percent of both ‘mostly public’ and ‘mostly private’ allocation categories.  
Despite encompassing the entire ‘equally shared’ category, this risk’s high range 
– due to a high variance – must be accounted for. Because a high range and variance is 
associated with lower conclusivity and confidence in a risk’s proposed allocation on the 
adjusted scale, it shares a lower membership degree to the membership function mES than 
supporting utilities risk does, despite both risks’ ranges encompassing the entire ‘equally 
shared’ portion of the adjusted scale.  
Due to its high range and variance, the risk of changes in industrial code of 
practice actually shares a lower membership degree with mES (i.e. 0.96) than site 
																																								 																				
363 Without reference to both risk’s range and variance, their equal membership degrees of 1 
incorrectly appear to denote an equally strong relationship with their respective sole membership 
functions. 
364 Changes in industrial code of practices risk’s range and variance are 0.826 and 1.391 
respectively. 
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availability risk does with mMpub (i.e. 1.0), despite the former falling within 100 percent of 
the ‘equally shared’ allocation category and the latter falling within 85 percent of the 
‘mostly public’ allocation category. The respective membership degrees of the three 
aforementioned risks are expressed as follows.  
For site availability risk,  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 1.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; and  mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
For supporting utilities risk, 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 1.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; and  mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
For changes in industrial code of practice,  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.02;  mES(CI) = 0.96;  mMpri(CI) = 0.02; and  mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
These three risks are unique in holding membership degrees above zero for either 
one or three membership functions – the remaining 24 risks in this study all hold 
membership degrees above zero for exactly two membership functions.365 Figure 6.13 
provides a conceptual illustration of the three aforementioned risks’ unique dispersions 
																																								 																				
365 Because of their unique dispersions over the adjusted scale, the membership degrees for these 
three risks were calculated differently than the other 24 risks. The beginning of Section 6.5.1 
provides an example with land acquisition risk to denote the method used to arrive at membership 
degrees for ‘typical’ risk ranges that fall within two membership functions – by calculating the 
percentage of a risk’s range that falls below and above its ‘cut off’ point of range demarcation 
(i.e. 1.8, 2.6, 3.4, or 4.2). For the two risks with one membership function, no calculations are 
necessary to find their membership degree – it is necessarily 1. For the risk with three 
membership functions, the differences between its: (i) lowest cut off point, 2.6, and its LCL, 
2.587 as well as its (ii) highest cut off point, 3.4, and its UCL, 3.413, are calculated and divided 
by its range. Because both differences equal 0.013, this number is divided twice separately by 
0.826 to arrive at its equal membership degrees for mMpub and mMpri – 0.02. Accordingly, 4 percent 
of changes in industrial code of practices’ range falls evenly between the ‘mostly public’ and 
‘mostly private’ allocation categories. Hence, 96 percent of this risk’s range falls within the 
‘equally shared’ allocation category, despite encompassing its entire section on the adjusted scale. 
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over this study’s adjusted scale; for context into the ‘typical’ dispersion of the remaining 
24 risks, land acquisition – mentioned earlier in this section – is also included.  
Figure 6. 13: Ranges for Select Risks over Adjusted Scale 
 
 Note that, because of the aforementioned effects risk ranges, due to variance, have 
on their membership degrees, membership functions (e.g. mES) and risk allocation 
categories (e.g. ‘equally shared,’ or 2.6 < 3.4) are not synonymous. While membership 
degrees do provide readers with the distribution under which each risk’s range is placed, 
understanding the size of each risk’s range, and how these ranges fall under risk 
allocation categories, is also a significant factor in arriving at a proposed risk allocation 
decision model. In short, the shorter a risk’s range is, the more confidently it can be 
placed under a proposed allocation category. Thus, it is important to view membership 
degrees and functions alongside the categorical placement of risk. Figure 6.14 provides 
each P3 risk’s range and degrees towards their relevant membership functions.  
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Figure 6. 14: Proposed Risk Allocation Decision Model for Contentious P3 Risks366 
  
As an educational resource, Figure 6.14’s risk allocation decision model provides 
readers with an intuitive understanding of each risk’s strength of association towards both 
the public and private sector – based on expert opinion – via colour accents. Where 
green, purple, and blue represent public, private, and shared allocations respectively, the 
darker the accent, the stronger a risk’s association with the sector to which it has a 
majority membership function (i.e. m[CI] > 0.50). 
																																								 																				
366 Risks are ordered in descending order from lowest total mean score to highest total mean 
score. 
Contentious	Risk 			LCL-UCL 						Range 															Membership	Degrees	Above	Zero
Expropriation	and	nationalization 1.391	-	2.026 0.635 mSpub(CI)	=	0.64;	mMpub(CI)	=	0.36
Land	acquisition	 1.567	-	2.100 0.533 mSpub(CI)	=	0.44;	mMpub(CI)	=	0.56
Political/public	opposition	 1.696	-	2.221 0.525 mSpub(CI)	=	0.20;	mMpub(CI)	=	0.80
Change	in	law 1.724	-	2.359 0.635 mSpub(CI)	=	0.12;	mMpub(CI)	=	0.88
Exclusive	right/competition	 1.698	-	2.468 0.770 mSpub(CI)	=	0.13;	mMpub(CI)	=	0.87
Site	availability 1.867	-	2.550 0.683 mMpub(CI)	=	1.0
Force	majeure	 2.126	-	2.707 0.581 mMpub(CI)	=	0.82;	mES(CI)	=	0.18
Residual	assets	risk 2.185	-	2.899 0.714 mMpub(CI)	=	0.58;	mES(CI)	=	0.42
Excessive	contract	variation 2.490	-	2.927 0.437 mMpub(CI)	=	0.25;	mES(CI)	=	0.75
Project	approval	and	permit	 2.389	-	3.111 0.722 mMpub(CI)	=	0.29;	mES(CI)	=	0.71
Ground	conditions	 2.513	-	3.154 0.641 mMpub(CI)	=	0.14;	mES(CI)	=	0.86
Residual	value	risk	 2.458	-	3.292 0.834 mMpub(CI)=0.17;	mES(CI)=0.83
Changes	in	industrial	code	of	practices 2.587	-	3.413 0.826 mMpub(CI)	=	0.02;	mES(CI)	=	0.96;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.02
Supporting	utilities	risk 2.600	-	3.400 0.800 mES(CI)	=	1.0
Influential	economic	events 2.610	-	3.473 0.863 mES(CI)	=	0.92;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.08
Environmental	protection 2.636	-	3.448 0.812 mES(CI)	=	0.94;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.06
Construction/design	changes 2.660	-	3.590 0.930 mES(CI)	=	0.80;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.20
Third	party	tort	liability 3.206	-	3.711 0.505 mES(CI)	=	0.38;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.62
Weather	conditions 3.101	-	3.815 0.714 mES(CI)	=	0.42;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.58
Tariff	change 3.143	-	3.857 0.714 mES(CI)	=	0.36;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.64
Market	demand	change 3.258	-	3.908 0.650 mES(CI)	=	0.22;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.78
Inflation	risk	 3.290	-	4.127 0.837 mES(CI)	=	0.13;	mMpri(CI)	=	0.87
Interest	rate	 3.492	-	4.341 0.849 mMpri(CI)	=	0.83;	mSpri(CI)	=	0.17
Income	risk 3.676	-	4.240 0.564 mMpri(CI)	=	0.93;	mSpri(CI)	=	0.07
Foreign	currency	risk		 3.742	-	4.424 0.682 mMpri(CI)	=	0.67;	mSpri(CI)	=	0.33
Asset	ownership 3.956	-	4.461 0.505 mMpri(CI)	=	0.48;	mSpri(CI)	=	0.52
Availability	of	labour/materials 4.030	-	4.637 0.607 mMpri(CI)	=	0.28;	mSpri(CI)	=	0.72
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Again, because this study’s respondents were confined to selecting variables on 
an ordinal semantic differentiation scale, the five-point scale “tells nothing about the 
intervals between responses.” This type of scale leads to “information lost during 
measurement” because its discrete variables provide little means of association between 
each other (i.e. other than their clear orderly ranking from one to five). Further, the 
“closed response format” of semantic differential scales (i.e. truncated variables) force 
respondents to make choices that may otherwise “not match their exact responses.”367  In 
short, while this study’s five-point scale allows respondents to gauge allocation 
preferences according to expert opinion, these opinions – on their own – come at an 
informational compromise due to the drawbacks of using ordinal, truncated measurement 
variables.  
By treating the questionnaire’s ordinal input as interval data, mean score methods 
can be applied to arrive at Figure 6.14’s proposed risk allocation decision model based on 
risk ranges and their degrees of membership towards membership functions. These 
degrees of membership reduce the information loss denoted with ordinal point scales, 
allowing for a more fluid risk allocation decision model premised on ‘grey’ risk 
categorization – opposed to ‘black and white’ – that more thoroughly accounts for the 
relational strength between risks and their accompanying allocation categories.368  
																																								 																				
367  Li, “A Novel Likert Scale Based on Fuzzy Sets Theory,” 1610. 
368 Albeit, by treating the ordinal data as interval data, two major assumptions are required: (i) the 
aforementioned assumed equidistance between points on the semantic differential scale and (ii) 
the assumed universality with which a point’s quality (i.e. the quality of being public, private, or 
equal) applies to each risk. The limitations of these assumptions are considered in Chapter 7.  
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6.6 Allocating Contentious P3 Risks  
While this study’s strength lies in its fluid allocation model, its 27 contentious P3 
project risks can easily be compartmentalized under three broad categories: (i) risks 
leaning towards public sector allocation, (ii) risks leaning towards an evenly shared 
allocation, and (iii) risks leaning towards private sector allocation. These categories are 
premised on the membership function the majority of a risk’s range falls under. Because 
of the ‘situatedness’ of P3s, risk allocation is a malleable process – it should never be 
assumed that certain P3 risks should always be borne by a public or private party in every 
circumstance. Thus, these broad categories should not be dogmatically followed, but 
rather used to conceptualize the general preferences of expert practitioners over the 
general treatment of contentious P3 risks.  
Eight risks fall under the broad public sector allocation category. These risks 
follow a general trend where their strength of public sector association falls in descending 
order according to Figure 6.14. Two of these risks share membership degrees with the 
‘equally shared’ membership function.  
Nine risks fall under the broad evenly shared allocation category, where the 
strength of equal sharing between sectors gradually increases until it climaxes two thirds 
of the way down at ‘supporting utilities risk.’ The remainder of this category’s strength of 
association towards an evenly shared membership stays relatively stagnant until its last 
risk, ‘construction/design changes,’ which shares a small – but significant – relationship 
with the ‘mostly private’ membership function. All of this broad category’s risks except 
‘supporting utilities risk’ share a membership degree above zero with either the ‘mostly 
public’ or ‘mostly private’ functions. This is because this category: (i) operates at the 
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center of the spectrum and (ii) revolves around one risk membership function out of five 
opposed to two risk membership functions out of five. 
Ten risks fall under the broad private sector allocation category. These risks 
follow a general trend where their strength of private sector association rises in ascending 
order according to Figure 6.14. Interestingly, five of these risks share membership 
degrees with the ‘equally shared’ membership function, representing half the broad 
private category. Compared to the broad public category, in which only a quarter of its 
risks share membership degrees with the ‘equally shared’ membership function, this trend 
may indicate that P3 practitioners have stronger confidence or conviction in allocating 
risks to the public sector in lieu of the private sector.   
The remainder of Chapter 6 assesses this study’s proposed risk allocation decision 
model reflected in Figure 6.14. P3 literature is consulted to justify, question, or 
comprehend this study’s results. Original allocation preferences from the core literature 
database are commonly referenced. Note, however, that some risks appear more 
frequently in the database than others (see Figure 5.3).369 
6.7 Risks Leaning Towards Public Sector Allocation  
This study indicates that eleven risks should generally be allocated to the public 
sector either fully or to a significant degree. The following ‘public’ risks – in order of 
their strength of association to the public sector370 – include: (i) expropriation and 
nationalization, (ii) land acquisition, (iii) political/public opposition, (iv) change in law, 
																																								 																				
369 For example, the risk of ‘change in law’ appears in every article examined while the risk of 
‘influential economic events’ appears in a quarter of the articles examined. 
370 According to their total mean scores. 
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(v) exclusive right/competition, (vi) site availability, (vii) force majeure, and (viii) 
residual assets risk.  
6.7.1 Expropriation and Nationalization  
mSpub(CI) = 0.64;  mMpub(CI) = 0.36;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
Expropriation and nationalization is the only risk in this study with the majority of 
its range falling under the ‘solely private’ membership function. Its strong ties to the 
public sector are likely due to expropriation traditionally being both a sole government 
power and, accordingly, a sole government responsibility. Governments often retain the 
right to acquire private projects or land through “compulsory acquisition” by means of 
expropriation.371 By viewing expropriation as a ‘risk,’ questionnaire respondents – both 
public and private – believe that governments should bear the financial consequences of 
the compulsory acquisition of a project – this includes providing reasonable 
compensation to their private P3 partners.  
Chan et al., Hwang et al., Ke et al., Li et al., and Tolani all recommend this risk be 
retained by the public sector. It should be noted, however, that public sector respondents 
present a total mean of 2.167 for this risk while private sector respondents present a total 
mean of 1.25. With a mean difference of 0.917, expropriation and nationalization remains 
one of the most contentious risks in this study; it has the tied fourth largest mean 
difference between public and private respondents (see Figure 6.3). Further, its 
independent public and private ranges – derived from its public and private LCLs and 
UCLs – do not overlap (see Figure 6.12). This high level of disagreement is echoed in P3 
																																								 																				
371 S. Keith et al., “Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation” 1, no. 3 (2008): 1, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0506e/i0506e00.htm. 
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literature, and it may be tied to the perceived conditions public and private sector 
practitioners denote with expropriation risks.  
Public practitioners may denote expropriation with first-step risk default where 
private partners breach contractual obligations (see Figure 4.1); in such situations, private 
partners should not be compensated for breaching contractual agreements.  Private 
practitioners may denote expropriation with strategic behaviour from governments, where 
public authorities strategically adopt PRM techniques employed by their preferred 
proponents and use them to procure or manage the same facility through another contract 
with separate partners (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7).372 
The concept of strategic behaviour has been largely denoted with private parties 
up to this point, though governments are capable of such practices too.373 However, P3s 
take a wealth of resources and years of preliminary public input to initiate. Governments 
do not undertake exhaustive preliminary screenings and competitive selection processes 
(e.g. RFQs, RFPs, and due diligence) with the goal of expropriating land from their 
preferred proponent’s concessionaire. This leaves two points to consider: (i) where 
expropriation risks occur, they are likely to be caused by extreme contractual breaches 
from the private sector; and (ii) according to this study’s findings, governments should 
bear the risk of compensating the private parties affected by expropriation.  
If these points appear contradictory, it is because they are. A commonly cited 
point of contention amongst P3 literature is the fact that governments are often the 
																																								 																				
372 As noted in Chapter 2, governments can use the intellectual property of preferred proponents 
by ‘purchasing’ their respective PRM methods and applying them to future projects. 
373 Chapter 7 will elucidate this concept further. 
167	
	
residual risk holder should private parties majorly default on risks.374 While this study’s 
findings on expropriation risk may seem uncharitable towards the public sector, they 
parallel industry standards (albeit contentious industry standards). An example of a 
brownfield P3 project going awry – and eventually leading to expropriation – is the 
infamous battle between the government and its SPV partner over the mistreatment of a 
water treatment facility in Hamilton in 1994.  
Under the operational oversight of the project’s SPV, Philips Utilities 
Management Corporation (PUMC), approximately 180 million litres of raw sewage spilt 
into the city’s harbour. This mishap required additional resources for cleanup, yet half of 
the PUMC’s subcontracted workforce was cut down in 1995; they cited financial strain as 
the reason for the lay offs (at least two of the project’s contractors are now bankrupt and 
both had dealings with the now infamous Enron corporation). The government reluctantly 
put the treatment of the plant back into the hands of the public sector, consequently 
accepting its large project losses.375  
While it is clear that governments should reimburse private partners affected by 
expropriation when contractual obligations are met, this issue remains largely project-
specific. Thus, this risk’s strong ties towards public sector allocation, while reflecting 
																																								 																				
374 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere †”; 
De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process”; De Palma, Leruth, and Prunier, “Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks 
in Public-Private Partnerships”; Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
375 Salim Loxely, “An Analysis of a Public-Private Sector Partnership : The Hamilton - 
Wentworth - Philip Utilities Management Corporation PPP,” Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (Manitoba, 1999), 
http://www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/e_records/walkerton/part2info/partieswithstanding/pdf/CUPEp
pp.pdf. 
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industry practices, are questionable from an ethical perspective. Degrees of sharing 
expropriation risks are necessary. 
6.7.2 Land Acquisition   
mSpub(CI) = 0.44;  mMpub(CI) = 0.56;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
It is unsurprising that ‘land acquisition’ falls within a public range of allocation; 
internationally, governments have “shown a tendency to retain ownership of government 
land and to grant leases to private parties… so that the land and any improvement on it 
revert to government.”376 Curiously, however, the degree to which this study’s experts 
denote land acquisition with public sector responsibility does not always correlate with 
allocation suggestions based in P3 literature. The VDTF notes that, “as the major project 
market has evolved, the need for government to retain a propriety interest has come 
increasingly into question… It should not be automatically assumed that the underlying 
land asset needs to be in government hands.”377 
Perhaps this is why there is discrepancy within the core literature database over its 
allocation. Chan et al., Ke et al., and Li et al. allocate land acquisition to the public sector 
while Tolani recommends a shared allocation. Li et al. provides conditions under which 
land acquisition should generally be borne solely by the public sector: 
i. Where the site is an existing government site, perhaps with existing 
defects or environmental liabilities;  
ii. Where the government wishes to retain ownership of the underlying land 
asset, or is to acquire it at the end of the contract term;  
iii. Where site approvals are likely to be particularly complex, as in the case 
of linear infrastructure projects involving an environmental impact 
assessment; or 
																																								 																				
376 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 43. 
377 Ibid. 
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iv. Where indigenous title/ownership issues arise over the land proposed for 
the project.378  
 
The VDTF provides additional conditions under which land acquisition should be borne 
solely by the public sector:  
i. Sites which government clearly wants into the future, e.g. major roadways;  
ii. Sites from which government may wish to receive or deliver future 
services; and  
iii. Sites in which government has no special interest and from which it can, if 
need be, walk away.379 
 
With these conditions in mind, risks associated with land acquisition (e.g. unanticipated 
delay in, or extra costs associated with, procuring land that is required for a P3 project) 
are still generally associated with the public sector – it appears this study’s public 
allocation is sound. However, this trend may change in the future as traditional public 
responsibilities and risks increasingly shift towards to the private sector.380 
6.7.3 Political/Public Opposition 
mSpub(CI) = 0.20;  mMpub(CI) = 0.80;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
 This risk is similarly linked with land acquisition as well as other issues that may 
arise before and during the P3 tender process (e.g. environmental protection and project 
approval and permit). When a P3 project experiences prejudicial backlash from factions 
within its surrounding community, the general response from governments is to form a 
“community liaison,” establishing a means of communication between the community 
																																								 																				
378 Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,” 32. 
379 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 43. 
380 J E Stiglitz and J K Rosengard, Economics of the Public Sector: Fourth International Student 
Edition, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 
https://books.google.ca/books?id=miPeCgAAQBAJ. 
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and the crown corporation responsible for the project during early site preparation 
stages.381  
Of course, SPVs can form community liaisons too, especially in the name of 
transparency with the general public.382 However, according to this study, the risk of 
mitigating potential public backlash against P3s should generally be borne by the 
government. This result runs parallel with findings from the core literature database: five 
studies recommend public sector allocation and one study recommends a private sector 
allocation. This study’s ‘mostly public’ allocation appears sound. 
6.7.4 Change in Law 
mSpub(CI) = 0.12;  mMpub(CI) = 0.88;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
The risk of legal change received six public, five ‘shared,’ and one private 
allocation recommendation according to the core literature database. It is the only risk out 
of 54 to appear in all twelve pieces of literature examined in the database.383  The VDTF 
defines change in law risk as “the risk that the agreed legal, policy and regulatory 
framework will change during the contract term in a way not allowed for when the 
contract was signed and which disadvantages or has a negative financial impact on the 
project.”384   
Changes in law generally affect private partners adversely during DBO phases of 
a P3 project. One of this risk’s most oft-cited consequences is the need for SPV partners 
																																								 																				
381 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide.”, 34. 
382 Mahran Maher Zatar, “Public Private Partnership Pitfalls In Toll Roads” (Civil & 
Environmental Engineering, 2014), 17, https://uta-ir.tdl.org/uta-
ir/bitstream/handle/10106/24447/Zatar_uta_2502M_12617.pdf?sequence=1. 
383 See Figure 5.3. 
384 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 90. 
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to undergo design modifications for the DB of infrastructure (e.g. a modification of 
ventilation stacks to minimize pollution caused by traffic in tunnels in accordance with 
new environmental standards). While private partners are often charged with mitigating 
change in law risk, this study indicates that governments should compensate them for 
doing so (pending final contract stipulations). For instance, public authorities could 
compensate private partners though payment measures like increased tariffs for adapting 
to project-adverse legal changes.385 This study’s public allocation appears sound. 
6.7.5 Exclusive Right/Competition 
mSpub(CI) = 0.13;  mMpub(CI) = 0.87;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
Similar to expropriation, public authorities are generally the only actors with the 
influence to revoke previously established exclusivity rights from their original project 
partners and potentially reopen competition to other private competitors. For this risk, a 
public allocation indicates some form of compensation to the private sector on behalf of 
public authorities, while a private allocation would indicate a lesser degree of 
compensation to no compensation at all. If a private party has its exclusive right 
agreements revoked or dishonoured, it should be fairly compensated according to this 
study. This result echoes the findings of the core literature database, where this risk 
received three public allocation recommendations and one ‘shared’ allocation 
recommendation.  
Interestingly, this study’s public and private respondents gave this risk an overall 
mean score of 2.833 and 1.333 respectively. This sectorial mean difference of 1.5 is the 
																																								 																				
385 Ibid.90, 93-94. 
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highest in this study (see Figure 6.3). Further, this risk’s public and private ranges do not 
overlap (see Figure 6.12).  It is of no surprise that the risk of exclusive right/competition 
showed statistically significant difference between sectors through the independent two-
sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a 95 percent confidence level. This suggests 
sector-driven partiality; of all risks in this study, the proposed allocation of exclusive 
right/competition risk needs to be viewed with the most skepticism. Further research on 
sectorial agreement over its allocation is necessary. However, according to the literature, 
a ‘mostly public’ allocation – for which it received a 0.88 membership degree – appears 
sound. 
6.7.6 Site Availability   
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 1.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
Site availability is only one of two risks in this study with a range that falls within 
one category – ‘mostly public.’ Like exclusive right and expropriation risks before it, site 
availability is among the six risks that showed statistically significant sectorial 
disagreement over its allocation. The public sector’s overall mean score of 2.667 and the 
private sector’s overall mean score of 1.75 yields a significant mean difference of 0.917 
(see Figure 6.3). Further, its public range and private range do not overlap; however, its 
public sector LCL and private sector UCL are only 0.015 units away from meeting on the 
adjusted five-point scale (see Figure 6.12). This suggests cooperative compromise over 
its preferred allocation is possible. 
 This risk differs from land acquisition because it deals with the risk of 
inaccessible land or resources already procured for a project, resulting in added delays 
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and costs. This risk may intersect with availability of labour/materials, weather 
conditions, environmental protection, project permits, and ground conditions – among 
others – as it broadly encapsulates unanticipated delays in using resources that are 
otherwise available save for specific obstacles.  
Both Hwang et al. and Li et al. suggest public allocation for site availability. 
Hwang et al. note that a corruption free public sector should be better able to manage this 
risk to “ensure that P[3] projects are in a favourable environment for private sectors.” 
Further, they note that the “public sector should also retain the risk of site acquisition as it 
has higher authority to control the process of land acquisition.”386   
Again, results from the core literature database are echoed in this study’s findings 
– land acquisition received a larger share of public allocation preferences both within the 
core literature database and within this study than site availability did. Land acquisition, 
with three public and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation, received relevant 
membership functions mSpub(CI) = 0.44 and  mMpub(CI) = 0.56; site availability, with three 
public, two private, and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation, received a relatively 
weaker public score with no mSpub degree of membership above zero.  
Site availability risk’s weaker public sector allocation likely arose in both 
circumstances because such risks are connected to a wide array of different factors – 
many of which may arise under private sector influence. Ng and Loosemore note that 
“site risks” should be allocated to different actors from different sectors depending on 
what each risk entails. For instance, should site availability risks arise due to Native title 
																																								 																				
386 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 430. 
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or cultural heritage issues, they recommend governments bear the risk; if site availability 
risks arise due to the failure of supporting structures or ground conditions, they 
recommend private construction contractors bear the risk; if site availability risks arise 
due to pollution and discharge, they recommend private operating companies bear the 
risk.387 Thus, this risk remains highly contingent on specific project circumstances.  
6.7.7 Force Majeure 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.82;  mES(CI) = 0.18;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
As noted in Chapter 4, large-scale, uninsurable risks that can neither be quantified 
nor influenced by private actors should be borne by public authorities. Even if the private 
sector has influence over such risks, unquantifiable risks should still be borne largely by 
governments with a risk cap for the private sector (see Figure 4.5).  The VDTF defines 
force majeure risk as “the risk that a specified event entirely outside the control of either 
party will occur and will result in a delay or default by the private party in… its 
contractual obligations.”388  Other force majeure definitions can be less optimistic; 
Yescombe defines force majeure risk as an event where, “though neither party is at fault, 
the effect of the event is so severe (and cannot be mitigated by insurance…) that the 
Project Contract has to be terminated.”389  
One pattern remains clear, however, and that is that force majeure risks are 
exogenous – they arise from external influences, and thus no party has control over their 
occurrence. In line with Chapter 4’s findings, force majeure has appropriately garnered a 
																																								 																				
387 Ng and Loosemore, “Risk Allocation in the Private Provision of Public Infrastructure,” 6. 
388 Emphasis added. See VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 106. 
389 Emphasis added. See Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and 
Finance, 245. 
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strong membership degree – 0.82 – towards ‘mostly public’ allocation on account of 
Figure 4.5’s rule: risks that cannot be fully insured, quantified, or controlled to any 
degree by either party should be borne by governments. Its relatively weak membership 
degree – 0.12 – towards ‘equally shared’ allocation nicely accounts for the concept of 
risk sharing for force majeure events with a private sector risk cap.  
 Force majeure takes shape in two distinct forms: political and non-political. Non-
political force majeure risks, often referred to as “acts of God,” include natural disasters 
(e.g. earthquakes, landslides, and floods) and biological calamities (e.g. nuclear or 
chemical contamination to a site). Political force majeure risks include war, terrorism, 
and riots. It is generally accepted that no party has influence over these risks and, 
accordingly, they should be borne by the public sector if they cannot be covered by 
insurance.390   
The reason events like force majeure risks – which cannot be affected by either 
sector – are solely borne by public authorities, or mostly borne by public authorities with 
a cap for the private sector, is twofold. Firstly, the main purpose of P3s for governments 
is to develop public infrastructure and services for citizens while the main purpose of P3s 
for SPVs is to make a profit. If SPVs were expected to bear a large portion of force 
majeure risks, they would be less likely to participate in P3s due to the exorbitant costs 
associated with bearing these risks. This would hamper the government’s ability to attract 
P3 bidders and thus utilize P3 procurement to develop public infrastructure. Second, 
governments have “a much higher (almost infinite) ability to absorb risk, while… private 
																																								 																				
390 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 106; Yescombe, Public-Private 
Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 245. 
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partner[s] ha[ve] limited legal and financial responsibility.” 391  Because of the 
government’s virtually unrestrained ability to accrue continual resources via taxation, it 
will be less affected than private parties in the long-term from bearing major force 
majeure risks.392 
6.7.8 Residual Assets Risk  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.58;  mES(CI) = 0.42;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Residual assets risks concern the designation of unspecified assets on project land 
remaining at the end of a project’s lifecycle. Residual assets risks, along with residual 
value risks, are considered a “handback risk” dealing with the ownership rights of either 
physical or intellectual property at a project’s end.393 As mentioned in Chapter 2, asset 
ownership can be temporarily transferred to the private sector over the course of a P3 
project’s lifecycle in a ‘rent to own’ transaction where public authorities pay their private 
partners annual fees over a specified period – generally between two to three decades – to 
own the infrastructure at the end of the period.394  
The end of a P3 project’s lifecycle presents two options to the government: (i) 
contracts are renegotiated with the original private partner or (ii) ownership of the facility 
reverts back to the government.395 In the event that public authorities select the latter 
option, the terms and conditions associated with handback risks are typically covered 
																																								 																				
391 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 262. 
392 I.e. because of continual guaranteed income via taxation. 
393 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for 
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” 21. 
394 This is the most common practice in P3 concessions that include an operation and/or 
maintenance phase (e.g. DBFOM). 
395 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 
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under P3 contracts. Governments typically structure incentives through awards and/or 
fees associated with facility upkeep to ensure that infrastructure is in suitable condition 
upon transfer of ownership.396  
However, in the instance that an SPV utilizes undesignated assets during the 
operation and maintenance of a P3 project, this study suggests that private partners 
should be able to either: (i) retain the assets upon ownership transfer or (ii) negotiate to 
receive extra compensation for transferring the assets alongside ownership of the facility. 
Unsurprisingly, the total mean score for public respondents was 0.583 points higher than 
for private respondents (2.833 to 2.25). 
6.8 Risks Leaning Towards an Evenly Shared Allocation  
This study indicates that nine risks should generally be shared significantly 
between sectors. With reference to the five-point semantic differentiation scale, a literal 
interpretation of its third point – ‘equally shared’ – is an imprecise reflection of industry 
practices. P3 contracts are long, exhaustive, and complex documents; such agreements 
are not conducive to exactly equal risk sharing. The term ‘equal sharing’ comes from the 
rhetorical limitations of using ordinal scales to propose risk allocation decision models in 
lieu of real-life industry methods. The aforementioned studies provided by Li et al., Ke et 
al., Chan et al., Hwang et al., and Tolani do not make this admission when presenting 
risks they regard as ‘equally shared.’  
With this in mind, the following risks that fall under the broad evenly shared risk 
category include: (i) excessive contract variation, (ii) project approval and permit, (iii) 
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ground conditions, (iv) residual value risk, (v) changes in industrial code of practices, (vi) 
supporting utilities risk, (vii) influential economic events, (viii) environmental protection, 
and (ix) construction/design changes.  
6.8.1 Excessive Contract Variation  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.25;  mES(CI) = 0.75;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Risks associated with excessive contract variation entail inappropriate contractual 
delegation at financial close (i.e. a poorly written final contract). This subsequently 
results in excessive mediation or arbitration procedures. Excessive contract variation was 
one of the most contentious risks recognized in the core literature database – it appeared 
in six of the database’s twelve articles and received public, private, and ‘shared’ 
allocation suggestions. According to Ke et al., since “feasibility studies and contract 
negotiation are relative to both parties, it would be the best for the public and private 
sectors to share the responsibility for these risks.”397 Hwang et al. adopt a similar 
perspective for risks that arise due to the “inadequate distribution of responsibilities.”398  
Hwang et al. believe risks arising from suboptimal contractual delegation are 
“relationship risks… [that] can be caused by both parties in a P[3] project.” Accordingly, 
																																								 																				
397 Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” 
490. 
398 The wording of risks found in the core literature database varies between articles. For example, 
the risk of ‘excessive contract variation’ appears as titled in Tolani’s study, but it is referred to as 
“improper contracts” in Ke et al. and “conflicting or imperfect contract’” in Chan et al. Thus, 
content analysis was required to ensure synonymous risks could be assessed together across the 
database despite having different titles. See Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and 
Allocation of Public-Private Partnership Projects in China,” 146; Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public 
Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation 
from the Perspective of Contractors,” 431; Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” 488; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation 
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they justify their study’s allocation for this risk being ‘equally shared.’399 This study’s 
public and private respondents gave excessive contract variation risk a total mean value 
of 2.833 and 2.583, respectively (see Figure 6.3). While leaning towards an equal sharing 
of risk, it is hypothesized that a quarter of excessive contraction variation’s range falls 
within ‘mostly public’ membership because ultimately, P3 contracts are written for public 
infrastructure projects where governments are principals and private parties are mere 
agents. Because governments are the project principals in a principal-agent relationship, 
they take on a supervisory role. Further, they are responsible for ensuring that their output 
specifications are both clear and coherent to their agents. 
In certain instances, public authorities protect themselves from some excessive 
contract variation risks due to poorly written contracts. For example, Partnerships 
Victoria – a crown corporation under Victoria’s Department of Treasury and Finance – 
has set a national precedent where public authorities are only liable for risks explicitly 
mentioned in P3 contracts; if risks are not identified and delegated by either sector due to 
suboptimal pre-contractual PRM, they are automatically borne by private partners. This is 
a risk private parties must accept upon entering any P3 contract with a Victorian public 
authority. 400  To cite protection methods against excessive contract variation risk, 
Canada’s Association of Consulting Engineering Companies (ACEC) refers to one P3 
model “called Project Alliance, [where] parties sign a contract that states they will not 
take legal action against each other.” Should unspecified cost overruns or savings occur 
																																								 																				
399 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 431. 
400 See VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 20. 
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under ‘Project Alliance,’ parties also agree to share these drawbacks and/or benefits over 
specified ranges depending on which type of instances occur.401  
In summation, excessive contract variation risks are treated differently on a 
project-to-project basis. This study recognizes their ‘equal sharing’ status while still 
acknowledging the principal role, and extra responsibilities, denoted with public 
authorities as project supervisors. This study’s proposed allocation appears sound. 
6.8.2 Project Approval and Permit  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.29;  mES(CI) = 0.71;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Project approval and permit risks deal with unanticipated delays or refusals 
against acquiring official documents authorizing the use of land, labour, or other 
resources that require permits or some other means of official consent from an authority. 
In its most extreme form, mitigation against risks associated with project approvals may 
require public expropriation (e.g. for land rights). Most commonly, however, both public 
and private parties obtain project permits through relatively straightforward 
administrative processes, generally before financial close.402  
Yescombe notes that public authorities often obtain “key planning permits 
before… bids take place” during the competitive selection process to hasten project 
progress while further permits pertaining to a project’s DBOM are obtained between both 
sectors, varying from project to project (e.g. construction permits and environmental 
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clearances).403 Yescombe’s insights are mirrored in the WDBA’s RFQ for the Gordie 
Howe Bridge: 
Project Co will be responsible for: obtaining all permits and approvals 
necessary for construction of the Facility, but excluding (i) those permits 
and approvals which have been obtained and (ii) those permits and 
approvals which are the responsibility of a WDBA Party… [which are] 
Canadian Government Approvals… to proceed [with the project]… and… 
zoning required to permit the Facility.404 
Li et al. note that project approval and permit risks are “strongly dependent upon 
projects.”405 Chan et al., Ke et al., and Tolani all allocate project approval and permit 
risks to the public sector. This risk received relatively weak public mean scores from 
Chan et al. and Tolani: 2.45 out of 5 and 1.66 out of 3, respectively.406 By adopting a 
fluid risk allocation model based on degrees of membership, this study recognizes project 
approval and permit risk’s public association while simultaneously recognizing its 
generally shared nature. This type of insight is not offered in other questionnaire-based 
literature on P3 risk allocation. With a relatively weak ‘mostly public’ membership of 
0.29 and a strong equal sharing membership of 0.71, this study’s proposed allocation for 
project approval and permit risk remains consistent with previous studies and appears 
sound. 
6.8.3 Ground Conditions  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.14;  mES(CI) = 0.86;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
																																								 																				
403 Ibid., 250. 
404 Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, “Request For Qualifications: Gordie Howe International 
Bridge,” 17-19. 
405 Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,” 31. 
406 Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership 
Projects in China.”; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private 
Partnerships in Nigeria.” 
182	
	
Ground conditions deal mainly with geotechnical engineering risks. Geotechnical 
engineering deals with the DB of infrastructure that is supported by, or constructed 
around, soil and/or rock.407 In this study, ground condition risks pertain to unforeseen or 
poorly surveyed land that requires alternative geotechnical engineering post financial 
close. Thus, these risks create additional costs and delays. If given a public sector mean 
rank score, public authorities should compensate private partners for this mishap; if given 
a private sector mean rank score, SPVs should accept that extra costs and delays will be 
borne by select JVs under its consortium. Upon review of the core literature database, 
ground condition risk remains very contentious, receiving public, private, and shared 
allocation suggestions over the nine times it appears (see Figure 5.3). 
Yescombe seconds this contention, noting that ground condition risks may be 
shared or allocated to either sector depending on project contexts:  
The risks that the geology of the site is not as expected… should 
preferably be passed from the Public Authority to the Project Company, 
and then to the Construction Subcontractor. Site surveys may be carried 
out in advance of Financial Close to reduce this risk… [and] one 
possibility is that the bidders collectively share the cost, another is that the 
Public Authority pays for them… this is a difficult area of risk transfer.408  
Yescombe notes that public authorities should bear ground condition risks for brownfield 
projects, where “access for [site] surveys may be difficult because there are old buildings 
on the site.” Greenfield projects, conversely, provide easier access for private parties to 
assess ground conditions before financial close (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for a summary 
of greenfield and brownfield projects). If ground condition risks are to be shared in the 
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final contract, private lenders and equity investors usually request a risk cap on the 
private sector to ensure that SPVs are only liable for a portion of potentially exuberant 
losses denoted with additional geotechnical engineering RMAs.409 
 While receiving a strong ‘equally shared’ membership function of 0.86, it is 
believed that ground conditions risks retain a slight public membership function of 0.14 
because – in this study – such risks are specified as those which are unforeseen or 
undelegated post financial close. Thus, this reflects the general consensus amongst P3 
practitioners that there is an expectation from public authorities to ensure contracts are 
tightly constrained to include foreseeable risks that may arise (i.e. because governments 
are project principals).410 Just like the risk of excessive contract variation before it, this 
study’s expert respondents appear to be charitable towards the private sector for mishaps 
involving undelegated responsibility, even when that responsibility may be shared with or 
delegated towards the private sector. This risk’s recommended allocation appears sound, 
albeit malleable, pending unique project specificities.  
6.8.4 Residual Value Risk  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.17;  mES(CI) = 0.83;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Another “handback risk,” residual value risks deal with the transfer of ownership 
from private partners to public authorities at the end of a P3 project’s lifecycle. These 
risks include provisions regarding the “terms, conditions, requirements and procedures 
governing the condition in which a private partner is to deliver an asset to the public 
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410 This risk is a more specific example under the broad umbrella of ‘excessive contract variation’ 
risks.  
184	
	
sector… as set forth in… [a P3 project’s] contract.”411 As noted in Chapter 2, public 
authorities provide incentive mechanisms – typically through awards and penalties – 
associated with the condition of public facilities to encourage the suitable maintenance of 
public infrastructure under temporary private control.412  
Over the six times residual value risk appears in the core literature database, it is 
given one public sector allocation, one shared allocation, and four private sector 
allocations. Results from this study suggest a shared allocation for residual value, 
meaning both public and private authorities should bear potential losses associated with 
the transfer of a devalued facility from private partners. Hwang et al.’s study suggests a 
shared allocation “because the ability to operate the project transferred to the public 
sector at the end of the concession period is concerned with not only the operation 
responsibility of the private sector but also the work of the public sector.”413 
Even if a facility is not impaired, public authorities are still exposed to residual 
value risks when, upon transfer back to the government, a facility “does not have the 
value originally estimated by [the] government at which the private party agreed to 
transfer it to [the] government.” This issue may arise if capital investments are used to 
upgrade a piece of infrastructure that has since depreciated or been removed, demolished, 
or not in use. Because private capital will likely be used for these investments, public 
authorities should compensate SPVs where these specific forms of residual value risks 
occur. Further, because governments commission regular inspections of P3 facilities 
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during private operation, it is fair to assume that risks associated with discrepancies found 
between lifecycle inspections and final inspections upon transfer of ownership should not 
be borne solely or majorly by private partners. In this case, a public allocation is 
warranted.414   
However, if private partners transfer an impaired facility to the public sector, they 
should be responsible for bearing costs associated with the facility’s condition. Thus, 
depending on the context of a residual value risk, both the public and private sector may 
be the justified risk receiver. Accordingly, this study’s ‘shared’ allocation preference is 
sound, while noting the risk may shift towards either sector depending which of the 
individual project circumstances mentioned above arise. 
6.8.5 Changes in Industrial Code of Practices  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.02;  mES(CI) = 0.96;  mMpri(CI) = 0.02; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
As noted in Section 6.5.1, the risk of changes in industrial code of practices 
presents a unique scenario where it shares degrees of membership above zero towards 
three membership functions. Albeit, this risk’s association with ‘mostly public’ and 
‘mostly private’ membership functions is marginal; its membership degree for both is 
0.02. It is hypothesized that this risk’s unique association towards three membership 
functions is attributed to its relatively large range of 0.826. Section 6.5.1 also notes that 
range shares a positive relationship with variance; because a high variance means less 
conclusivity amongst respondents, the confidence with which a risk’s range is predicted 
decreases. 
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Accordingly, risks with high respondent variances require higher ranges to 
confidently predict where they will fall under. Consider, at the most extreme level, 
respondents were asked to assign a number on the questionnaire’s five-point scale to a 
28th variable with no title or definition. Because this variable would be given arbitrary 
respondent input, it would likely yield an extremely high variance between respondents – 
so much so that its predicted range for a population could not be accurately predicted at 
all. In this hypothetical scenario, the variable’s range may theoretically fall under all 
membership functions on the five-point adjusted scale (see Figure 6.13).  
Because of its high range and association to three membership functions, it is 
unsurprising that the risk of changes in industrial code of practices was one of six project 
risks showing a statistically significant disagreement between public and private sector 
respondents over its allocation. With a public mean score of 3.5 and a private mean score 
of 2.5, its mean difference between sectors represents an entire point on the 
questionnaire’s five-point semantic differentiation scale. A small sanction may be 
offered, however, in citing the intersection of this risk’s public CI range and private CI 
range, which overlap at 0.128 units (see Figure 6.13).415 
This risk is equally split between three private and three shared allocation 
preferences amongst its six appearances in the core literature database. While Li et al.’s 
study – based on majority opinion analysis – recommends private allocation for changes 
in industrial code of practices, they note that “risk[s] of industrial regulation change 
attracted [a significant] preference for shared allocation… This reflects the fact that… 
																																								 																				
415 Because public sector respondents present an LCL of 2.936 and private sector respondents 
present a UCL of 3.064, the sectorial overlap of ranges is found from subtracting the private UCL 
from the public LCL to arrive at a difference of 0.128.   
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private contractors may endeavor to have the public client bear part of any extra costs due 
to regulation change.”416  
Industrial code change risks differ in scope from general law change risks in that 
they seldom involve regulation from political bodies tied to P3 projects (hence this 
study’s more preferred public allocation of the latter and more equally shared allocation 
of the former). More specifically, risk associated with ‘changes in law’ deal with “strictly 
legal requirements… [or] policy requirements,” which emanate from common law and 
statute law, both of which are within Parliament’s – or a governmental department’s – 
power to change or influence.  
Conversely, changes in industrial code of practices refer to “regulatory 
requirements set by… independent” firms. While governments ultimately influence 
private practices through legislation, “their operation is otherwise self-sufficient” in this 
respect.417 Thus, when commercial industries experience changes in their industrial codes, 
P3 crown corporations are seldom tied to these changes and, accordingly, “government 
generally does not accept the risk of change in… [these] regulatory requirements.”418   
The VDTF’s primer, which was included in this study’s core literature database, 
believes such risks should be borne solely by the private sector:  
A private party should not be shielded from changes in law which apply 
generally to the business environment or to which its particular industry 
sector would ordinarily be subject, merely because it has entered [into] a 
contract with [the] government. Accordingly, costs arising from any 
change in law which applies universally to the business environment… or 
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to the project's particular industry sector, should be borne by the private 
party.419  
It is possible that this study’s expert respondents prefer an equally shared allocation for 
this risk because they inflate the degree to which public authorities are responsible for 
changes in industrial practices and codes. While a shared allocation preference for this 
risk runs consistent with a large portion of P3 literature, its allocation scheme remains 
contentious even after this study.  
However, to be charitable to this study’s findings, a clear demarcation can now be 
made between the risk allocation of: (i) changes in law that emanate directly from 
common law and statute law, which should be borne mostly by the public sector, and (ii) 
changes in law that apply directly to regulatory practices of commercial industries, which 
should include private sector allocation to some degree.  
6.8.6 Supporting Utilities Risk 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 1.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Like site availability risk before it, supporting utilities risk presents a special 
situation where it falls under only one membership function. However, the confidence for 
supporting utilities risk’s strength of association with ‘equally shared’ is less than the 
confidence for site availability risk’s strength of association with ‘mostly public.’ This is 
due to supporting utilities risk’s higher range of 0.8 compared to site availability risk’s 
range of 0.683. As mentioned above, a risk’s degrees of membership for a function must 
be viewed alongside its range to account for variance between respondents. Higher 
ranges create a relatively lower strength of association towards a membership function. 
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Section 6.5.1 uses the examples of site availability, changes in industrial code of 
practices, and supporting utilities risks to explain why degrees of membership alone do 
not provide a holistic conception of this study’s results for this reason.420 
Supporting utilities risk deals with the availability and/or price of a P3 project’s 
required local utilities (e.g. electricity, gas, and water supply). This risk was among the 
six contentious risks that experienced a statistically significant difference in allocation 
preferences between public and private sector respondents. With a public mean score of 
3.583 and a private mean score of 2.417, its mean difference between sectors is the 
second largest in the study at 1.167. Of the four times this risk appeared in the core 
literature database, its suggested allocation preference was split evenly between ‘shared’ 
and public allocation preferences. 
For the Laibin B Power Project case study in Chapter 5, Ke et al. note that the 
public sector retained risks associated with supporting utilities to aid the project’s SPV. 
The public sector was responsible for: 
…providing the Project Company with the transmission line and providing 
start-up electricity and steam and all fuel for testing… Government 
support would also be offered to ensure that no similar competitive project 
will be approved so that the market volume would not be undermined by 
the other projects.421 
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This method is mirrored in the Gordie Howe Bridge project, where the WDBA’s RFQ 
states that early works towards facilitating the availability and relocation of project 
utilities are “the responsibility of [the] WDBA and will be undertaken at the expense of 
[the] WDBA. [The] WDBA’s expenses… will be recovered through tolls.”422 
There are instances in P3 literature where supporting utilities risks are given 
public sector allocation preferences,423 private sector allocation preferences,424 and shared 
allocation preferences. 425  Yescombe notes that supporting utilities risks – such as 
relocating gas, sewage, or water pipelines – may generally be transferred to JV private 
partners because they entail “relatively routine requirement[s] in construction, although 
[they] may be treated as… Relief Event[s].”426   
‘Relief events’ are agreements created during pre-contractual PRM that specify 
events for which, if certain risks occur, SPVs are to be pardoned from otherwise breached 
responsibilities (e.g. if a water treatment plant’s water supply becomes contaminated for 
reasons beyond an SPV’s control, JV operators may be afforded extra time by the 
government to provide the public with suitable drinking water). While relief events 
provide no financial compensation, they allot private partners with extra time to complete 
project tasks affected by certain risks. 427  Thus, while Yescombe largely denotes 
supporting utilities risks with private sector allocation, he recognizes a form of ‘shared’ 
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allocation preference – to a degree – as well. Considering the combination of supporting 
utilities risks’ (i) inconclusive allocation preferences within P3 literature, (ii) high degree 
of sectorial disagreement in this study, and (iii) the relative frequency with which its 
allocation is expressly designated under a ‘project-to-project’ basis, its ‘shared’ allocation 
preference from this study is subject to scrutiny. Further research is required. 
6.8.7 Influential Economic Events 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.92;  mMpri(CI) = 0.08; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
For this study, the broad risk of influential economic events is defined as 
‘macroeconomic anomalies on a national or global scale that greatly affect local market 
conditions.’ It appears thrice under the core literature database with two private sector 
allocation preferences and one shared allocation preference. It passed both the 
independent two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a confidence level of 95 
percent. However, this risk presents a considerably higher mean score difference between 
sectors compared to the other 21 risks that showed statistically significant agreement 
between sectors over their allocation. Its public mean total is 3.416 and its private mean 
total is 2.667, creating a large – albeit not statistically significant – mean score difference 
of 0.75.428  
Ibrahim et al.’s and Roumboutsos’ and Anagnostopoulos’ studies on P3 project 
risk allocation also suggest a ‘shared’ allocation preference for influential economic 
																																								 																				
428 To provide context, the next highest mean score differences among the 21 risks that showed 
statistically significant agreement between sectors are 0.583, 0.333, 0.25, and 0.167, respectively.  
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events.429 While neither article is included in the core literature database, their findings 
echo the opinions of this study’s expert respondents. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
uninsured large-scale risks that can be quantified – but not influenced by public or private 
actors – should be shared without a cap for the private sector (see Figure 4.5). Thus, this 
study’s ‘shared’ allocation recommendation between public and private parties for 
influential economic events – such as ‘booms’ or recessions – is considered sound.430 
6.8.8 Environmental Protection 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.94;  mMpri(CI) = 0.06; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Environmental protection risk concerns events where a P3 project impinges on 
environmental regulations and, subsequently, legal ramifications ensue. This risk boasts 
one of the highest levels of agreement between sectors over its allocation with a public 
mean score of 3.083 and a private mean score of 3. Ke et al. also denote environmental 
protection risk with a ‘shared’ allocation. However, they further note that, “if the 
invitation of bidding has stated the environment standards required for the project, 
additional measures undertaken to protect the environment by the private sector due to 
changes of the requirements should be rationally compensated.”431  
For the Gordie Howe Bridge, the WDBA worked alongside the state of Michigan 
to conduct a coordinated environmental assessment to determine the project’s potential 
																																								 																				
429 A.D. Ibrahim et al., “The Analysis and Allocation of Risks in Public Private Partnerships in 
Infrastructure Projects in Nigeria” 11, no. 3 (2006): 157; Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos, 
“Public–private Partnership Projects in Greece: Risk Ranking and Preferred Risk Allocation,” 
760. 
430 With reference to the mention of economic ‘booms,’ remember that not all risks exclusively 
pose the possibility of adverse outcomes. See Chapter 4, Section 4.5 for a short summary of risk 
‘opportunities’ and risk ‘threats.’ 
431 Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
Projects,”490. 
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environmental impact, potential RMAs to minimize this impact, and environmental 
commitments and regulatory approvals identified under the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Record of Decision (ROD) for the project.432 Although the WDBA 
already obtained early project approvals concerning environmental regulations before 
issuing an RFP, it specifies in the project’s RFQ that some “environmental 
commitments… and… regulatory approvals identified in the ROD… are to be obtained 
by Project Co.”433 
While the WDBA provides guideline resources for prospective private bidders 
(e.g. a link to the Gordie Howe Bridge’s ROD), it states that prospective project bidders 
are ultimately “responsible for obtaining [their] own independent… environmental… 
advice, and making [their] own investigations with respect to the Project.”434 Thus, while 
environmental responsibilities for the Gordie Howe Bridge are generally ‘shared,’ its 
public authority puts a considerable onus on the private sector to ensure it comprehends 
environmental regulations pertaining to the project (for which it may receive potential 
awards for upholding or penalties for ignoring). Ultimately, this study’s ‘shared’ 
allocation for environmental protection risks appears sound. 
6.8.9 Construction/Design Changes 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.80;  mMpri(CI) = 0.020; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
																																								 																				
432 RODs are public documents that delineate project responsibilities pertaining to the 
environmental upkeep of a forthcoming construction site. See P. Tomlinson and S. F. Atkinson, 
“Environmental Audits: Proposed Terminology,” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 8, 
no. 8 (1987): 190-191, doi:10.1007/BF00404264. 
433 Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, “Request For Qualifications: Gordie Howe International 
Bridge,” 17. 
434 Ibid. 43. 
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Project risks associated with construction and design changes are defined in this 
study as ‘changes to project terms due to poor preliminary investigations resulting in 
improper design.’ These risks may be linked to geological P3 project risks, such as 
environmental protection and ground conditions, or to general DB project phases that 
exclusively deal with the engineering and construction of infrastructure. For most 
projects, “[d]esign, construction and commissioning risk[s]… [are] implicitly allocated to 
the private party… provided that the ability of the government to interfere with the 
design, construction and commissioning processes is then extremely limited.”435 
Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that P3s generally operate under ‘output-based’ 
contracts. Because private sectors may be given considerable leeway over the ‘input’ of 
the public infrastructure’s design and build, it is universally understood that mishaps 
regarding the improper design or construction of infrastructure are ‘private’ risks. 
Consider, for example, Chapter 5’s case study on the Right Honourable Herb Gray 
Parkway. The government issued fines on the project’s SPV – the WEMG – for 500 
faulty girders produced by one of its JVs, Freyssinet Canada Ltd. While the WEMG has 
mitigated economic consequences associated with this risk through second-step risk 
transfer, fines associated with this risk must be borne by the private sector.436 This 
example presents a textbook DB risk that is justifiably allocated to the private sector. 
																																								 																				
435 If governments impose post-contractual stipulations relating to a P3 project’s DB phases, their 
original first-step risk transfer to the SPV is jeopardized. See VDTF, “Risk Allocation and 
Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 52. 
436 Personal correspondence with Dominic Amicone, President and CEO of Triamico 
Development Affiliates, revealed that the main question associated with this legal dispute is not 
if, but which private actors will pay for these losses and for how much. The government – along 
with other project JVs – will receive compensation regardless. 
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The risk in question, however, deals with ‘poor preliminary investigations 
resulting in improper design.’ While governments may provide private partners with 
considerable leeway over the DB of P3-procured infrastructure, they generally provide 
guidelines associated with preliminary investigations presented in project RFQs and 
RFPs. In cases where design and construction risks arise due to government-initiated 
mishaps, such as the inclusion or omission of a DB specifications that adversely affect a 
project, “it may be appropriate, using optimal risk allocation principles, for 
government[s] to bear the cost of such [DB] changes” that result from these mishaps.437  
In summation, risk allocation preferences over a P3 project’s DB changes are 
contingent on the sector responsible for requiring DB changes. If such risks arise due to 
poor post-contractual PRM (i.e. the ‘output’ of otherwise acceptable DB guidelines), then 
private parties should bear the risks. If such risks arise due to poor pre-contractual PRM 
(i.e. the ‘input’ of DB guidelines), then public parties should compensate private partners 
by bearing an agreed portion of the risks. This study’s ‘shared’ allocation is relatively 
sound in that both sectors may bear risks associated with design and construction 
changes, but specific project conditions ultimately dictate which sector bears them. 
6.9 Risks Leaning Towards Private Sector Allocation  
This study indicates that ten risks should generally be allocated to the private 
sector either fully or to a significant degree. The following ‘private’ risks – in order of 
their strength of association to the private sector 438  – include: (i) availability of 
labour/materials, (ii) asset ownership, (iii) foreign currency risk, (iv) income risk, (v) 
																																								 																				
437 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 52. 
438 According to their total mean scores. 
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interest rates, (vi) inflation risks, (vii) market demand change, (viii) tariff change, (ix) 
weather conditions, and (x) third party tort liability. 
6.9.1 Availability of Labour/Materials  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.28; mSpri(CI) = 0.72. 
While this risk is considered ‘contentious’ based on the core literature review, it 
almost registers as a ‘sound’ P3 risk. Availability of labour/materials is one allocation 
recommendation shy of unanimously holding a ‘private’ allocation – it appears seven 
times in the core database with six private allocation recommendations and one public 
allocation recommendation. It is no surprise that this risk garners the highest – and thus 
most private – mean score on the questionnaire’s five-point scale for both public and 
private sector respondents with a 4.083 and 4.583 rating, respectively.439  
 It is generally accepted in P3 literature that SPVs should be tasked with 
delegating responsibility over the provision of project resources – i.e. materials and staff 
– amongst its selected JVs through second-step risk transfer. Should project 
subcontractors and suppliers fail to produce the resources they are tasked with, they are 
generally liable to bear the financial penalties associated with such mishaps. If, for some 
reason, a subcontractor or supplier defaults this risk back to its sender (i.e. from a JV to 
an SPV through second-step risk transfer default), its associated penalties will still be 
levied against a private party. Thus, the private sector generally retains such risks during 
a P3 project’s potential DBFOM stages.  
																																								 																				
439 Between private sector respondents, this risk conclusively received the highest mean score. 
Between public sector respondents, this risk received the joint highest mean score alongside asset 
ownership, which also received a 4.083 public mean score. 
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 Ke et al. note that “most construction and operation risks are assigned to the 
private partner… [including] ‘Delay in Supply.’”440  Li et al. note that “construction risk 
is assigned completely to contractors for all procurement methods.”441 Hwang et al. note 
that “the private sector should be more familiar with design and construction risks, 
including… ‘material availability’…Hence, it is not surprising that [it was] preferably 
assigned to the private sector.” 442  The private allocation of material and labour 
availability for P3s is confirmed in several other studies.443 This study’s private allocation 
of risks associated with the availability of labour/materials appears sound.  
6.9.2 Asset Ownership  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.48; mSpri(CI) = 0.52. 
Risks associated with the – temporary – ownership of public infrastructure 
through P3 concessions entail the costs of owning, operating, and maintaining 
infrastructure over a project’s lifecycle. Potentially, maintenance and upgrade 
requirements may entail additional design and build stages as well over the course of a 
DBFOM P3 contract. Asset ownership encompasses a broad spectrum of post-contractual 
PRM-related risks that may arise either during a P3 service contract (e.g. changes in 
industrial code of practice, construction/design changes, force majeure, and market 
																																								 																				
440 Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” 
490-491. 
441 Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,” 34. 
442 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 431. 
443 Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership 
Projects in China.”; Ibrahim et al., “The Analysis and Allocation of Risks in Public Private 
Partnerships in Infrastructure Projects in Nigeria”; Lam et al., “Modelling Risk Allocation 
Decision in Construction Contracts”; Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos, “Public–private 
Partnership Projects in Greece: Risk Ranking and Preferred Risk Allocation”; Tolani, “An 
Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria.” 
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demand change) or upon termination of a contract (e.g. expropriation, exclusive rights 
revocation, and residual value risks). Asset ownership risks mainly arise for three broad 
reasons: (i) maintenance or upgrade costs of a facility are higher than anticipated, (ii) a 
facility’s value falls below the initial projected value to which it was ascribed, or (iii) a 
project’s lifecycle is shorter than anticipated.444 
 As noted in Chapter 2, conventional infrastructure procurement methods 
traditionally allocate asset ownership risks to the public sector. However, a key 
component of P3 projects concerns the transfer of ‘whole life’ costs to the private sector 
– especially for projects with longer lifecycles and heavy private partner involvement (i.e. 
DBFOM projects). Thus, it is no surprise that asset ownership risk received this study’s 
second highest total mean score of 4.208 and its second highest ‘solely private’ 
membership degree of 0.52.  
It should be noted that, for some of the risks associated with asset ownership 
mentioned above, mean score ratings differ greatly from asset ownership’s mean rating. 
For example, expropriation, exclusive right, and force majeure risks received total mean 
scores of 1.708, 2.083, and 2.417, respectively. None of these risks fall under private 
sector membership functions. This stark contrast between allocation preferences for risks 
linked to asset ownership is a testament to the wide range of risks denoted with the 
operation and maintenance of P3s over project lifecycles – mirrored by a similarly wide 
range of RMAs suited for responding to these risks.  
																																								 																				
444 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 112. 
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This study’s proposed allocation scheme for asset ownership risk should only be 
applied to the general, day-to-day risks denoted with the operation and maintenance of P3 
facilities (in lieu of more grandiose risks – like force majeure – which retain their own 
risk categories). Asset ownership risk is typically denoted with a P3 project’s general 
operation and maintenance, technological obsolescence, and structural degradation. As is 
generally the case, these common risks are borne solely by the private sector. 
6.9.3 Foreign Currency Risk  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.67; mSpri(CI) = 0.33. 
Foreign currency risk, dealing with the exchange and convertibility of foreign 
monies, is a macroeconomic risk that concerns private equity investors, lenders, and 
SPVs.445 Privately funded P3 projects are frequently financed with the aid of foreign 
lenders and investors. P3 project revenue, however, is almost always denominated in a 
project’s local currency (e.g. through local tolls or local government availability 
payments). When ‘revenue’ currencies and ‘debt’ currencies differ, SPVs are faced with 
currency exchange risks, as the cost of a project’s debt may increase – or decrease – 
depending on international market fluctuations.446 With reference to Chapter 4, when 
currency exchange risks decrease project debt, SPVs are faced with risk ‘opportunities’; 
when currency risks increase project debt, SPVs are faced with risk ‘threats.’  
																																								 																				
445 I.e. for privately funded P3 projects. For P3s procured through public funding (e.g. DBOM 
projects), the risk of currency exchange is less applicable to a project’s finance debt. 
446 The World Bank, “Risk Allocation, Bankability and Mitigation in Project Financed 
Transactions,” Public-Private-Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center, 2016, par. 17-18, 
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/risk-allocation-
mitigation#currency.  
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 According to “purchasing power parity” – a theory regarding the equilibrium of 
purchasing powers between different currencies – devalued currencies should face 
enough inflation pressures over time to bring them back to parity levels with foreign 
currencies. However, more often than not, foreign project lenders are unwilling to wait 
for currency equilibriums to be reached before receiving payments owed.447 Thus, SPVs 
must pay amortization and interest even when currency exchange rates have adversely 
affected their net capital (see Figure 2.2).  
The VDTF states that foreign currency exchange risks are beyond the control of 
both public and private partners. Thus, it should “be dealt with in an express provision in 
the [final] contract.”448 The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
concedes that central banks and government agencies may have limited control of 
exchange rate risks, but – ultimately – “currency risk is largely unmanageable for the 
private sector and may be beyond the control of the government agency in charge of 
infrastructure development, which means that it may not be easily acceptable for either 
party.”449    
The literature on foreign currency risk is too inconclusive to assign it a consistent 
allocation framework that does not recognize its variability and contingency on 
individual P3 project circumstances. However, this study’s respondent pool of experts 
showed high levels of unanimity both within and between respondents groups over the 
																																								 																				
447 Ibid., par. 17. 
448 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 21. 
449 Wim Verdouw et al., “Currency Risk in Project Finance” (Winnipeg, Manitoba, 2015), 2. 
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private allocation of foreign currency risks.450 A framework can be adopted where foreign 
currency risk is implicitly allocated to private partners to a large degree with room for 
contractually explicit addendums to this principle should private partners require fiscal 
support from the government. Thus, its private allocation recommendation may stand, 
though the degree to which the private sector should bear this risk will likely need to be 
assessed on a project-to-project basis.  
For example, if the preferred proponent chosen for a Canadian P3 project has ties 
to foreign financiers – or if foreign shareholders own the SPV itself – it may be assumed 
that foreign currency risk can be more readily adopted by the private sector due to 
established rapports with foreign financiers. Carpintero notes that “Spanish developers… 
have been particularly successful in winning P[3] contracts during the last decade.” 
Further, “the consortiums of financial institutions responsible for arranging the financing 
for the concessions awarded to Spanish companies abroad have included at least one 
Spanish bank, if not several.”451  
6.9.4 Income Risk 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.93; mSpri(CI) = 0.07 
 This study defines income risk as the degree to which private sector revenue 
streams align with revenue projections. Referring back to Chapter 2, SPVs may be 
compensated by the public sector either directly (i.e. through availability payments or 
																																								 																				
450 Based on analyses using t-tests, Kendall’s W, Chi-squared, and Mann-Whitney U. This risk’s 
public mean score is 4, its private mean score is 4.167, and its combined mean score is 4.083. 
451 These Spanish firms – which include Acciona, ACS, Dragados, and Ferrovial – have been 
majority stakeholders of their SPV consortiums when leading Canadian P3s projects. See 
Carpintero, “Public-Private Partnership Projects in Canada : A Case Study Approach,” 1, 4. 
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milestone payments) or indirectly (i.e. through full tolls or shadow tolls).452 As stated 
previously, a key factor distinguishing P3 contracts from many conventional DB 
contracts is that payments are generally contingent on the performance of private partners 
(e.g. meeting specific project deadlines). It is understood that this incentivizes private 
partners to complete project tasks in both an adequate and timely manner.  
 Of the six times income risks appeared in the core literature database, it received 
five private allocation recommendations and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation. 
This is unsurprising, as private partners have a large degree of influence over their ability 
to meet public sector output specifications denoted with availability payments and 
milestone payments. With a high level of agreement between sectors over its allocation 
(i.e. a 0.083 mean difference) and a combined mean score of 3.958, this study’s pool of 
expert respondents appear to second this opinion.  
 However, when SPVs accept indirect payments methods such as highway or 
bridge tolls, they bear a higher income risk if projections over the use of public facilities 
are not met. This is because private partners have little influence over the degree to which 
public infrastructure is utilized by citizens. Thus, income risks are most significant to 
private partners when they accept toll-based payment methods. If volume projections for 
a facility fall short, SPVs either lose profits, or garner profits at a slower rate than 
anticipated, depending on a P3 project’s contractual specifities.453 
																																								 																				
452 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1 for a summary of SPV payment methods. 
453 For example, if a P3 contract contains explicit agreements that SPVs must receive a minimum 
amount of toll revenue from the project, then income risk for the private sector concerns when 
payments are received opposed to how much is received. 
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 While it is true that private partners have considerably less influence on income 
risks associated with toll-based payments, this study’s findings suggest that they should 
still bear income risk to a major degree. Li et al. report similar findings, noting: 
… financial attraction and level of demand for a project are important 
investigations to be carried out in most P[3]… projects during the detailed 
feasibility study phase by the private consortium. Thus, most respondents 
do not see either of these… risks as being the responsibility of the public 
sector.454  
This is an important consideration. Recall key concepts from Chapter 4 regarding pre-
contractual PRM and risk premiums. A key point of risk transfer in P3 procurement 
projects is that, to a degree, risk cannot be completely avoided or mitigated in all 
instances.  
 Accordingly, P3 players will inevitably accept risks that cannot be fully mitigated 
by neither the risk sender nor the risk receiver. In such instances, risk premiums play an 
important incentivizing role for risk takers to accept potential project threats they do not 
have complete influence over. In summation, even when private partners accept toll-
based payments, income risks should be borne mostly by the private sector. This study’s 
proposed allocation model for income risk – with a 0.93 ‘mostly private’ membership 
degree – appears sound. 
6.9.5 Interest Rate  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.0;  mMpri(CI) = 0.83; mSpri(CI) = 0.17. 
Interest rate risks concern fluctuations in interest on monies owed to project 
financiers. Recall from Chapter 2 that private financing has recently become a 
																																								 																				
454 Li et al., “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK,” 33. 
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prerequisite condition for public-private contracts to adopt a ‘P3’ label in Canada. 
Accordingly, Canadian SPVs are responsible for paying back project debts either fully or 
partially. Interest rate risks typically pose the largest threat when project lenders charge 
interest at a “floating” rate opposed to a “fixed” rate. Floating interest rates fluctuate over 
a project’s lifecycle due to periodic changes in benchmark interest rates and indexes (e.g. 
fluctuating bank lending rates). Fixed interest rates remain stagnant over a specified 
period of time, thus the amount of money owed for P3 project financing is more 
foreseeable and stable when fixed interest rates are used.455 
Interest rate risks can intersect with foreign currency risks when foreign lenders 
finance projects, presenting “a question of balancing… [interest] rate debt with foreign 
exchange rate risk or local currency debt subject to interest rate risk.”456 Like foreign 
currency risk before it, interest rate risk likely receives a high ‘mostly private’ 
membership degree because debt providers – local or foreign – generally deal directly 
with private partners for privately financed P3 projects. It is hypothesized that this 
study’s expert respondents believe that, because SPVs commit to pre-contractual 
agreements with their financiers, they should be responsible for interest rate fluctuations 
that adversely affect private partner revenue streams over the course of P3 projects.  
Following this study’s independent two sample t-test, sectorial agreement over the 
allocation of interest rate risks received a remarkably perfect significance level of one 
and, naturally, a mean score difference of zero. Both public and private sectors 
respondents accumulated a mean score of 3.917 for interest rate risks, denoting its 
																																								 																				
455 The World Bank, “Risk Allocation, Bankability and Mitigation in Project Financed 
Transactions,” par. 19-20. 
456 Ibid., par. 20. 
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‘mostly private’ allocation. Unfortunately, this level of agreement is not found between 
scholars in P3 literature. Despite unanimously receiving a mean score of 3.917 from both 
respondent groups in this study, interest rate risk is frequently given public, private, and 
‘equally shared’ allocation preferences throughout P3 literature. 
Internationally, public and private parties are likely to share interest rate risks for 
P3 projects to some degree. For example, governments may permit “flexibility in pricing” 
for private partners or – in instances where P3 projects have a significantly large debt 
component – governments may allow private partners “to commit to a specified pricing 
regime before signing the project agreements” (e.g. risk caps for interest rates).457  
However, in instances where interest rates are fixed, major government 
intervention should not be needed, as project lenders and SPVs consult with one another 
over the viability of planned payments methods (e.g. amortization specification) during 
pre-contractual PRM before financial close (e.g. feasibility studies and due diligence 
investigations).458  It is assumed that pre-contractual agreements between SPVs and 
project lenders will yield accurate projections over interest risks where rates are fixed. 
Thus, the risk of growing interest rates undermining projected profit margins for SPVs is 
mitigated through the use of fixed interest rates. 
Consequently, interest rate risk’s high ‘mostly private’ membership degree in this 
study remains sound when fixed interest rates are selected for P3 projects. According to 
																																								 																				
457 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 64-65. 
458 Refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.3 for the relationship dynamic between SPVs and project lenders. 
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The World Bank,  “project finance debt tends to be fixed rate.”459 Further, Yescombe 
adds that “project-finance bonds for P[3] projects always carry a fixed-rate coupon… 
[while] commercial banks do not generally lend for such a long term at a fixed rate, 
because they cannot fund the loan with matching deposits.” 460  
 In Canada, public financing of P3s entails bonds in lieu of bank loans. Hellowell 
notes, “Canadian banks [are] more conservatively managed than many of their European 
counterparts, and also [take] a more cautious approach to infrastructure lending… In 
[response], Canada has… developed [a] P3 bond market… structured [around] pension 
funds.” Because Canada’s pension funds “have spearheaded direct investments in 
infrastructure since the early 2000s,” fixed interest rates are primarily used when 
governments take part in P3 financing.461   
In summation: (i) the private sector is better able to bear interest rate risks when 
fixed interest rates are used because of their predictability; (ii) there is a relationship 
between bonds and fixed interest rates; (iii) P3s in Canada that incorporate public 
financing will utilize bonds; thus, (iv) P3s in Canada that incorporate public financing use 
fixed interest rates and, accordingly, they should allocate interest rate risks mainly to the 
private sector. 
It can be reasonably asserted that this study’s pool of expert respondents chose to 
unanimously allocate interest rate risks to the ‘mostly private’ category because they are 
Canadian practitioners who have worked under the influence of a bond-centric P3 
																																								 																				
459 The World Bank, “Risk Allocation, Bankability and Mitigation in Project Financed 
Transactions,” par. 20. 
460 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 171. 
461 Hellowell, “Public-Private Partnerships: What the World Can Learn from Canada,” 17. 
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market. In conclusion, this study’s findings appear sound for domestic P3s in Canada. 
When foreign lenders finance large portions of a Canadian P3 project, the government 
may need to bear a larger portion of interest rate risk to account for foreign currency risks 
and floating interest rates. However, in the context of nationally financed P3s in Canada, 
this study’s ‘mostly private’ allocation for interest rate risks appears sound. 
6.9.6 Inflation Risk  
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.13;  mMpri(CI) = 0.87; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
Inflation risks, like interest rate risks, are macroeconomic in nature and largely 
outside of both public and private sector influence. Because long-term P3 contracts 
typically span between 25 to 30 years, the incremental accumulation of inflation can have 
a significant effect on projects decades after final contracts are signed.462 The main risk 
inflation poses to private actors is the devaluation of agreed-upon payments received 
during a project’s lifecycle. Typically, this adversely affects SPVs and, potentially, 
project financiers through “diminution in real returns of the private party.”463  
Inflation risk also applies to the public sector in that public authorities want to 
avoid overcompensating for inflation rates based on contractually agreed upon indexation 
levels. When public authorities transfer macroeconomic market risks to SPVs, they 
employ “indexation adjustments” to corresponding risk premiums. Indexation is a 
payment adjustment method used by governments to compensate for inflation. With 
																																								 																				
462 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 187. 
463 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 186. 
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reference to a price index – or some other market benchmark – public authorities adjust 
payments to SPVs to reflect the “current state of the market” via indexation.464  
Scholars generally agree that, when the private sector bears inflation risk, public 
authorities should index private sector service fees – to a degree – to avoid heavy charges 
associated with risk premiums and contingencies.465  However, public authorities should 
be weary of “over-indexation” to avoid the overuse of its resources.466 For example, if 
public authorities spend more on indexation measures than they would have spent paying 
extra fees for transferring non-indexed risks (e.g. through higher risk premiums, 
contingencies, and other service related costs), then public indexation can become a 
redundant, or even suboptimal, public RMA for inflation.  
Thus, this study’s results for inflation risk appear sound. Under the assumption 
that public authorities should adopt some indexation measures, 0.13 ‘equally shared’ and 
0.87 ‘mostly private’ membership degrees for inflation risk allows for a degree of risk 
sharing between sectors while avoiding the problem of over-indexation for the 
government.467 Where risk premiums and service charges do not account for inflation, 
private actors should anticipate inflation risk’s potentially adverse effects on the ‘real 
returns’ they receive throughout a project’s lifecycle through appropriate contingency 
strategies during pre-contractual PRM and necessary renegotiation strategies during post-
contractual PRM.  
																																								 																				
464 Ibid., 78. 
465 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 77; Yescombe, Public-Private 
Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 187. 
466 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 199. 
467 With a combined mean score of 3.708 and a mean sectorial difference of 0.25, inflation risk 
received a relatively moderate ‘mostly private’ allocation preference supported by a relatively 
strong level of agreement over allocation between public and private sector respondents. 
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6.9.7 Market Demand Change 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.22;  mMpri(CI) = 0.78; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
As a risk, market demand change concerns the accuracy with which actors 
forecast the future demands and costs of operational services over a P3 project’s 
lifecycle. If the demand for a service transcends forecasted levels, parties that bear 
market demand change risks may experience a risk ‘opportunity’ in larger revenue 
streams. If the cost for a service transcends forecasted levels, parties that bear market 
demand change risks may experience a risk ‘threat’ in capital losses. Conversely, if 
service demands – or costs – fall short of forecasted levels, risk bearers may experience 
risk ‘threats’ in smaller revenue streams – or risk ‘opportunities’ in capital gains – 
respectively.  
Market demand change is closely linked to income risk. Other market risks 
associated with market demand change include: influential economic events, availability 
of labour and materials, supporting utilities risk, asset ownership, inflation risk, and 
interest risks. What demarcates market demand change from other market risks is its 
distinguished connection with exogenous market factors that arise from shifting market 
dynamics. Whether the demand or cost for a service is affected by shifts in market 
competition, composition, or focus, both public and private partners have relatively little 
influence over their occurrence.  
A shift in market competition denotes the progression – or regression – of 
competing services affecting a facility’s revenue positively or negatively (e.g. the 
construction, or demolition, of an alternative bridge, or toll fee changes from a competing 
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facility). A shift in market composition denotes changing demographic trends affecting a 
facility’s revenue (e.g. an aging populace’s increasing frequency of using hospitals). 
Finally, a shift in market focus denotes technological or industrial changes affecting a 
facility’s revenue (e.g. technological innovation resulting in the replacement of obsolete, 
yet expensive, border security equipment or the shifting industrial landscape of a 
country’s energy sector embracing gas-fired facilities in lieu of coal-based facilities).468 
Yescombe notes that the P3 concession model (e.g. DBFOM) with toll-based 
payment agreements are “the prime example of a P[3] where usage risk is transferred to 
the private sector.”469 Of course, Section 6.9.4 already established that a ‘mostly private’ 
allocation preference for income risk is sound. However, for P3 projects with availability-
based payment agreements, usage risk is retained by the public sector. Pending 
contractual specifities, P3 contracts that use availability payments generally do not 
require private partners to influence or bear any demand-related risks during a project’s 
lifecycle.470  
Thus, the allocation of market demand change risk is contingent on project 
circumstances. It appears that market demand change’s ‘mostly private’ allocation 
preference is justified to the extent that it is applied to projects where income risks and 
operating risks are largely borne by the private sector (which is often the case for 
Canadian P3s).  
																																								 																				
468 VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 74. 
469 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 13. 
470 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual.” 
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For the majority of Canadian P3 projects, “in cases where… revenues of projects 
have been forecast poorly, the private operator… and… its equity holders… have ‘skin in 
the game.’” This is a key factor distinguishing P3s from conventional public procurement 
methods.471 This study’s relevant membership functions for market demand change – i.e. 
0.78 degrees towards ‘mostly private’ and 0.22 degrees towards ‘equally shared’ – 
recognize its general private allocation while acknowledging that the degree to which 
these risks are ‘shared’ is contingent on individual project circumstances. This result 
echoes findings from the core literature database, where market demand change risk is 
given six private allocation recommendations and two ‘shared’ allocation 
recommendations.   
6.9.8 Tariff Change 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.36;  mMpri(CI) = 0.64; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
The risk of tariff change is closely linked to other market risks, such as income 
risk, because it deals with the accuracy of revenue or cost projections associated with 
market factors that are not ‘fixed.’ More specifically, tariff risk concerns the suitability 
and flexibility of tariff design frameworks and their affect on future revenue streams. 
Tariff change appears eight times in the core literature database, with seven ‘private’ 
allocation recommendations and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation. Interestingly, 
this considerably strong association between tariff change and private risk transfer is not 
mirrored in this study’s questionnaire results. With a membership degree of 0.64 towards 
‘mostly private’ and a 0.36 membership degree towards ‘equally shared,’ its proposed 
degree of private allocation appears to be relatively weak. 
																																								 																				
471 Hellowell, “Public-Private Partnerships: What the World Can Learn from Canada,” 9. 
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This study’s expert respondent pool may have opted for a more moderate form of 
private allocation for tariff risk because tariff changes are conventionally steered by 
governments and, accordingly, beyond the control of the private sector. While public 
authorities retain the right to regulate tariff payments, P3 contracts can contain long-term 
power purchase agreements between governments and SPVs where terms and conditions 
applying to tariff payments on utilities are contractually outlined.472 Typically, these 
contractual stipulations are covered under service charge fees “under certain caps and 
predetermined rules for indexation.”473  
In instances where tariff costs are regulated by the public authority, the risk of 
tariff change – i.e. price variations impacting projected revenue – should be borne by the 
government through some sort of indexation method. This method is typically applied to 
already subsidized utilities under captive public markets where revenue levels are not 
maximized (e.g. hydro rates).  In instances where tariff costs are regulated under long-
term power purchase agreements, the risk of tariff change should be borne by SPVs 
alongside an agreed upon cap for the private sector. This method is typically applied to 
projects where tariff rate variability is low and thus tariff rate projections are highly 
certain.474  
In light of the aforementioned considerations, this study’s weaker proposed 
private allocation for tariff change remains sound, albeit with recognition of the fact that 
the allocation of tariff risk is contingent on the tariff in question. Depending on individual 
																																								 																				
472 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 11, 267. 
473 APMG International, “PPP Certification Program Guide,” Section 1.2.2, par. 3. 
474 Ibid., Section 1.2.2. 
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project circumstances, certain tariffs may be privately allocated to a degree (e.g. with risk 
caps) while others may be publicly allocated (e.g. alongside indexation). 
6.9.9 Weather Conditions 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.42;  mMpri(CI) = 0.58; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.  
For P3s, the risk of weather conditions affect day-to-day construction and 
operation practices. Theoretically, weather conditions conducive to seamless construction 
and operation practices present an ‘opportunity’ for risk bearers to work uninterrupted 
(e.g. sunny days); abnormal weather conditions conducive to project delay or impairment 
present a ‘threat’ for risk bearers (e.g. storms).  
During pre-contractual PRM, public authorities and SPVs will identify these risks 
and adopt optimal RMAs in response to potential weather-induced schedule delays and/or 
facility damages. Recall from Chapter 4 that the four broad P3 RMA methods include: 
avoiding, reducing, transferring, or accepting risks (see Figure 4.4). Weather conditions 
are exogenous risk factors that private actors cannot influence. In Canada, however, they 
are largely foreseeable, predictable, insurable, acceptable, and – to an extent – avoidable.  
For instance, North American P3 partners will typically plan the construction of 
crucial infrastructure during summer months to avoid schedule delays from unfavourable 
weather conditions.475 Also, site drainage systems like storm water management ponds 
are used frequently in Canada to prevent – or at least suppress – site flooding and erosion 
from surface runoff during heavy rainfall. While Canada’s weather varies significantly, 
																																								 																				
475 US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Guidebook for Risk 
Assessment in Public Private Partnerships,” 2013, 24, 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/p3_guidebook_risk_assessment_030314.pdf. 
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this variation is predictable due to seasonal climate patterns. Further, adverse weather 
conditions in Canada are relatively mild in severity compared to other “extra-tropical 
areas” like East Asia or the United States’ eastern coastline.476 Hence, the risk of adverse 
weather conditions – or, in their most extreme form, ‘acts of God’ force majeure events – 
are seldom an issue.  
This study’s proposed private allocation for weather conditions – albeit weak – 
echoes the findings of Chan et al., Hwang et al., Li et al., and Tolani. Both Hwang et al. 
and Li et al. note that “natural risks” affecting the construction stage should be borne by 
SPVs.477 While public authorities may offer relief events tied to stipulated weather 
conditions (e.g. force majeure), it is generally understood that private partners are 
responsible for the “adequate provision [of]… reasonably foreseeable events such as bad 
weather during the winter, and hence… [they] should not be excused for such delays.”478 
Thus, a 0.58 ‘mostly private’ membership function alongside a smaller, yet significant, 
0.42 ‘equally shared’ membership function appears sound. 
6.9.10 Third Party Tort Liability 
mSpub(CI) = 0.0;  mMpub(CI) = 0.0;  mES(CI) = 0.38;  mMpri(CI) = 0.62; mSpri(CI) = 0.0. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, an SPV accepts risks from the public sector through 
first-step risk transfer, which is directly followed by second-step risk transfer to multiple 
																																								 																				
476 Extra-tropical areas are regions situated outside of the two geographical zones from which 
severe tropical storms originate: the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. See 
Roger G. Barry and Richard J. Chorley, Atmosphere, Weather and Climate, 8th ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 262. 
477 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” 431; Li et al., “The 
Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK, 33.” 
478 Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 260. 
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JVs throughout its consortium. Once a JV bears a risk, it may transfer a sect of its own 
risks to a third party subcontractor. This is referred to as ‘third-step risk transfer’ in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.5.1.479 When a third party breaches its project obligations (i.e. 
defaults risk back to the original risk sender), it poses financial consequences for its 
original risk sender, which is usually a private partner under the SPV consortium. Private 
parties will agree to accept this risk’s financial consequences “provided [they] can earn a 
commensurate return for accepting them.”480   
With a public sector mean score of 3.833 and a private sector mean score of 
3.083, third party tort liability risk presents a statistically significant mean score 
difference of 0.75. It is no surprise that private practitioners believe the private sector 
should be able to share a large portion of third party risks with the public sector; private 
partners have little direct influence over the ability of third parties to enact post-
contractual PRM as expected. However, it is expected that private partners perform due 
diligence on third parties they transfer risks to. Further, if private partners do transfer 
risks to third parties, it is expected that they accept the trade-off between the potential 
returns and losses with doing so.  
Thus, it is important that third party subcontractors only accept risks they are 
capable of bearing, just like JV private partners should only accept risks they are capable 
of bearing – this rule applies to all steps of risk transfer. Of course, when third party 
liability risks arise, contractual agreements do not preclude post-contractual renegotiation 
																																								 																				
479 Third parties also accept risks by way of insurance. This is a common practice for insuring 
risks in P3s. However, this study focuses on third party risks dealing with subcontractors, not 
third party insurers or financiers. See VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 
12. 
480 Ibid. 
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and mediation to account for project mishaps. For instance, the degree to which parties 
are liable for risk defaults can still be legally disputed (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1). 
Accordingly, third party tort liability risks may be shared when private partners prove: (i) 
they are not at fault for these risks occurring and (ii) due diligence measures on the third 
party in question were thorough and accurate despite of the third party’s contractual 
breach of obligations. With this in mind, this study’s private allocation of third party risks 
(i.e. mMpri[CI] = 0.62) – with an acknowledgement of their potential ‘shared’ dynamic (i.e. 
mES[CI] = 0. 38) – appears sound. 
6.10 Conclusion 
Overall, there is significant agreement between sectors over allocation preferences 
of the 27 ‘contentious’ P3 project risks identified in this study. It is important to point out 
the six risks in Figure 6.14 that hold statistically significant sectorial disagreement 
between mean ratings based on this study’s independent two-sample t-test and Mann-
Whitney U test. These risks include: (i) expropriation and nationalization, (ii) changes in 
industrial code of practice, (iii) site availability, (iv) supporting utilities risk, (v) third 
party tort liability, and (vi) exclusive right/competition. Unsurprisingly, these risks make 
up the highest six mean differences between sectors in this study.481 
 Together, these six risks average a mean sectorial difference of 1.042 on a five-
point scale. To put the level of disagreement between these six risks in perspective, the 
other 21 risks average a mean sectorial difference of 0.254 altogether. Because of their 
																																								 																				
481 One risk, ‘influential economic events,’ has the same mean difference as ‘third party tort 
liability,’ each with a mean difference of 0.75 between sectors. The former, however, passed both 
the independent two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a confidence level of 95 percent; 
the latter did not. 
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large respective mean score differences, the proposed allocation for the six risks with 
statistically significant sectorial disagreement should be viewed with degrees of 
skepticism and their allocation and mitigation strategies should be studied further in 
future studies.482 As noted in Chapter 4, mutual agreement between sectors over the 
preferred allocation of risk is seldom conclusive, hence the need for long negotiation 
periods during the P3 tender phase, which can span years before a final contract is signed. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the allocations of these 27 risks are not conclusive in the core 
literature database.483 Thus, it is unsurprising that divisive stances are held between 
sectors over the allocation of at least a portion of the risks studied.  
However – despite these risks being deemed ‘contentious’ based on the core 
literature review – according to Kendall’s W and Chi-squared tests, this study’s results 
show a high degree of overall sectorial agreement over their allocation preferences. This 
is an encouraging revelation; if ‘contentious’ risks have garnered a high amount of 
sectorial agreement between public and private practitioners, it can be assumed that 
‘sound’ risks would have garnered a high amount of sectorial allocation agreement as 
well. Thus, scholars and practitioners alike can be optimistic that the main problem of the 
principal-agent relationship between P3 partners – namely, aligning the motivations of 
public authorities and private partners – is both manageable and achievable.  
	
																																								 																				
482 In this case, because 6 of the 27 contentious risks experienced significantly different public-
private perceptions over allocation at a 95 percent confidence level, the allocation of 22.22 
percent of risks under Figure 6.14’s proposed risk allocation model must be viewed with degrees 
of skepticism.   
483 I.e. based on the core literature database, which is used as a large representative sample of P3 
risk allocation literature.  
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction   
 Chapter 6 highlights the many advantages – or rather, lack of disadvantages – 
associated with this study’s methodology compared to previous studies with similar 
scopes and focuses. Nonetheless, there are notable drawbacks to this study’s 
methodology that must be acknowledged. As is the case with all social science, this 
study’s literature reviews, theoretical framework, and research methodologies are all 
subject to degrees of subjective selection. This includes a subjective selection of covered 
P3 processes, a subjective selection of adopted stakeholder perspectives, a subjective 
selection of data to study, and a subjective selection of tools used to analyze data.  
Even the most exhaustive research projects will be faced with such selectivity 
issues. While it is important to acknowledge such research limitations, it is more 
important to assess their potential impact on findings so that future scholarly works 
continue to be built on solid empirical foundations. The following paragraphs attempt to 
acknowledge this study’s methodological and theoretical limitations to ensure that 
relevant ‘gaps’ can be filled in future studies both descriptive and prescriptive in nature. 
7.2 The Issue of Transparency  
Scholar Dennis De Clerck notes that the P3 industry is “difficult to study from an 
empirical angle due to the scarcity of data.”484 More specifically, the lack of contractual 
transparency offered from public authorities and SPVs is a “regularly reoccurring” issue 
																																								 																				
484 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 224. 
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for scholars to overcome.485 This limitation extends to all forms of P3 research to some 
degree, as even ex post evaluation studies of past projects suffer from limited access to 
contractual frameworks and public-private PRM mechanisms.486  From a theoretical level, 
the issue of transparency also poses accountability questions on the public sector 
regarding how it treats the privatization of public resources through P3s. This issue will 
be discussed in Section 7.4. 
The issue of contractual transparency, which is repeatedly mentioned in Chapter 
4, is an obstructive factor that limits research “into the human aspects of the procurement 
process” that practitioners face.487 To combat this barrier, this study utilizes the feedback 
of an expert research network to illuminate the industry’s current state of practice in 
Canada (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1).  Of course, the usefulness of expert input is 
limited to how research is conducted (i.e. data retrieval, aggregation, calculation, and 
application).  
7.3 Methodological Limitations  
This structure of this study’s questionnaire, the calculations applied to its results, 
and the structure of its proposed risk allocation decision model all present respective 
methodological limitations that must be addressed to ensure such limitations are 
considered, or at least acknowledged, in future studies of the same nature. The most 
contentious limitation, perhaps, is the use of parametric analysis on ordinal data.  
																																								 																				
485 Ibid., 37. 
486 Here, the ‘ex post evaluation’ of a P3 project entails the ex post study of a P3 that does not 
require any further DB phases. This includes: (i) P3 projects that have run the course of their 
contract lifecycles, (ii) P3 projects that have renewed project lifecycles to continue under private 
sector operation and/or maintenance, and (iii) P3 projects that are still currently under contract, 
but at the operations and/or maintenance phases. 
487 Ibid., 6-7. 
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7.3.1 The Assumed Equidistance between Ordinal Data Points 
 As mentioned in Chapter 6, the use of mean score methods on semantic 
differential scales necessitates the interval treatment of ordinal data. It is commonplace 
in academic literature to analyze scaled ordinal data under the incorrect assumption that 
distances between ordinal points are equal. Further, researchers seldom acknowledge this 
methodological mishap when it occurs in literature.488  
For example, in this study’s five-point semantic differential scale, data points 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 have a clear rank order, but by computing sample mean scores and standard 
deviations for these ordinal points, an illegitimate assumption must be made that the 
difference between points 2 and 3 (i.e. ‘mostly public’ and ‘equally shared’) are the same 
as the difference between points 3 and 4 (i.e. ‘equally shared’ and ‘mostly private’).489 
Because “the differences between any two consecutive [points on ordinal] scales [do not] 
reflect equal differences in the variable[s] measured,” parametric methods that assume 
their equidistance are inappropriately applied.490  
Literature that criticizes the treatment of ordinal scales as interval tends to focus 
on Likert scales, where a range of response categories is used to gauge respondent 
																																								 																				
488 Susan Jamieson, “Likert Scales: How to (Ab)use Them,” Medical Education, 2004, 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x; Bjorn Lantz, “Equidistance of Likert-Type Scales and 
Validation of Inferential Methods Using Experiments and Simulations,” Electronic Journal of 
Business Research Methods 11, no. 1 (2013): 16–28, doi:10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x; Li, 
“A Novel Likert Scale Based on Fuzzy Sets Theory”; Chien-Ho Wu, “An Empirical Study on the 
Transformation of Likert-Scale Data to Numerical Scores,” Applied Mathematical Sciences 1, no. 
58 (2007): 2851–62, http://www.m-hikari.com/ams/ams-password-2007/ams-password57-60-
2007/wuchienhoAMS57-60-2007.pdf. 
489 It should be noted, however, that this study makes less of an assumption over ordinal 
equidistance than traditional Likert scales because its points 1 and 5 (i.e. ‘solely public’ and 
‘solely private’) are denoted with a 100 percent association to a function – whereas points 1 and 5 
on traditional five-point Likert scales (e.g. ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’) are not. 
490 Li, “A Novel Likert Scale Based on Fuzzy Sets Theory,” 1609. 
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attitudes towards a question or statement. In a five-point Likert scale where the first 
ordinal point represents ‘strongly agree,’ for example, the fifth ordinal point would reflect 
its bipolar attitude, ‘strongly disagree.’ However, the intervals between these two points – 
which separate them between points 2, 3, and 4 – are loosely defined in such a way that it 
is illegitimate to use fractions, decimals, or any procedure involving mean scores and 
standard deviations for integers, because the space between these integers cannot be 
quantifiably measured with certainty.   
Because there are degrees of arbitrary selection over the values of ordinal data 
points and the values between ordinal data points, ordinal scales are not technically suited 
for parametric tests that assume the equidistance of their integers. Consider the point of 
Kuzon et al.:  
Just as it is invalid to rank the results of a given surgical procedure as poor, 
fair, good, or excellent and state that the average result is ‘fair and a half,’ it 
is invalid to rate those same outcomes as 1, 2, 3, or 4 and state that the 
average result is 2.5.491 
Here, Kuzon et al. are saying that the average of ‘fair’ and ‘good’ cannot be 
displayed as ‘fair-and-a-half’ even when there are integers assigned to represent ‘fair’ and 
‘good.’ Similarly, it is invalid to use a half-adjusting scale to rate a P3 project risk with a 
mean value of 2.5 as ‘mostly public.’ In response to this problem, this study utilizes 
membership degrees towards membership functions over an adjusted scale, which allows 
variables to be rated over a ‘fuzzy range’ (e.g. between 2 and 3) in lieu of an arbitrary 
																																								 																				
491 William M. Kuzon, Melanie G. Urbanchek, and Steven McCabe, “The Seven Deadly Sins of 
Statistical Analysis,” Annals of Plastic Surgery 37, no. 3 (1996): 266, doi:10.1097/00000637-
199701000-00026. 
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‘crisp value’ (e.g. 2.5) between categorical sections that are each allotted 0.8 units of 
space on a five-point scale.  
On their own, ordinal ranges succumb to the same theoretical limitations as ordinal 
crisp values; the LCL and UCL of each confidence interval still lands over the technically 
unquantifiable space between ordinal integer points. Further, terms like ‘publicness’ and 
‘privateness’ are imprecise linguistic labels that cannot be clearly defined as intervals. 
Accordingly, the ‘public’ or ‘private’ value of an integer cannot be assumed, let alone the 
area separating it from neighbouring integers.  
 However, by using these ranges to prescribe membership degrees from 0-1 towards 
membership functions mSpub, mMpub, mES, mMpri, and mSpri, data can be assessed in relation to 
its strength of association towards discrete, ordinal variables. This method captures the 
details that go into parametric statistics – albeit invalidly applied – without providing 
crisp interval values (e.g. 2.5) for ordinal data. In other words, while this study relies on 
invalid input by using mean score methods, its output runs more consistent with ordinal 
methods of measurement, which typically use the “frequencies/percentages of response[s] 
in each category.”492 In this study: (i) membership degrees are equated with the projected 
frequency or percentage of responses given by a sample pool’s population, and (ii) 
membership functions are equated with each ordinal category.493 
																																								 																				
492 Jamieson, “Likert Scales: How to (Ab)use Them,” 1217.  
493 It is understood that a limitation for this study is that: (i) invalid parametric methods had to be 
applied to arrive at membership degrees, and (ii) invalid interval-level assumptions had to be 
applied to the ordinal five-point scale to divide it evenly between five membership functions. 
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7.3.2 The Assumed Equivalue of Ordinal Data Points 
 When assuming equidistance between ordinal points on a five-point scale, it is 
also easy to overlook the assumed equivalue of these ordinal points in relation to each 
variable they are assessing. It is now understood that, in this study, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 
assumed to represent a public-private spectrum demarcated by equidistant ranges 
between integers. However, it should also be considered that 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are assumed 
to apply to all 27 contentious P3 risks universally. This issue also has to do with the 
contentious treatment of ordinal data as interval or ratio data.494  
Consider, for example, a five-point ratio scale measuring the length of different 
insects in centimeters. It is clear that an insect that is 2.5 centimeters long is half the 
length of an insect that is 5 centimeters long – this is due to a legitimate equidistance 
between data points. Not only are the data points on a ratio scale equidistant, but they 
also retain equivalue in relation to all variables they measure (e.g. whether a measured 
variable is one centimeter or a million centimeters, the size of a ‘centimeter’ always 
remains stagnant).  
Because of the aforementioned issue of assigning non-quantifiable – or inexact – 
integer values to ordinal points, the assumed stagnant – or universal – relationship 
between this study’s five-point scale and each of its P3 project risks is invalid. The 
question of assumed ordinal equivalue is really a subset of assumed ordinal equidistance, 
but it merits discussion on its own for one main reason – while both questions stem from 
																																								 																				
494 The difference between ratio data and interval data is that ratio data entails “a meaningful zero 
point representing complete lack of the characteristic.” See Kuzon, Urbanchek, and McCabe, 
“The Seven Deadly Sins of Statistical Analysis,” 266. 
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the same essential assumption, the question of data point equivalue directly confronts the 
problem of transferability between this study’s five-point scale and its variables.  
Unlike centimeters, ordinal risk allocation categories do not equally apply to 
variables they assess. For instance, a proposed ‘solely public’ allocation for force majeure 
risk has a higher potential impact cost to the government than a proposed ‘solely public’ 
allocation for weather conditions risk. Thus, where this study provides a proposed risk 
allocation decision model based on risk relationships to membership functions, these 
membership functions apply differently to different risks. The assumed universal value 
for this study’s five-point scale in relation to each of the 27 contentious P3 risks is a 
limitation that could be mitigated by adjusting the allocation model to incorporate each 
risk’s: (i) probability of occurrence and (ii) potential project impact or cost.  
Together, these risk factors could be used to arrive at a ‘risk significance’ level 
where: “Risk Significance = Risk Probability × Risk Impact.” Chan et al.’s study includes 
‘risk significance’ by finding each risk’s “probability of occurrence and severity… 
[through a] five-point Likert scale… [where] 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = average, 4 = 
high, and 5 = very high.” 495  However, Chan et al. assess each risk’s calculated 
‘significance’ and each risk’s allocation preference separately. By considering both in 
relation to one another, the ‘significance’ of risks could be used to gauge how they would 
affect the sectors associated with them. As mentioned in Chapter 4, risk probability of 
occurrence and potential project impact are two critical considerations that affect P3 
PRM and selected RMAs – including risk allocation. 
																																								 																				
495 Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership 
Projects in China,” 140.  
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7.3.3 Points of Consideration from Expert Respondents 
The participation criterion for this study is considered sound; it is assumed that all 
questionnaire respondents are qualified to provide information into the aforementioned 
‘human aspects’ of P3 procurement from their respective areas of expertise. As is usually 
the case with all questionnaire studies, a larger respondent pool would have been 
beneficial to the project. More specifically, ranges derived from each risk’s LCL and 
UCL could have been analyzed from a higher confidence level with a larger sample – it is 
hypothesized that each risk’s CI would have been shorter and thus more accurate.  
 The very last section of the questionnaire posed an optional question to 
respondents asking them to provide additional points of consideration that could not be 
made with the semantic differential scale. This question was framed to direct respondents 
towards offering ‘context dependent’ insights that may affect the treatment of certain 
risks due to the ‘situatedness’ of P3s. A common point, first brought up by esteemed P3 
practitioner Mike Marasco, was that P3 risk allocation is a largely circumstantial 
endeavor.496 While there are certain PRM ‘trends’ and patterns in the field over risk 
allocation, individual project circumstances determine specific risk allocation models. 
Despite their popularity, P3 risk allocation studies cannot account for nuanced details.497 
Other respondents echoed the same point in more specific ways. Will McDonald, 
Chief Procurement Officer at the City of Ottawa, noted that the allocation of some of the 
questionnaire’s risks was contingent on specific contract negotiations – where risks can 
																																								 																				
496 Mike Marasco is a decorated P3 practitioner with executive-level experience in both the 
Canadian public and private sector. As CEO of Plenary Concessions, a Director of the CCPPP, 
and former VP of Partnerships BC, Mike’s insights were held in high regards. 
497 Most of the core literature database’s studies focus on general risk allocation models of P3s 
without choosing a project or sector of interest. 
226	
	
be properly identified and appropriately costed. Mark Liedemann, who now occupies 
Mike Marasco’s former VP position at Partnerships BC, noted that the allocation of some 
risk undergoes planned changes over the course of a project’s lifecycle. Liedemann cites 
inflation risk as an example, which he says should be ‘solely private’ during construction 
phases and ‘solely public’ during operations phases for typical P3 DBFOM projects.498 
Brenda Liegler, Contract Innovations Engineer at the MTO, notes that this 
questionnaire’s general approach towards risk allocation made it difficult to ‘be 
definitive’ over the allocation of risks for which there may be ‘extenuating 
circumstances.’ For example, she notes that project approvals and permits risk is often 
‘solely public,’ but this risk can be affected by the activities of the private partner (i.e. the 
private partner can impact the public authority’s ability to obtain project approvals or 
permits). In such instances, even with contractual allocation to the public sector, the 
private partner may be responsible for bearing risks associated with the public retrieval of 
project approvals and permits.499  
Peter Bullen, Project Director at EllisDon Capital, also believes this study could 
have benefited from a narrowed scope of focus. For example, Bullen notes that the risk of 
project design and construction changes should be borne by the private sector when 
infrastructure does not meet standards set out in a contract’s performance specifications; 
yet, if government changes its DB specifications post-contractually, risks associated with 
design/construction changes should be borne by the public sector. He also adds that 
																																								 																				
498 The semantic differential scale questionnaire could not account for planned shifts in risk 
transfer over a timeline like Liedemann mentioned.  
499 Liegler’s point is connected to Liedemann’s in that both acknowledge the contractual 
proclivity for change in P3s. Whether future changes are anticipated or not, risk allocation is 
hardly finite upon the singing of a final P3 contract at financial close.  
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market demand change risk should be mostly or solely borne by the private sector if 
payments are toll-based, while these risks should be solely borne by the public sector if 
payments are availability-based. Both of these points are recognized in Chapter 6, 
Sections 6.8.9 and 6.9.7, respectively.  
7.3.4 Narrowing Research Scope 
In response to these claims, among others, future studies concerned with project 
risk allocation in Canadian P3 projects should develop more specific subjects of study. 
The scope of future studies could be narrowed by providing specific context to their 
questionnaires. For example, scholars could focus on the allocation of risk for specific 
projects through ex post studies, garnering expert input over the justification for risk 
allocation selections and procedures. This type of research also benefits PRM literature 
because it allows for scholars to reflect on the post-contractual management of risk, citing 
where ex ante expectations and ex post actualities align and, more importantly, where 
they fail to align.500  
Future research that does not focus on individual P3 projects may still benefit 
from selecting an industry of focus. Many studies are not confined to particular 
industries. For those that are, the transportation sector remains a heavily predominant 
topic of interest. Other areas of interest include: education, energy, healthcare, housing, 
national defence, waste management, and water provision.501 By honing in on a particular 
industry, researchers will be able to access more specialized knowledge pertaining to 
																																								 																				
500 See, for example, Samuel Carpintero and Ole Helby Petersen, “PPP Projects in Transport: 
Evidence from Light Rail Projects in Spain,” Public Money and Management 34, no. 1 (2014): 
43–50, doi:10.1080/09540962.2014.865935. 
501 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
Process,” 12. 
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specific sectors of interest and also find risk allocation patterns that may be unique to a 
given industry. For example, Chapter 6, Section 6.9.8 notes that tariff risks for already 
subsidized public utilities, like hydro, are generally borne by governments.  
7.3.5 Questionnaire Methods 
For P3 risk allocation studies that utilize expert input via questionnaire, the 
Delphi method is already commonly used to allow respondents to modify their original 
answers, taking into account the selection preferences made by their peers. Both Hwang 
et al. and Ke et al. utilize a two-round Delphi survey to allow their expert respondents to 
refine original risk allocation preferences, which in turn promotes more deliberation over 
the treatment of each risk. Delphi surveys can contain optional records of ‘why’ certain 
respondents made the original selections they did, thus allowing respondents to reflect on 
previously unconsidered points in subsequent Delphi rounds.502  
Delphi questionnaires promote the convergence of varying values held between 
different respondents. After reviewing some of the additional points of consideration 
offered by respondents in Section 7.3.3, it is clear that this study could have benefited 
from this type of indirect correspondence between respondents. This may have changed 
respondent selection preferences – albeit marginally – but the changes would have been 
based on informed consideration. The Delphi method may have also promoted higher 
agreement levels between sectors over the six aforementioned risks that did not pass the 
independent two-sample t-test or the Mann Whitney U test (i.e. the risks that showed 
statistically significant disagreement between sectors over their allocation). 
																																								 																				
502 Hwang, Zhao, and Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors, Critical 
Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors”; Ke et al., “Preferred 
Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects.” 
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Finally, contextual additions to the definitions of risks provided in the 
questionnaire would have addressed many of the respondent pool’s points of 
consideration. While it is understood that respondents assumed a DBFOM P3 model 
when answering questions over each risk, some risks were still too broad to definitively 
allocate. For example, a few respondents have noted that risks regarding project 
approvals and permits are regularly shared – defining which type of approvals and 
permits should be allocated to either sector would have made it easier for respondents to 
be more definitive in their answers.  
Conversely, some risks included in this questionnaire were too contextually 
specific in that they disregarded scenarios that would have influenced the respondent 
pool’s allocation preferences. In this study, for example, residual value risk is considered 
as the risk of public authorities receiving impaired assets from the private sector upon 
return of ownership at the end of a P3 concession period. However, residual value risk 
also applies to the devaluation of a facility that is not impaired. Generally, the former is 
denoted with a more private risk allocation than the latter.503 The omission of the latter 
consideration from this study undoubtedly influenced respondents over the allocation of 
residual value risk. 
7.3.6 Specifities of Risk Matrices  
Risk matrices are mechanisms used by both governments and private parties to 
assist in the pre-contractual PRM process. They are usually simple and qualitative in 
scope, whereby parties gauge the degree to which: (i) risks have a probability of 
occurrence and potential for impact and (ii) risks should be allocated to a party based on 
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proposed RMAs. This study – along with the other questionnaire-based studies performed 
by Chan et al., Hwang et al., Ke et al., Li et al., and Tolani – utilizes its expert 
questionnaire input to propose a risk allocation decision model (i.e. a simplified risk 
matrix). While P3 risks matrices are widely used by scholars and practitioners alike, it is 
important to acknowledge their limited application value for both parties.  
Ng and Loosemore note that scholarly risk allocation schemes have a modest 
application value to the P3 industry because they contain broad categories of risk and – 
due to their situated nature – “every [P3] projects has a different array of risks, which 
need to be thoroughly analy[z]ed and understood.” Further, risk allocation is highly 
contingent on the risk bearing capabilities – and resources – of parties, which “can vary 
considerably” between projects. Finally, these risk allocation models are static; such 
schemes do not account for the fact that RMA models can change considerably over a P3 
project’s lifecycle during post-contractual PRM.504 
In conclusion, because of their “simplified form, [risk matrices] can misrepresent 
the actual allocation of risk accomplished by both the structure and detail of the [P3] 
contract.” For example, where risks are denoted with a ‘shared’ allocation preference 
between public and private partners, risk matrices provide little detail regarding the 
intricacies of sharing such risks.505 With these considerations in mind, the VDTF notes 
																																								 																				
504 Ng and Loosemore, “Risk Allocation in the Private Provision of Public Infrastructure,” 5. 
505 E.g. Figure 6.14 suggests an ‘equally shared’ allocation for environmental risks, but this does 
not provide insight into which specific environmental risks are borne by which party or to which 
degree. 
231	
	
that a project’s “contract and… structure, not the matrix, are the tools by which risk 
allocation is achieved.”506 
Unfortunately, it is difficult for scholars to obtain transaction-specific agreements 
made behind the closed doors of P3 negotiations. Thus, scholars are continually limited 
in obtaining empirical data to propose risk allocation decision models via risk matrices. 
One means of mitigating this issue, but not circumventing it completely, is to conduct ex 
post analyses of P3 projects where public authorities can provide public documents tied 
to contractual agreements for the public to view. Albeit, such documents will not reflect 
project terms and conditions to the same degree as final contracts, but they will allow 
scholars to develop more specific risk allocation decision models based on the PRM 
measures adopted over the course of specific P3 projects.  
7.4 Theoretical Limitations 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the majority of P3 literature – whether focusing on 
the positives and negatives of P3s, the key ex post success factors of P3s, or risk 
identification, assessment, and allocation, among others – adopts a public stakeholder 
perspective either implicitly or explicitly. Due to the aforementioned issue of contractual 
transparency, in which projects are mired in secrecy, “significantly less studies… solely 
focus on the private side of… agreement… [because] private empirical data are scare and 
the SPVs are often reluctant to share information about their strategies.” Even less 
attention is paid to third party subcontracting, where an SPV’s JVs delegate tasks through 
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third-step risk transfer. De Clerck notes that, nevertheless, “the public-private 
relationship… is a well-studied perspective.”507  
More often than not – however – even when scholars adopt a public-private 
stakeholder perspective, they implicitly adopt public-sector bias in their analysis. 
Scholars associate government losses with project losses, evaluating PRM processes and 
RMA decisions through the lens of the public sector. For example, despite explicitly 
adopting a public-private stakeholder perspective, Li et al.’s questionnaire-based study on 
risk allocation states that their research findings “should enable public sector clients to 
establish more efficient risk allocation frameworks.”508 It is unsurprising that scholars are 
charitable towards the public sector. After all, governments are meant to be a reflection of 
the general public’s greater interests. Therein lies the rub, however – scholars should not 
assume that governments act in accordance with the general public’s interests merely 
because that is their purpose.  
This is not to say that scholars do not criticize government management of P3 
transactions (e.g. strategic behaviour leading to optimism bias and adverse selection). In 
fact, there are several that repeatedly do.509  However, such acknowledgements are 
generally confined to studies or commentaries where government criticisms are the focal 
point of consideration. For studies that consider P3 risk allocation from a public-private 
																																								 																				
507 De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender 
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UK,” 25. 
509 Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere”; 
Graeme A. Hodge and Carsten Greve, “Public-Private Partnerships: An International 
Performance Review,” Public Administration Review 67, no. 3 (2007): 545–58, 
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stakeholder perspective, principal-agent issues like moral risk are often not accounted 
for.510 When they are accounted for, these issues are generally denoted with the private 
sector when scholars implicitly adopt a public stakeholder perspective. This portion of P3 
literature still recognizes principal-agent issues like moral hazards and asymmetric 
information sharing, but only to the extent that private partners can affect governments 
through strategic or pernicious behaviour.511   
The scholarly tendency towards adopting a public stakeholder perspective, at least 
explicitly, is not the issue at hand. The issue is doing so without acknowledging that the 
respective ‘gains and losses’ of government do not necessary align with the gains and 
losses of taxpayers. Both are distinct actors with distinct motivations. Recall from 
Chapter 3 that P3s are fundamentally documents governed by principal-agent 
relationships. This implies a relationship between two main parties: the public principals 
and the private agents. There is a third dynamic to this relationship, however, that 
Chapter 3, and a large portion of P3 literature, fails to consider – citizens themselves.  
Taxpayers are an important party involved in the P3 transaction – they are the 
very reason public infrastructure is procured to begin with. By implicitly aligning their 
gains and losses alongside those of public stakeholders, scholars can fail to recognize that 
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governments are capable of opportunism and strategic behaviour themselves. More 
importantly, when governments employ strategic practices, it can be against taxpayers 
themselves, not just SPVs. Hence, the final limitation of this study – as well as the final 
recommendation for future researchers – is theoretical in nature: the public sector and its 
taxpayers must be demarcated as separate P3 players, even when assessing risk allocation 
from a public-private stakeholder perspective. 
7.4.1 Public-Choice Approach to Agency Theory 
In the same vein as this thesis, Tolani – whose research is part of this study’s core 
literature review – also: (i) notes the principal-agent relationship between public 
authorities and SPVs and (ii) utilizes an expert questionnaire to extract data on risk 
allocation preferences using psychometrics. However, Tolani also finds that, depending 
on the theoretical framework used to analyze P3s, public authorities can be viewed as 
principals and agents:  
Theoretically, in P[3]s, the private firm is an agent for the public 
organization, in providing a piece of infrastructure, and the public 
organization is an agent for the consumers, who finance the public 
organization through taxes and fees. Thus, the public organization is 
accountable to the customers of its own agent. It, therefore, has a 
responsibility to ensure that the agent acts in the best interests of the 
consumers.512 
This perception of the principal-agent relationship between public authorities, SPVs, and 
consumers is significant because it highlights a reality that is often ignored in P3 
literature – regardless of contractual allocations, P3s are ultimately accountable to the 
general public. 
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 Remember from Chapter 3, general principles of agency theory adopt the 
assumption that both principals and agents are self-interested actors – both seek to 
maximize their utility. Thus, when their agendas do not align, their cooperation may be 
compromised. While much of Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the problem of aligning private 
agent interests with public principals, both chapters – along with the majority of P3 
literature – ignore the fact that public authorities are agents to the general public. More 
specifically, both chapters ignore the fact that a public authority’s interests may not 
always align with the general public’s interests.513 This previously unconsidered issue 
coalesces agency theory principles with public-choice theory principles. 
Reverting back to Chapter 3’s introductory paragraph, neoclassical economics is 
credited as the predominant field from which many P3 theory frameworks hold their 
roots. Because P3s operate simultaneously under a political, social, and economic realm, 
they stand to benefit from assessment under a neoclassical economic framework that 
includes political, social, and economic theory. Public-choice theory, also referred to as a 
“neoclassical theory of politics,” is a strand of neoclassical economic theory that adopts 
the same principle assumption as agency theory: “the assumption of egoistic 
rationality.”514 Rui Sousa Monteiro notes that, from a public-choice perspective, P3 
players are self-interested and self-motivated. When assessing principal-agent 
relationships through public-choice theory, scholars recognize: (i) that the government’s 
interests may not always align with their principals – i.e. taxpayers – and (ii) that 
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“Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere”; Monteiro, “Risk Management.” 
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taxpayers have little influence in aligning government agent interests with their own 
principal interests.515  
By hierarchically demarcating taxpayers and governments via agency theory, 
Tolani recognizes taxpayers as distinct principal actors that should, theoretically, hold 
self-interested government agents accountable for their actions.516 However, taxpayers 
experience a comparatively larger separation between ownership and control with 
governments than governments experience with SPVs. 517  Thus, the potential for 
principal-agent issues between taxpayers and public authorities is expounded. In theory, 
taxpayers are “owners” (principals) and governments are “managers” (agents).518 In 
practice, however, government officials – as self-interested agents – can go unchecked in 
adopting strategic behaviour. This leaves room for moral hazards to ensue. 
To demonstrate the potential for public authorities to employ strategic behaviour 
– as agents – against taxpayers during P3 procurement projects, Monteiro cites economist 
William Nordhaus’ public-choice research on political business cycles. Nordhaus 
“assumes myopic voters, and sees politicians as having no long-term view and as anxious 
to maximize short term re-election prospects.” Politicians, being self-interested agents 
acting on behalf of the general public, “present a utility that is a function of both the 
																																								 																				
515 Albeit, he does so without explicitly mentioning agency theory. Nonetheless, his insights 
implicitly denote principal-agent relationships. See Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 264-265. 
516 At least in democratic states, where public officials are elected representatives – i.e. agents – 
acting on behalf of citizens – i.e. principals. 
517 See Figure 3.1 for agency theory’s general principle of progressive separation between control 
and power for principals. 
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public interest and [their] own personal interests.” 519  From a public-choice perspective, 
public policy decisions can be mired in personal interests issues with politicians, 
bureaucrats, and private practitioners that seek to maximize power or profits – even at the 
expense of accruing future public debt at a suboptimal rate.  
According to public-choice theory, opportunism can harm public sector PRM in 
two broad ways: first, from the standard opportunistic behaviour of politicians, who are 
“looking for the benefits they can get from being in power”;520 second, from politicians 
with a “willingness to work for the benefit of the population, but who, having [little] 
statesperson profile… perceive voters as short-memory myopic people, and so cannot 
stop considering the coming elections (and not the future of the country) as the main 
goal.”521 Monteiro especially considers the latter factor in assessing public sector PRM 
for P3s. He adopts a Nordhausian approach to the political-cycle and notes its affects on 
the ‘authenticity’ of public sector PRM for infrastructure procurement.  
Public-choice theory dictates that the political-cycle can affect political behaviour 
because politicians face annual budgetary constraints while simultaneously being 
expected to produce services and infrastructure for the general public. As self-interested 
																																								 																				
519 Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 264. 
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agents, politicians are most concerned with voters’ perceptions of them, especially during 
upcoming election periods. In an effort to maximize the probability of winning elections, 
they may “launch all public projects that present benefits for the users, even without 
financial resources to do so.” Because of public deficits and debts, politicians can utilize 
P3s as a short-term means of circumventing budgetary constraints while providing 
additional infrastructural services. This general issue of the political-cycle puts a 
premium on delivering projects through private financing (i.e. P3s), even at the expense 
of optimal “production allocations.”522 
For example, a project might achieve better allocative efficiency in the long-term 
when procured through a conventional procurement model than through a P3 DBFOM 
model – due to factors like avoiding expensive competitive selection and tender processes 
– but, because the conventional model would require immediate public financing, the 
proposed project may seem more viable in the short-term when procured through a 
privately financed P3. If political emphasis is placed on ensuring P3 procurement is 
adopted for a particular project, P3 screening and PSC stages may be compromised and 
tailored to present VFM for P3s regardless of what is the optimal choice.523   
7.4.2 Holding the Taxpayer’s Agent Accountable 
Regarding the authenticity of the public sector’s VFM assessments, Hodge and 
Greve claim “it is difficult to obtain clear evidence… in the absence of an accurate and 
uncontroversial public sector comparator.” They claim PSCs may suffer from optimism 
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bias “and are qualified to the extent that [public] managers may have aimed to report 
cost-saving… for political reasons, knowing that outcomes for long-term contracts are 
always uncertain.” 524 Regarding the United Kingdom’s PFI, which has encouraged P3-
esque practices for decades, scholars George Monbiot and Jean Shaoul have been openly 
critical of government PSCs and VFM appraisals. Shaoul also notes the aforementioned 
issue of transparency – she cites a general lack of contractual transparency for P3s 
preventing in-depth evaluations for projects.525 
Monbiot charged the government with failing to uphold the interests of its 
citizens, labeling P3s as “public fraud and false accounting… commissioned and directed 
by the Treasury.”526 Shaoul's most peculiar evidence for biased VFM methodology cites 
multiple cases where PSCs present a VFM case for P3s mainly on the base of risk 
transfer, but – “ironically” – these cases rest on almost the exact amount of risk transfer 
needed to ‘tip the balance’ for P3 procurement in lieu of conventional models. She also 
cites scandals over the refinancing of P3 arrangements where taxpayers have borne risks 
defaulted from the private sector back to the government.527 These criticisms appear 
bolstered by the fact that specialized crown corporations, like Partnerships BC, influence 
public policy initiatives, creating “a need for clearer separation of policy advocacy from 
the stewardship responsibilities of public funds.”528 
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In situations where P3s would show ‘authentic’ VFM over conventional 
procurement models, it is not guaranteed that the public sector’s main priorities are 
optimal risk and resource allocation (i.e. in lieu of pushing to get projects into motion). 
Thus, public sector PRM during P3 tender phases may suffer: “politicians may reduce 
their concerns with project assessment and assume that more important than selecting the 
best projects is delivering the maximum number of projects.”529 For instance, government 
officials can be guilty of optimism bias in selecting RMAs for risks with a preferred 
proponent regardless of if SPVs adopt strategic behaviour or not.530 Flyvberg et al. make 
a bold claim:  
Underestimation today is in the same order of magnitude as it was 10, 30, 
and 70 years ago. If techniques and skills for estimating and forecasting 
costs of transportation infrastructure projects have improved over time, 
this does not show in the data. No learning seems to take place in this 
important and highly costly sector of public and private decision making… 
Strong incentives and weak disincentives for underestimation may have 
taught… that cost underestimation pays off.531 
The authors provide several explanations for predicaments of this vein, where risks are 
identified and acknowledged but continually underestimated. Of note in this chapter is 
their criticism of public officials, whose mismanagement of risk transfer may be 
premised on biased forecasts. Flyvberg et al. argue that both politicians and political 
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consultants share an inclination for downplaying the expected costs of large public 
infrastructure procurement and overplaying expected revenue projections with the goal of 
increasing the prospect of obtaining legal authorization for projects.532 
7.4.3 Increased Transparency and Accountability: A Recommendation for All 
It is difficult to take a definitive stance on the validity of VFM-based arguments 
for P3s, both nationally and internationally, in the absence of transparent, uncontroversial 
PSCs. This rings especially true if cost-savings and successes are reported for political 
reasons due to strategic behaviour or optimism bias. Perhaps this is why P3s are subject 
to displays of remarkably juxtaposing commentary. The Canadian model of P3s has been 
dubbed “one of the most successful in the world” by Hellowell.533 On the other hand, 
Louise Bowman candourously described Canadian P3s – which are also referred to as 
PPPs – as a “Problem, Problem, Problem.”534 
 It is not the purpose of this chapter to criticize the P3 procurement process. In 
fact, there is strong evidence both domestically and abroad that, when risks are 
transferred optimally and successfully, P3s deliver infrastructure on time and on budget 
with significant design innovations from the private sector.535 For a summary of the main 
benefits P3s can provide to Canadian taxpayers, refer to Figure 1.1.  
																																								 																				
532 Ibid., 289-290. 
533 Hellowell, “Public-Private Partnerships: What the World Can Learn from Canada.” 
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Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada”; Michael Pollitt, “Learning 
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What is at stake, however, is the question of government accountability towards 
taxpayers under their principal-agent relationship. It is important to study and research 
the allocation and subsequent management of P3 risk through a public-choice perspective 
that acknowledges agency theory’s ties to both public-private and public-taxpayer 
relations. If scholars adopt such theory frameworks, they can research the P3 
procurement process – e.g. P3 screenings, VFM measures, PRM strategies, and RMA 
methods – holistically, considering all relevant stakeholders involved.  
Where public agents do not enact strategic behaviour, the issue of transparency – 
and an overall scarcity of accessible data – still remains. Stewardship of public officials 
on behalf of taxpayer interests should demand governments address this “evaluation 
deficit” so scholars can study primary data instead of, for instance, questionnaire input.536  
Scholars attempt to circumvent this issue through Freedom of Information requests, but 
governments can still withhold crucial documentation when presented with them.537 In 
fact, “in Canada, most freedom of information legislation does not apply to public-private 
partnerships.”538  
Thus, even when scholars recognize the distinction between adopting a public 
stakeholder perspective and a taxpayer stakeholder perspective, their studies will be 
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(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 207–30. 
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International Experience, ed. Graeme Hodge and Carsten Greve (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
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limited to the degree governments cooperate with them. A redeeming sanction to this 
issue may be found in the form of independent government auditors like the OAG. 
However, even independent auditors of federal and provincial governments face 
challenges to their core functions as watchdogs. In the words of Bruce Doern, the OAG is 
“an indispensible part of the accountability chain. However… the OAG… delicate[ly] 
balance[s] between its media-related public persona as the taxpayers’ white knight and its 
private day-to-day need to gain trust from dozens of government departments.”539  
This internal contradiction is one of several limitations to the OAG’s role as a 
watchdog – the most important being its limited ability to affect the mismanagement of 
public resources. Michael Ferguson, Canada’s current Auditor General, recently cited the 
OAG’s limited impact on the Federal Government of Canada in light of its continual 
failure to act on repeated OAG recommendations: “Our audits come across the same 
problems in different organizations time and time again. Even more concerning is that, 
when we come back to audit the same area again, we often find that program results have 
not improved.”540 In the same vein as this chapter, Ferguson has relayed the question: 
“What about programs that are managed to accommodate the people running them rather 
than the people receiving the services?” Further, he states that the Federal Government is 
guilty of issuing “public accountability reports that fail to provide a full and clear picture 
of what is going on.”541  
																																								 																				
539 Bruce Doern, Public Budgeting in Canada: Politics, Economics and Management (Ottawa, 
ON: Carleton University Press, 1991), 220. 
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Increased principal-agent cooperation between governments and taxpayers is no 
small feat. As previously mentioned, the ambiguous role of public authorities – as agents 
to the taxpayer and principals to the private sector – presents governments with a special 
conflict of interest. They must advocate policies, develop economies, and regulate private 
DBFOM, all while acting as elected representatives of the public interest. Hodge and 
Greve neatly summarize the aforementioned detractors from a healthy principal-agent 
relationship between taxpayers and governments, most of which impede scholars from 
accessing crucial data:  
… the unavailability of project economic evaluations, the fact that most 
deals are two-way affairs between governments and business without 
explicitly including citizens… the apparent willingness to protect investor 
returns rather than the public interest, the lack of clarity of commercial 
arrangements, and the desire of governments to proceed with hasty project 
construction for political purposes all appear to contribute to this 
conclusion.542 
Because of the aforementioned considerations, scholarly acknowledgment of the 
unique principal-agent role governments play in P3s is not enough to bypass contractual 
secrecy issues. Scholars will continue to face problems retrieving empirical data for the 
study of P3 risk allocation and P3 PRM as a whole. The only foreseeable means of fixing 
this issue at large is to change legislation frameworks to account for transparency issues. 
Thus, this thesis’ theoretical recommendations apply not only to scholars, but P3 
practitioners themselves – particularly public officials, whose PSCs, VFM assessments, 
and contractual arrangements are criticized for lacking transparency and, at times, 
disingenuously promoting the interests of taxpayers. P3s require good governance after 
all, and good government – if anything – is an effective and accountable government. 
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7.5 Conclusion  
 This thesis provides both descriptive and prescriptive passages on the P3 
procurement process. Its literature reviews: (i) summarize the main stages of P3 
procurement, (ii) provide theoretical frameworks to assess risk and stakeholder 
motivations, (iii) explain project risk management methodologies, and (iv) cross-examine 
risk allocation literature to arrive at a catalogue of ‘contentious’ P3 project risks. Its study 
presents findings on the risk allocation preferences of P3 practitioners through an expert 
research network split evenly between the public and private sector. Its final risk 
allocation decision model, based on privileged industry insight, is provided in Figure 
6.14. The risk allocation recommendations this thesis offers would benefit from 
inspection with reference to past industrial risk allocation schemes in order to validate its 
claims. Further, risks with statistically significant sectorial disagreement should be 
studied more in depth.  
Both the research’s subject matter and methodology are applicable to a wide array 
of academic disciplines. This work contributes to infrastructure procurement literature in 
general, particularly PRM literature concerning P3 and P3-esque infrastructure projects 
(e.g. AFP and PFI models). P3 PRM literature tends towards merely empirical studies 
without reference to theoretical frameworks. This thesis’ theoretical dimension provides 
an explanatory function for both: (i) the separate motivations of public and private 
partners over the treatment of risk and (ii) the restrictive regulations that govern 
contractual agreements, which are mired in secrecy. While this acknowledgment alone 
does not circumvent the issue of data scarcity, it does highlight areas where industry 
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standards can improve to promote cooperation and transparency between all relevant P3 
players under a principal-agent relationship, including taxpayers.  
 This thesis’ relevant subject matter and methodology need not be confined to the 
broad parameters typically denoted with P3 risk allocation literature. Other scholars who 
focus on P3 PRM – and risk allocation in particular – should consider narrowing the 
scope of future questionnaires to develop more refined and specific risk allocation 
decision models that focus on particular P3 delivery models, sectors of interests, stages of 
lifecycles, or individual projects. This, in turn, would provide more conclusive results 
when presenting proposed risk allocation decision models. 
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